Protests called a Global Day of Action, a march for action on climate change, in Durban, South Africa, on December 3, 2011. (Photo by: tcktcktck, Global Campaign for Climate Action)

By Climatico Contributor: Shira Honig

With the Durban climate change negotiations barely a week old, key countries are drawing their “red line” positions in the sand.

On one side of the line, where the Group of 77 (G77) + China and other developing countries firmly sit, is a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol that continues binding targets for current country signatories after the first period expires at the end of 2012 (excluding Canada, which has announced that it is pulling out of the treaty altogether). On the other is a European Union plan for a new global agreement with binding targets for all countries beginning in 2015 and in force by 2020.

Emerging today is the news that India has rejected the EU plan for a new treaty.

Leading up to Durban, the EU said it was willing to consider an extension of the current Kyoto Protocol commitments, in exchange for a broader international agreement to begin in 2015, with emerging economies under the same binding targets as western industrialized countries. Since the first day of the negotiations, Poland, who currently holds the revolving EU presidency, has clearly stated that a “Kyoto II” could be a part of a transition to a wider, post-Kyoto agreement.

Before India announced its opposition, China had already rejected the plan, saying that a new mandate before the Bali Roadmap was complete was “too much.” China, which so far has spoken on behalf of both the G77 and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) – which has concerned some negotiators – remains firm in its opposition to binding cuts at the international level. It maintains that it is pressing ahead with ambitious national plans to cut emissions, increase energy efficiency and renewable production, and decrease deforestation.

India’s rejection of the EU plan brings the opposition level to three countries, including the United States. Like China, India maintains its current position of not committing to legally binding emissions cuts. The U.S. maintains its own position that China and India must accept legally binding cuts like other western countries. Only then would it consider a new treaty. In an interview, U.S. negotiator Jonathan Pershing deflected the issue, saying that until resistance from India and China to the EU plan abates, it is not prepared to take on legally binding obligations.

Meanwhile, in its own interviews, the EU has expressed frustration that its significant efforts to reduce emissions and provide climate finance – the most ambitious of western blocs and countries – have gone unrecognized. As in Copenhagen, where it was shut out of a final deal negotiated by the U.S. and the BASIC countries, it finds itself rejected again.

Without a move on these red-line positions from one country or another, a compromise deal is unlikely. Senior ministers and heads of state will join the negotiations on Dec. 6.

By Climatico Director: Paige Andrews

Canada takes first Fossil of the Day at COP17 (Source: Adopt a Negotiator)

On Monday, Environment Minister Peter Kent announced that Canada “will not make a second commitment to Kyoto.” In addition, Canada will no longer take steps to cut greenhouse gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol and may begin to formally withdraw from the agreement next month. In place of the Protocol, Canada’s goal is for “a new international agreement, eventually binding, which would include all the major developed and developing emitters.”

Canada’s withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol would make it the first nation to do so after its ratification. Although Kyoto provisions are set to expire at the end of 2012, this action on the part of Canada would demonstrate a symbolic blow to the UN climate process which has already been weakened by Party divisions.

The fate of Kyoto, the only legally binding accord that specifies reductions in greenhouse gases, has proven to be the source of much tension at the annual climate talks taking place through next week in Durban, South Africa.

Canada’s announcement angered poor nations who say that rich nations are reneging on pledges made when the protocol was signed 14 years ago.

“For countries that are historically responsible for the problem to explicitly back out would undermine the process and the credibility of what we are trying to do,” stated Seyni Nafo, spokesman for the Africa Group in Durban. “How are we to going to ask India and China to do more when Canada is saying, ‘OK, we’re checking out of the Kyoto Protocol?”

Since the election of Conservative Stephen Harper as Canada’s Prime Minister in 2006, Canada’s government has demonstrated weakening support for binding emissions reductions, stating that it had no intention of complying with Kyoto and arguing that it was too ambitious and not applied fairly.

“The Canadian government is looking for every escape possible to avoid the consequences of inaction in the face of dangerous climate change and to ensure they can expand the tar sands as projected,” said Hannah McKinnon of Climate Action Network Canada.

