

Climatico

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Copenhagen De-briefing *An Analysis of COP15 for Long-term Cooperation*



Post-Copenhagen Report

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Introduction

The 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) and the 5th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP/MOP5) in Copenhagen marked the culmination of two years of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Bali Roadmap. The purpose of the negotiations was to ultimately create a comprehensive, legally-binding international treaty to replace the Kyoto Protocol when it expires in 2012. However, it has been clear for some time that such an agreement would not materialise in Copenhagen as a result of the ongoing contention associated with many of the issues on the negotiating table.

Widely disputed aspects of a deal:

- Levels of climate finance and its long-term governance
- Discussions around targets for emissions reduction
- The threshold at which to limit average global temperature increase
- The introduction of a brand new treaty, or upgrade of the existing Kyoto Protocol

Early negotiations in the run-up to the Copenhagen conference highlighted the lack of progress in reaching a unanimous agreement on how to tackle climate change, suggesting that the negotiations in Copenhagen may instead provide us with a strong political agreement or framework, which could then be turned into a legal treaty by mid-2010.

With the expectations for a legally-binding agreement lowered, Yvo de Boer, the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, outlined¹ five essentials for success in Copenhagen.

5 essentials for success:

- Enhanced adaptation assistance to the most vulnerable and poorest nations
- Major industrial countries must propose substantial greenhouse gas emission reductions
- Emerging economies – such as China and India – must limit the growth of their emissions
- The mechanisms in place to help developing countries engage in mitigation and adaptation activities must be financed (through both short-term and long-term funds)
- An equitable governance structure for the management and deployment of financial resources

Utilizing Mr. de Boer's criteria for success in Copenhagen, there arise several issues to analyse beyond the conference's resultant document, the Copenhagen Accord.

Report Structure

In this report, we begin with a discussion of the dynamics between developing and developed countries that have influenced the debates. This is then followed with a description of the financial mechanisms, requirement for short and long-term funds, and problems with the current institutional arrangements. We then highlight some of the mechanisms in place to help countries mitigate climate change that were under discussion in Copenhagen. In particular, we focus on: technology transfer; Reducing Emissions for Deforestation in Developing Countries (REDD); the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the Copenhagen Accord and an analysis of the Accord's potential effect on future negotiations.

¹ Address by Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Delhi High Level Conference on Climate Change: Technology Development and Transfer, (New Delhi), 22 October 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/statements/application/pdf/091022_speech_delhi.pdf



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The role of Developed and Developing Countries at COP15

Developed (Annex I) and developing (Non Annex I) countries held very different roles coming into Copenhagen and often found themselves in conflict over matters of finance, emissions reductions, and the future of the Kyoto Protocol.

Developed Countries

Developed countries have always maintained a crucial role in the UN climate change negotiations, with calls from the developing countries for strong action to address the climate change impacts already faced by some of the most vulnerable nations² in the developing world. Developed countries are often accused of being historic emitters, responsible for paying their 'climate debt' by providing finance and technology transfer for developing countries to support their low carbon development and reduce further global emission increases, enshrined in the concept of *common but differentiated responsibilities*.



COP15 provided a platform for developed countries to take the lead on climate change policy, making significant contributions, which are hoped to kick-start confirmations of tentative pledges and encourage nations to accept reasonable compromises to reach a global deal.

The negotiating positions of developed countries at COP15 were somewhat progressive compared to other COPs, with many delegations more willing to negotiate and compromise to reach a deal. By the second week, the pledges made by rich nations were in the order of 14-18% cuts against a 1990 baseline. However, developing nations have called for a collective cut of at least 40% by 2020 (1990 baseline) for developed nations.

Developing Countries

The developing country bloc at the COP is perhaps the most complex and diverse bloc of nations: separated by geography, economies and people. Not legally obligated to make emissions reductions, the group includes China, the world's greatest emitter of carbon emissions. The group also contains Brazil, India, and South Africa – viewed as key negotiating countries and huge emerging economies with rapid increases in carbon emissions. On the other end of the scale are the least developed countries (LDCs) which include the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the African group, as well as large forested countries such as Indonesia and Brazil.