Canada’s announcement signifies a growing trend away from any agreement that fails to include big polluters such as the United States and China. In addition to Canada’s potential withdrawal, Japan and Russia have similarly confirmed that they will not renew their commitment to Kyoto and the European Union, a consistent supporter of the Protocol, has hinted that its continued support may be conditional.

Developed countries are not alone in their hesitation about the Protocol. China, the world’s leading greenhouse gas emitter, has also refused to commit to new binding targets, arguing that it wants to see developed countries to act first and follow through with their commitments.

“If we cannot get a decision for the future of the second commitment period, the whole international system on climate change will be placed in peril,” China’s lead negotiator Su Wei told news agencies. “If the Kyoto Protocol is devoid of any further commitment period, the Kyoto Protocol itself will be dead.”

The timing of Canada’s announcement on Day 1 of COP17 in Durban has led to questions about Canada’s role and credibility in the negotiations, as well as its ability to influence international policy.  Should other countries follow Canada’s lead, the talks in Durban may result in a series of voluntary pledges, rather than a legally-binding international agreement. 

EB at COP17, Durban. Source: UNFCCC

By Climatico Contributor: Roddy Boyd

The fate of the Clean Development Mechanism, the most robust and successful United Nations’ instrument to fight climate change, hangs in the balance at the 17^th Conference of the Parties. It risks being used as a negotiating ‘chip’ in the penultimate COP before the Kyoto Protocol’s (KP’s) first commitment period ends. A leading climate change NGO explained that the KP is expected to ‘emerge alive from the conference, but it will be on life support.”

Along with Japan, Russia and the United States who have all said that extending the commitments after 2012 is not possible without industrialised countries taking targets, it surfaced that Canada may even withdraw their ratification and participation in the KP before the end of this year: an accusation that they are yet to refute. If it is true, it could have wide ranging consequences for future negotiations.

Hurdles from ‘Further Commitments’

As we covered before Durban began, expectations of any successes with respect to the KP’s CDM and Joint Implementation were low. Even an acknowledgment that they may continue to live without the KP would be seen as an achievement.

It seemed, however, that whenever the Ad-hoc Working Group for the KP (AWG-KP) discussed ‘Further Commitments’, the rift between Annex I, emerging economies and non-Annex I countries was ever present.

Almost as a warning, many developing countries are pushing for another commitment period and highlighting that the CDM would not be possible without one, with the vulnerable Small Island States demanding a new commitment period within a year.

Even though the KP has no clear termination clause, any extension to its bodies and mechanisms will need UNFCCC COP approval. China and Brazil therefore stepped up to explain that it is ‘inconceivable’ to have the CDM [and JI] without the KP, and that they would vote to block such an extension. It was suggested that developing countries could end up ‘restricting access’ to CDM offsets if a second commitment period is not reached.

Because China represents around 60% of the total offsets issued so far and to some extent drives the price with its floor price for CERs, this move would worry investors in the CDM by facing large degrees of uncertainty on its future. Already, record low market prices and risks from limitations on what CERs are accepted for compliance under the EU ETS are driving interest elsewhere.

The EU has also been involved with discussing potential ‘new’ market mechanisms for offsetting emissions, by using ‘national policy baselines’ as a means to standardise and measure offsets from national emission trajectories. In doing so, Japan’s case for a non-UNFCCC mechanism could become possible.

Executive Board Reports

Meanwhile, the COP listened to an update on progress from the CDM regulatory body, the Executive Board. As well as explaining the EB’s successful efforts to streamline approval processes, generate simpler additionality guidelines, and continue work on standardised baselines for methodologies, the EB chair reiterated that uncertainty surrounding the CDM post-2012 is potentially a crippling factor to progress.

In an effort to encourage deployment of the CDM to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), a CDM loan scheme was launched this week, expected to be operational within a few months. It was first discussed in Copenhagen COP15 negotiations, and now has a fund around $4.4 million (USD). For countries that have less than 10 registered projects registered in the CDM, loans can be provided to projects in order to cover their feasibility studies, validation and registration expenses which can sometimes lead into the tens of thousands of USD.

The move can be seen as a positive one, in that it could kick start many new CDM projects. The EU is a strong supporter of LDC CERs. After 2012, strict limitations will mean only certain types of CERs will be allowed for compliance in the emissions trading scheme – those from LDCs being eligible until 2020.

As the CDM moves slowly forward, negotiations look like the KP is having a smaller and smaller impact. As Point Carbon points out, if the US had ratified the KP in the first place, the KP may have covered half of the world’s emissions. Without the US, and adding other Annex I countries like Japan, Russia and Canada along with many non-Annex I followers to the list of non-KP supporters, a second commitment period could potentially see only 15% of the world’s emissions. This means that the scope of the CDM could reduce dramatically.

If the CDM is seen in isolation from the KP, further work on its life post-2012 could be possible. At the moment, further commitments (nevertheless) bring the COP to a standstill.

Smoke stacks (Source: UNFCCC)

By Climatico Contributor: Roddy Boyd

As the 17^th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC kicks off in Durban this week, negotiators hope to build upon progress made during 2011 to govern the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) more effectively. Coupled with the positive sentiment that has been seeping from recent negotiations en route to Durban via largely pre-negotiated texts, progress is expected but expectations remain low.

Seeking clarity

The CDM has been in transition for some time. While it has grown substantially since 2005, with 3,600 projects in 81 countries now registered and some 780 million tonnes of carbon mitigation generated, a cloud of uncertainty looms as only 13 months remain until the end of the first commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol (KP).

The CDM and JI will continue so long as the KP remains legally binding, but there is a lack of clarity in the KP’s legal provisions for the mechanisms beyond the first commitment period.  Fortunately, the KP has no specific mention of a ‘termination’ clause, and therefore its mechanisms and bodies cannot simply (legally) disappear after 2012, but uncertainties make for difficult market conditions for investors and other stakeholders.

The head of the UNFCCC, Christiana Figueres, has spent a good part of the year since COP16 in Cancun remaining optimistic about the future of the CDM and JI. “It is evident that there is uncertainty with respect to the future of the [CDM] market or markets for one very simple reason: the carbon market stems from a political agreement… the CDM has been improved, reinforced and enhanced constantly since its birth and that process will continue. The CDM will not drop off a cliff.”

Alternative mechanisms?

While the flexibility mechanisms may be able to survive, some are considering the potential to fill in current and pending gaps with the introduction of alternative mechanisms to the CDM and JI. These alternatives may garner some attention during the conference in Durban, including a proposal from Japan for a new carbon offset mechanism that does not contain the political nature of the CDM.

Initially launched in South East Asia, Japan’s bilateral offset carbon mechanism turns attention toward African countries where only 2% of all projects registered are currently based (see Climatico article for more information), and pays particular attention to 12 countries with little or no development in offset projects. Although the lack of CDM projects based in Africa has received little attention during negotiations thus far, with an African country hosting this year’s COP, it may be the right time to make much needed progress.

Expectations for Durban

Any negotiating time left for the Parties to put together a meaningful plan for post-2012 considerations of Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms is quickly slipping away. However, major breakthroughs regarding extending, or more crucially not extending, the Kyoto Protocol and its commitments are not expected to take place in Durban. Many developed countries remain staunchly against extending a commitment period without similar emission targets for the major developing economies (India, China, etc.) who themselves are arguing for a new and additional binding agreement that is inclusive of the United States.

This sentiment was further concreted after the Guardian this week revealed that ‘rich nations’, led by the EU, have quietly admitted that no new global deal would be reached by 2012, a target date established two years ago at the COP conference in Copenhagen. Instead they aim for a roadmap to be developed in Durban that now targets 2015 for a deal.

It is likely then that there will be a gap of some sort between the KP and Long-term Cooperative Action (LCA) tracks. Even if an extension (or otherwise) to the KP is agreed upon in Durban, UNFCCC processes will take more than one year to complete. Previous negotiations focused largely on a second commitment period, taken up first by the AWG-KP, then largely by the LCA (because it is here that the US attends who are viewed by many, including China, as a ‘must have’ for any further commitments). The negotiations will once again take up this point of view, but the flexibility mechanisms may be relegated to a bystander position within the discussions.