The developing country bloc entered the Copenhagen negotiations with a historical view of a weak negotiating stance although many were anticipating a hard line on the issue of adaptation financing.

² Host Country website for COP15, (Denmark), January 2010. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2885>.



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The announcements of voluntary emission reductions by China and India just a few days prior to the opening of the COP filled some with hope that a legally-binding deal could be sealed despite the numerous contentious issues that still needed to be resolved.

Negotiating Blocs

Many delegations sought safety in numbers, joining forces with other like-minded nations to form negotiating blocs to increase the pulling power of their positions within the debate. Key negotiating blocs include the European Union (EU), the Umbrella Group (UG), and the G77+China. The G77+China includes smaller groups, such as the African group and AOSIS, which sometimes speak out or act independently of the larger G77+China group. These negotiating blocs are often led by a rotating chair, and aim to speak with one voice. However, the negotiations in Bonn, Bangkok, Barcelona and Copenhagen saw major rifts between many of these blocs (particularly the African group), though the EU stood resolutely united.

Proposals and Demands

On the next two pages, we outline bloc positions and the most recent country emission reduction proposals where available. Countries are listed below their respective negotiating blocs if proposals differ or exceed commitments made by their bloc.



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Bloc Positions and Emissions Reduction Proposals

COUNTRY/BLOC	Proposals: Emissions Reductions				Unconfirmed Proposals: Emission Reductions				Other
	2020		2050		2020		2050		
	%	Base	%	Base	%	Base	%	Base	
Eastern European Group	Many Eastern European countries argued for smaller EU funding to developing nations, preferring to base contributions on economic output rather than emissions amounts as their economies are coal-intensive.								
Belarus	5%	1990			10%	1990			
Environmental Integrity Group									
Mexico					30%	BAU*	50%	BAU*	Proposed: 8% below 2009 by 2012
South Korea	4%	2005							
Switzerland					20%	1990			Proposed: Carbon neutral by 2030
European Union	Parallel financial discussions in Brussels saw EU leaders consider a global tax on financial transactions to reduce the risks of a further financial crisis and raise funding for tackling climate change.								
	20%	1990	80%	1990	30%	1990	95%	1990	
Finland			80%	1990					
Germany	40%	1990							
Great Britain	34%	1990	80%	1990	40%	1990			40% reduction conditional on other countries' commitments and the EU cutting emissions by 30%
Scotland	42%	1990	80%	1990					
G-77 + China									
African UN regional Group	Financial demands: Rich countries to provide between 0.5-1% of GDP to developing nations for short-term finance and 5% of GDP for long-term finance Position: Supported the proposal for a new protocol								
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)	Financial demands: Rich countries to provide between 0.5-2% of their GDP to developing nations for long-term finance Position: Supported the proposal for a new protocol.								
Least Developed Countries	Financial demands: Rich countries to provide 1.5% of their GDP to developing nations for long-term finance Position: There appeared to be an emerging consensus that the global average temperatures should not increase by more than 1.5 degrees Celsius and that atmospheric carbon levels cannot increase above 350ppm. Wanted participating countries to come up with a legally binding document that would follow the Bali Action Plan.								
Argentina									Proposed: Zero deforestation by 2020
Brazil	36%	BAU*			39%	BAU*			Amazon deforestation rate 70% below 2009 levels by 2017. Zero deforestation by 2020
China	45% C1**	2005							Increasing the forest coverage rate to 20% by 2010 Proposed: Emissions peak in 2030 and fall to 2005 levels by 2050; increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares by 2020; increase proportion of non-fossil fuels to 15% by 2020. Non-binding commitments.
Costa Rica									Zero emissions by 2021
India	20% C1**	2005							Keep emissions per capita below those of