Negotiations surrounding the flexibility mechanisms in Durban will therefore likely include: clarification of the roles for the mechanisms, discussion of whether other less prescriptive and legally demanding mechanisms to reduce emissions may exist, and identifying where the CDM and JI fit in with other operational mechanisms such as REDD+, National Appropriate Mitigation Actions, and Climate Finance.

Breakthroughs for the flexible mechanisms in Durban may not be expected, but progress will remain an important ingredient in any outcomes from the COP. As Figueres affirms, “Let’s work hard to find a common, effective way forward, and let’s recognize and build on our successes as they come. The CDM is an important success that Parties need to build on in Durban, with text that reaffirms the mechanism’s continuing usefulness in the international response to climate change.” 

The International Conference Centre in Durban, South Africa, venue of the COP17 climate change negotiations. (Photo by: Karen Lotter/Ethekwini)

By Climatico Contributor: Shira Honig

Heading into Durban and the United Nations Climate Change Conference, otherwise known as the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP-17), the G77 remains committed to its long-standing position of achieving a legally binding agreement. Given the ongoing stalemate between developed and developing countries, however, many media accounts say they are unlikely to achieve it anytime soon.

Chief among its goals, the G77 is seeking a “Kyoto II,” a second commitment period that kicks in when the current commitment phase in Kyoto expires at the end of next year.

Developed countries such as the United States and Japan, meanwhile, remain committed to their own long-standing position of refusing to accept their own legally binding targets without also including binding commitments from major emerging economies such as China and India. For its part, India in recent months has consistently refused to commit to legally binding emissions cuts without more commitments from the U.S. Alongside this, several developed countries have attempted to downplay expectations for a treaty before 2015 or even 2020, angering many in the G77 who are urgently seeking international support to deal with climate change impacts.

The G77 is a loose coalition of developing countries founded in 1964 that has now grown to 132 members. Such large numbers inevitably lead to different positions within the group, with some members splintering off into other smaller regional blocs of which they may also be members, such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) or the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). At the same time, larger numbers mean greater negotiating strength, and the G77 maintains several collective positions, including the desire for a Kyoto II. The BASIC countries issued a joint statement early November calling for a second commitment period.  

Another of G77’s main goals, and a sticking point heading into Durban, relates to climate financing flows from developed to developing countries. The G77 is looking for progress on implementation of the Green Climate Fund, as agreed to in Cancún at COP-16 last year.

Many of its members are largely distrustful of western promises for financing, and with good reason. The rules governing development aid have long been opaque and bureaucratic, with countless requirements that developing countries generally do not have the capacity to meet. In the current round of climate negotations, at least some of what developed countries promised as “new and additional” funding through the Copenhagen Accord has not been proven to be new or additional. For example, following an announcement early November that European Union finance ministers would provide $5.5-billion in short-term funding, criticisms came from NGOs such as Oxfam, to developing country ministers, such as India’s new environment minister, Jayanthi Natarajan, who said the money was merely repackaged aid. While such criticisms are fair, today’s economic crisis in Europe – and threatening to spread far beyond – poses a critical threat to both short and long-term climate funding.

As host of COP-17, G77 member South Africa is looking for ways to minimize the ongoing rift. Its negotiators have called in Valli Moosa, former Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and now the chairperson of the board of the World Wide Fund for Nature in South Africa, to advise the South African delegation and ease tensions between countries.

With its international clout, China is also seeking ways to bring parties together.  Xie Zhenhua, China’s chief negotiator whose influence was evident in the pivotal – and negotiators would say, negative – role he played in Copenhagen, is encouraging emerging economies to increase their own commitments. Xie is asking them to present national plans that may not be legally binding under Kyoto, but that at least show they are serious about reducing emissions at the national level. It is not clear at this point whether G77 members will buy into the plan, or whether it will satisfy the U.S. and other developed countries as being enough.  

Perhaps unintentionally, Xie’s idea is similar to those of U.S. chief climate change envoy Todd Stern, who was reported as saying this past spring in New York that internationally binding emissions caps are not necessary if you have national laws and regulations instead. In fact, he added, making obligations legally binding creates a perverse incentive that “diminish the ambition of what countries are proposing to do.” No doubt he was thinking of China as he made his statement.

The G77 would certainly take issue with Stern’s statement that a treaty is not necessary for targets, or for that matter, for financing implementation. Nevertheless, if a binding outcome does not emerge from Durban, they will need to seek ways to work around this deficit.

Emissions trading is set for a key role in UN negotiations (Source: UN Climate Change)

By Climatico Contributor: Sabina Manea

With the United Nations Climate Change Conference due to start on 28 November, emissions trading is a key topic due for discussion in Durban. As one of the three Kyoto market-based mechanisms seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, emissions trading has emerged as a crucial weapon in the arsenal of climate change mitigation at the international level. It needs to be decided whether the tradable units (called assigned amount units, or AAUs) remain valid beyond 2012, or whether the surplus of AAUs currently in existence should be reduced in line with emissions reductions targets. An investigation is also necessary into possible solutions to link the various existing and emerging national and regional trading schemes.

Continued validity of AAUs and linkage

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol runs from 2008 until the end of 2012. Carrying over an unlimited amount of unused AAUs into a second commitment period is permitted under the current formulation of the Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a considerable surplus of AAUs, principally due to over-allocation to former Eastern bloc countries, whose industries shrank significantly in the 1990s. In order to pursue the targets of emissions reductions set by the Kyoto Protocol it is necessary to establish whether the surplus could be cancelled or otherwise retired from the market.

The number of national and regional emissions trading schemes is on the increase. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the largest mandatory scheme currently in existence. California and Australia have announced plans to implement emissions trading in their respective jurisdictions. China and South Korea have also publicised their intention to run such schemes in the future. The possibility of establishing a means of linking these different schemes to one another would help establish a truly worldwide emissions market.

Reconciling conflicting interests

Countries holding surplus AAUs understandably wish to bank them into a second Kyoto commitment period. EU Member States could use these AAUs to help their industrial installations comply with the EU ETS (as AAUs are equivalent to EU emissions allowances). Unused AAUs can also be sold in the market to make substantial windfall profits.

Other countries are taking a more restrictive approach. Denmark is lobbying for AAUs not to be bankable, in line with continuing emissions reductions. As a compromise, South Africa, the host country for the UN conference, has suggested a compromise consisting of a limited 1% carry-over of spare AAUs.

AAU allocations and emissions reduction targets

The Kyoto Protocol sets caps for countries with emissions reduction commitments (Annex B Parties). These caps consist of AAUs, which are allocated to each country on the basis of historical levels of emissions. If a country requires more AAUs than provided in its initial allocation, it can buy additional ones in the market from other countries who hold excess AAUs, and vice versa.

The surpluses of AAUs held by some countries call into question the validity of their emissions reductions, which have been achieved incidentally due to economic decline, rather than actively through the development of greener technologies.

Emissions trading as an effective pillar of climate change mitigation

A firm decision on the treatment of the AAU surplus is overdue; the issue of unlimited banking was noted, but not amended at the Cancún conference in 2010. Ideally the conference in Durban would provide a clear statement regarding the extent to which AAUs are bankable into the following commitment period, as well as a plan for addressing the problem of the surplus. The international emissions market would also greatly benefit from a proposal for a system of linkage between national and regional emissions trading schemes. A variety of opinions has already surfaced on how this would work, ranging from a centralised mechanism to a decentralised network of trading links.

Tying the loose ends of the Kyoto emissions trading mechanism is vital for its continued success in the fight against climate change. The validity and internal workings of this mechanism beyond 2012 are areas which would particularly benefit from direct attention by the negotiating parties at Durban. A further step in the direction of improving interconnectivity with other emissions trading schemes would provide additional support. These important issues will therefore form the focus of coverage as the conference progresses.  

By Climatico Contributor: Nick Oakes

Baby steps for REDD+ set to take place in Durban. (Image source: Nick Seers)

REDD+ is one of the building blocks for a new international agreement, and like other blocks, such as finance and technology transfer, it is one that many observers are hoping will become operational relatively soon, perhaps even in absence of a post-Kyoto agreement and the merging of the AWG-LCA with the AWG-KP.