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									developed countries. Voluntary. Proposed: 10% of electricity from renewable energy by 2020
Indonesia					25	BAU*			Proposed: 40% below 2005 by 2030; Change forest to net sink by 2030. Conditional on international funding and technology transfer.
Jordan									10% renewable energy by 2020
Maldives									Carbon neutral by 2019
Morocco									600% increase in wind power and 15% reduction in building, industry, and transport energy use by 2020
Paraguay									Zero deforestation by 2020
South Africa					34%	BAU*			Emissions peak in 2025, stabilize for 10 years and decline Proposed: 42% below BAU* by 2025
Umbrella Group									
Australia	5%	2000	60%	2000	10%	1990			
Canada	20%	2006	60%	2006			70%	2006	
Iceland	15%	1990	50%	1990			75%	1990	
Japan					25%	1990	80%	2005	Initial conditions on Kyoto Protocol extension. Now, announced targets should not be considered legally-binding.
New Zealand	10%	1990	50%	1990	20%	1990			
Norway	30%	1990			40%	1990			Proposed: Carbon neutral by 2030
Russia	20%	1990	50%	1990	30%	1990			
Ukraine					20%	1990	50%	1990	
USA	17%	2005			28%	2005	75%	2005	
Western European and Other Group									
Liechtenstein	20%	1990			30%	1990			
Monaco	20%	1990	60%	1990					

* BAU stands for "Business as usual"

** CI stands for "Carbon intensity"

Research compiled from the findings of Climate Interactive,³ Oxfam,⁴ and Climatico. Unconfirmed proposals include unofficial government statements, proposals with conditions attached, or legislation currently under consideration. Proposals that have been confirmed include official government statements, adopted legislation, and official submissions provided to the UNFCCC.

³ Current Climate Proposals, Climate Interactive, 15 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010.
<http://climateinteractive.org/scoreboard/scoreboard-science-and-data/current-climate-proposals-1>.

⁴ Copenhagen Climate Change Summit State of Play: Week 2, Oxfam International, December 2009.
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/state_of_play.pdf.



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Finance

While the negotiation of targets to mitigate climate change sets a regulatory framework, financing is crucial to realise emission reductions and to adapt to impending climatic changes. Without the financial support for the implementation of adaptation projects, the developing countries cannot further their development and achieve the Millennium Development Goals. It is therefore not surprising that, along with mitigation targets, climate finance was a focal point of the negotiations, given that ambitious GHG emission reductions, adaptation to climate change, and technology transfer cannot happen without significant investments to support least capable countries.

The main finance issues under consideration in Copenhagen:

- Availability of adequate short-term funding for developing countries
- Availability of adequate long-term funding for developing countries
- An improved mechanism under which the financial resources should be allocated

To the extent that debate in Copenhagen centred on the creation of a new climate finance regime, there has been a clear distinction between **pre-2012** “fast start” issues and a **post-2012** long-term financing regime.

Copenhagen

Short-term (fast start) finance

From the opening ceremony, Lesotho, on behalf of the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), set the tone for the political discussions; highlighting, among other things, the need to contribute to the LDC Fund to finance countries immediate adaptation needs.⁵

By the end of the first week, the European Union attempted to put some pressure on other big players when it announced its fast start pledge of 2.4 billion Euros per year for the years 2010-12 allocated in priority for adaptation efforts of LDCs, small island states and Africa.⁶ The announcement did not result in the boosting effect expected, but surprisingly raised many criticisms. The G77 bloc characterised the pledge as “insignificant” and, together with China, raised concern about long-term financing needs.⁷

Long-term finance

Coming into the Copenhagen Conference, developing and developed countries generally had a very different understanding of the size needed for long-term funding. The developed countries bloc recognized the need of the developing countries for substantial funding for adaptation with priority

⁵ Copenhagen Highlights, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol 12 (449), IISD, (UK), 8 December 2009. Date of Access: 9 January 2010. <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12449e.html>.