There are four forums/themes in which REDD+ will be discussed at Durban. Most of the discussions so far have taken place within the AWG-LCA and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), whilst there have also been discussions in the AWG-KP, and the talks across multiple bodies on the common theme of finance. Briefly analysing each of these forums/themes will indicate some benchmarks for success and the likely outcomes at Durban.

Safeguarding the safeguards

In the Cancun agreements the SBSTA was tasked with building the methodological rigour needed to operationalise a REDD+ mechanism. The SBSTA called on Parties to submit guidance on three issues that need to be addressed for COP17: (1) the systems needed to provide guidance on how safeguards are addressed; (2) modalities of forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels; and (3) modalities for monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV).

Turning first to the submissions on protection of safeguards, these are outlined in Annex I to the Cancun Agreements. They cover a range of topics, from national level policy promotion and consistency with the Convention, to ensuring there are results-based approaches and that relevant stakeholders’ needs are addressed.

There seems to be agreement that the systems for monitoring safeguards will be designed nationally. This means that the UNFCCC process will issue only guidelines on how to build the systems, whilst the systems themselves are constructed by each Party. Norway, however – perhaps resonant of broader developed country sentiment – suggests that Parties should submit information on how the systems are designed, as a means of quality control.

MRV still lurking

Turning to the forest reference levels and MRV – the former of which is a subcategory of the latter, and so probably better presented as one topic rather than two – some Parties have pointed to the lack of clarity on the definition of forest reference emission levels and forest reference levels. One suggestion is that the former cover REDD, while the latter cover REDD+. Establishing guidance used for construction of a reference level moves discussion on to baseline measurement, a key component necessary for operationalising a REDD+ mechanism.

A slight sideshow to this discussion is the inclusion of Development Adjustment Factors (DAF) in the reference levels. These are planned activities that cause deforestation or degradation in the future. It seems that many countries will push for their inclusion in reference levels at COP17, but the definitions and terms of usage may be more difficult to define post-COP, given that DAFs will doubtlessly be highly politicised.

On the principles of an MRV regime, these are broadly in agreement, in that it should be separate and independent from systems created to monitor safeguards, whilst reiterating they should be “non-intrusive, non-punitive, and respectful of national sovereignty and legislation.” Some countries have noted that much of the groundwork is in place for MRV principles, given its primacy at Cancun last year.

Some ad-hoc submissions

The AWG-LCA has continued working on a draft text within an informal REDD+ working group. However, given that the content of this text will be largely contingent on the outcome of the SBSTA, the exact nature of the draft text without agreement on the SBSTA’s submissions is somewhat unclear. Nonetheless, it is possible that if the essential elements of a decision are agreed, at the very least a draft decision on REDD+ could emerge.

With the AWG-KP, however, there is far less of a focussed discussion. It has been agreed that land-use, land-use change and forestry will be considered as an emissions source under the Kyoto Protocol (KP), but little has been negotiated on the subject of REDD+ within the KP.

One submission from a variety of forest countries outlines a possible means of including a REDD+ mechanism within the KP. However, given the amount of work going in to REDD+ outside of the KP, and that the continuation of the KP is by far the largest uncertainty at the talks, there is little chance this proposal will receive much attention.

Financing REDD+

Finance will undoubtedly be raised across a number of forums. For example, it seems to be agreed that the Green Climate Fund (GCF) will have a distinct REDD+ facility, whilst the majority of funding to date has come from Norway, via its own bilateral mechanisms.

It’s probable that forest countries will seek funding from a number of sources as a prerequisite to agreement on other issues, but as a theme itself there is little holistic oversight. In this sense finance has been more of a country-by-country approach, each individually seeking sources of funding. As a result, we are likely to see a push by forest countries to solidify funding commitments from multilateral sources, such as the GCF, whilst simultaneously coveting bilateral ties.

COP17 will undoubtedly result in Parties edging closer to approving the technicalities needed to get a REDD+ mechanism up and running, but given the complex, inter-linked nature of the mechanism’s connections to the overarching discussions on targets and legal nature of a successor to Kyoto, agreeing – possibly even formalising – the technicalities of a REDD+ mechanism and focussing discussions on finance is the most that Durban is likely to achieve. 

By Climatico Contributor: Jean-Benoit Fournier

A severe drought in East Africa threatens lives. (Image by: Colin Crowley/Save the Children)

Adaptation to climate change, a topic largely covered in this forum in recent years, is back with a vengeance in the march towards the next Conference of Parties (COP17) in Durban, South Africa. Back with a vengeance mainly because of the growing gap that seems to develop between the need for – and the supply of – adaptation solutions and funding. This gap, largely attributable to the timidity with which recent agreements have been reached, creates discontent amongst developing countries, international NGOs and, to some extent, the private sector, which is looking for strong signals from governments to propose climate change adaptation solutions.

Just a few weeks ago, the generally prudent International Energy Agency took an unusual step in its World Energy Outlook of 2011, warning the world that the business-as-usual scenario with regards to energy infrastructures and investment patterns might lead us into an energy lock-in that would allow the conditions for an irreversible climate change to materialize in just five years from now. Although this should be understood as a call for action to mitigate climate change before it is too late, it also indirectly acts as a reminder of how difficult it will be to steer the world away from a dangerous climate change scenario. It is rational for some vulnerable countries to, put simply, freak out, and ask that help be extended to them.

The World Bank, in a landmark study that combined top-down and bottom-up approaches to cost estimation, evaluated that adaptation to climate change, net of regular development funding and requirements, could represent costs between $4 billion to $109 billion a year. To those familiar with the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, this is old news: adaptation costs an awful lot more than early action (mitigation of the root causes of climate change) and some of the most vulnerable countries happen to be those with the least money to deal with these impacts.

Climate change adaptation, in the context of international negotiations of the UNFCCC, thus encompasses the necessity, mostly by developing nations, to reduce their country’s vulnerability to the current and future impacts of climate change and/or boost their adaptive capacity.

Progress on the adaptation front at Durban will likely be directly linked to the last COP in Cancún, where Parties reached an agreement on the Green Climate Fund (GCF), a vehicle aimed at managing international donors’ money devoted to climate change mitigation and adaptation. As mentioned in earlier articles, the final format of the GCF has not yet been agreed upon. However, a Transitional Committee (TC) has been mandated with coming up with recommendations for approval in Durban.

The TC’s recommendations are visibly aimed at generating consensus, making sure that this funding mechanism would be jointly controlled by developed and developing countries, balance mitigation and adaptation in funding decisions, and build on the efforts already undertaken by several international financial institutions, regional development banks and UN institutions.     

Sadly, this is probably one of the only good news to expect from Durban with regards to adaptation, namely that negotiators may eventually agree upon the structure of the GCF. As noted by China’s top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, the current financial uncertainty and European difficulties could end up playing a damping role on the climate talks, especially when it comes to funding, so it might be wise not to expect big announcements with regards to funding.

Under a conservative scenario for adaptation funding, the Durban talks could end up being slightly more than a procedural step leading to an agreement on the form that this funding-to-come could take. In the best of scenarios, one could imagine that the GCF could be amended as to create enough incentives to, at best, secure current commitments by donor states and the private sector. 

Guest Editorial by: Matt Williams, UK Youth Climate Coalition

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres during a press briefing (Image by: IISD Reporting Services)

The UNFCCC process has been mired in something of a quandary since the high hopes around Copenhagen in 2009 were quickly dashed when countries failed to come up with a second global, legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (due to expire in 2012). But the meeting in Cancun in late 2010 repaired some of the damage.

In Bonn, it quickly became clear to me that there are still a lot of big gaps in the negotiations. The talks are now over but these gaps remain unresolved ahead of the talks in Durban in December.

One such gap is a concern around the Green Climate Fund, agreed upon in Cancun. This body which aims to provide $100bn a year by 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation faces problems concerning its funding in the medium term (2012-2020). While kick-start funding currently stands at $10bn a year, Parties must increase their public climate finance commitments to ensure that the Green Climate Fund moves forward. There is a lack of clarity about how it will reach its 2020 target. The funding gap between now and 2012 still looms large.