⁶ EU putting more money on the table, AP/Nanet Poulsen, UNFCCC, (Bonn), 11 December 2009. Date of Access: 9 January 2010. <http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2933>.

⁷ G77- EU funding insignificant, UNFCCC, (Bonn), 12 December 2009. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. <http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=2946>.



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access to the resources for the least developed countries and small island developing states (SIDS).^{8,9}

In contrast, the bloc of the developing countries under the aegis of G77+China has been calling for additional financial resources. The G77+China have been claiming that the financial assistance provided by the developed countries so far and their pledged contributions for the future are inadequate.¹⁰

Institutional arrangements

Beyond sheer amounts, negotiations on long-term finance focused on the existing institutional arrangements, especially the Adaptation Fund,¹¹ and how the new funds, pledged by developed countries, should be best channelled.

Adaptation Fund Board Chair Jan Cedergren raised concerns over the inadequacy of available funds from the sales of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERS). This concern was echoed by countries such as Bangladesh, Nigeria, Uruguay, Senegal, and Jamaica. India pointed out that more ambitious emission cuts by developed countries would address the problem to a certain extent by positively impacting the price of CERS.¹²

During a review of the GEF (see callout on right), key issues were raised including the adequacy, predictability and accessibility of funds. With regards to the latter, LDCs specifically expressed their dissatisfaction that access to funding (the Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF)) was tied to the development of a National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPA); China pointed out that contributions to the fifth replenishment¹³ should be increased and the GEF reformed to facilitate implementation. In this sense, CEO Chair Monique Barbut stressed that GEF reform will focus on responding to Convention guidance, country ownership, effectiveness and efficiency, and the fifth replenishment.¹⁴

Global Environmental Facility

Established in 1991, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) unites 179 member governments (in partnership with international institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector) and is largest funder of environmental projects. The GEF is the financial mechanism for the UNFCCC and allocates and disburses approximately \$250 million per year for projects in energy efficiency, renewable energies, and sustainable transportation.

⁸ Australia tells United Nations Copenhagen Climate Summit to take bold action, Herald Sun, (Melbourne), 8 December 2009. Date of Access: 26 December 2009. <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/national/australia-tells-united-nations-copenhagen-climate-summit-what-it-wants/story-e6frf7l6-1225808048661>.

⁹ The Copenhagen climate change negotiations: EU position and state of play MEMO/09/493, Press Release RAPID, (Brussels), 9 November 2009. Date of Access: 26 December 2009.

<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/493&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>.

¹⁰ Copenhagen climate talks begin, Copenhagen News Update, The Third World Network, (Copenhagen), 7 December 2009. Date of Access: 19 December 2009. <http://www.twinside.org.sg/title2/climate/copenhagen.up.01.htm>.

¹¹ The Adaptation Fund was established under the Kyoto Protocol to finance adaptation projects in developing countries. It has so far received USD 23.52 million through grants and the sale of emission reduction certificates (Financial Status of the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund (as at 30 November 2009) World Bank, (Washington), 30 November 2009. Date of Access: 15 December 2009. <http://afboard.org/AFreport.pdf>.

¹² Copenhagen Highlights, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol 12(451), IISD, 10 December 2010. <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12451e.html>

¹³ Donor nations fund the GEF and every four years, they commit money through a process called the "GEF Replenishment."

¹⁴ Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Vol. 12(459), IISD, (UK), 22 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12459e.html>.



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Mexico and Norway put forth a proposal to establish a new Copenhagen Green Climate Fund that would finance mitigation and adaptation actions of the developing countries. The Green Fund would receive financial resources through two tracks – one that would have a determined amount of emission allowances for countries for auctioning, and one track that would utilize public resource contributions from developed countries according to their amount of emissions, GDP, and population.