The second potential gap concerns the Kyoto Protocol. This is the legally binding global deal which commits some countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions between 2008-2012. The commitments concern only 37 Parties, the wealthier countries in the world (with some notable exceptions – the US still hasn’t ratified the Kyoto Protocol). Nonetheless it has been a key part of moving global climate negotiations forward. In 2012 the Kyoto Protocol will expire and there is currently no new deal on the table to replace it. Any amendment to extend or replace the Kyoto Protocol would require all countries to independently ratify it by 31 December 2012 to prevent there being any gap. It is almost too late for this now, and so a regulatory gap is almost a certainty. Indeed, in a meeting with young people in Bonn which I was lucky enough to attend, Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, said that a regulatory gap is inevitable.

Coming up with a new deal is high on everyone’s list of priorities, but remains a contentious issue. It is made particularly difficult by questions over the involvement of emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, who are unwilling to limit their economic progress, but whose involvement will be vital before countries such as Canada and the US will even begin to discuss entering a new deal. However, there are signs that the EU and the G77 might be beginning to talk behind the scenes about how a new deal could be struck. What such a deal would avoid is a so-called “pledge and review” system whereby countries would essentially go it alone and commitments would not be part of a global legally binding framework.

Finally, the ambition gap is probably the best known of all the gaps. Outside of the Kyoto Protocol, countries discuss their pledges to reduce emissions in the long-term. The ambition gap can be defined as the difference between the emissions reductions countries are committed to and the emissions reductions the science requires in order to keep global warming to safe levels. The science tells us that there is a big gap between the amount of emissions that would be saved by current pledges on the one hand and the need to limit warming to 2C on the other.

What’s more, at the opening of the talks last week, Oxfam released a report showing that two thirds of emissions reduction efforts currently on the table are those made by developing countries (those countries with the least historical responsibility for climate change and with fewer means to make emissions reductions). This revelation puts wealthier developed nations to shame and shows that a second ambition gap is opening up, between developed and developing country Parties.

The negotiations in Bonn were frustrating. Positive options are still on the table, but countries did little to move towards them at these talks. The space remains open for many countries to show leadership on a number of issues in Durban and to move the world towards a clean, fair future.

Matt Williams is part of UK Youth Climate Coalition’s (UKYCC) youth delegation to the UN climate talks (un.ukycc.org) and is currently interning with the ClientEarth communications team.

This story originally appeared on ClientEarth.

Naoto Kan at G8 summit in France (image source: @ANN News)

My previous article mentioned that it is now very difficult to pursue the current Japan’s energy strategies highly depending on nuclear energy because its ‘safety myth’ collapsed as a result of Chernobyl-level radioactive leak from the Fukushima nuclear plant. Further, reducing GHG emissions by 25% by 2020 seems infeasible because its global warming strategies are similarly focusing on nuclear energy. Then,  in order to suffice the present/future energy demand and achieve the mid-term GHG reduction target,  Prime Minister, Naoto Kan, seeks to replace nuclear energy by renewable energy especially solar power and his favourite wind power.

As a result, on May 25th, Kan at the OECD in Paris addressed that Japan will install solar panels onto ’10,000′ houses. However, this proposition is not the official Government’s policy proposition but just his idea off-hand. Even his cabinet members including the Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry, Banri Kaieda, mainly responsible for energy issues, came to know it after he suddenly made this proposition in Paris. Unsurprisingly, Kaieda was very frustrated saying ‘I came to know it through the media. I was not told’. Further, Kansei Nakano, National public safety commission chairman, criticized ‘as a member of Kan’s cabinet, I want to share information and concerns with Kan before Kan proposes something’. As Kan was severely criticized by his cabinet members, on May 31st, he finally apologize for his inappropriate behaviour.

Though his proposition might have been welcomed for those for solar power, it is therefore unclear whether Japan will actually pursue solar power. Moreover, it should be pointed that the main world-wide concern may not be Japan’s future energy strategies but resolution of the current nuclear accident, as clearly indicated at G8 summit again in France. The Japanese Government must  solve the accident as soon as it can and disclose any information that it obtains during dealing with the accident. This is the main responsibility for Japan to fulfill as information on the accident will be utilized for other nations that have nuclear power plants and Kan should be strongly aware of this responsibility.