Among the positive surprises, Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva announced the possibility that Brazil will contribute economically toward climate change measures in needy countries; the first offer by a developing country with an emerging economy to contribute toward climate finance.¹⁵

¹⁵ Brazil ready to provide funding, Morten Andersen, 18 December 2009, (UNFCCC). Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://en.cop15.dk/news/view+news?newsid=3053>



REDD+

At COP11 in Montreal, discussions began regarding reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries with a proposal by Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea. These discussions led to a major decision at COP13 in Bali to stimulate action, resulting in the inclusion of a Reducing Emissions for Deforestation in Developing Countries (REDD) mechanism in the Bali Action Plan.

The original Bali agreement simply called for reducing emissions from deforestation (RED) and then progressed to include land degradation (REDD). In the months leading to COP15, REDD grew to include conservation, sustainable forest management, and forest carbon stock enhancement (REDD+).¹⁶ In general, REDD+ is a difficult mechanism to structure, as it applies to 37 different countries. Each of these nations has its own specific forest issues and governance structures applicable to indigenous peoples' rights, ownership, and clearing.

Discussions on REDD+ at the international level have progressed considerably since first introduced, but no UNFCCC decision providing specific details on the structure of such a mechanism were officially outlined.

REDD+ was one of the most anticipated mechanisms to come out of the Copenhagen negotiations. Copenhagen was to provide the text that would solidify the place of REDD+ into international climate law. As such, every aspect of REDD+ design would be open for discussion, although this discussion is built upon the preliminary work of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA) and the numerous proposals by governments and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs).

Coming into COP15, there were clear measures as to the success of any agreed REDD+ mechanism. The REDD+ text should clearly address issues of scope, finance, reference levels, distribution, and importantly, safeguards for people and forests, which are under-represented in proposals by many of the key players. Both short and long-term sources of funding must be secured and specific targets for REDD+ emissions reductions considered. Additionally, a viable agreement will address major concerns about the rights of indigenous peoples,¹⁷ viable targets, uniform ways to gauge the



¹⁶ Fulfillment of the Bali Action Plan and components of the agreed outcome., UNFCCC, (Bonn), 18 March 2009. Date of Access: 20 December 2009. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca5/eng/04p01.pdf>.

¹⁷ The need for participation by indigenous peoples was an overwhelming concern throughout the process of REDD discussions. Tanzania and Mali called for consideration of benefits for local communities as rewards for REDD+ are allocated on the national level.¹⁷ In countries with unstable governments there is a real danger that these funds will not be used appropriately or end up in the hands of those to whom they should accrue. Negotiators were aware that, to best safeguard indigenous peoples, two major elements would need to come together in Copenhagen: 1) Forests and those residing within forests need "early action" language to fast track financing to save forests immediately as possible; and 2) To move forward, national forest reference levels and timelines need to be decided.



threshold values as well as performance of carbon savings, and set-up a fund to address immediate forest needs. Fundamentally, a REDD+ mechanism must be part of a larger, legally-binding decision including emissions reductions by industrialized countries -- without which, the viability of forests under a changing climate, and thus their carbon sequestration potential, is severely threatened.

Copenhagen

Heading into COP15, negotiations on REDD+ did not divide along traditional negotiation bloc lines, in large part due to the fact that it was still in an amorphous, design phase. A number of governments submitted proposals for a REDD+ mechanism in the year leading up to Copenhagen, and the dividing issues in these proposals were found along lines of scope, financing, and safeguards.

Scope

All governmental proposals included forest degradation along with reduced emissions from deforestation, and many supported forest carbon stock enhancement inclusion.¹⁸

Finance

Brazil and Columbia favoured a strictly fund-based mechanism, but all other countries included at least some link to carbon markets. The USA and India favoured a fully fungible market mechanism, and the majority of countries fell somewhere between, often preferring a phased approach -- gradually moving from a fund-based to a market-based approach.

Safeguards

Few proposals explicitly addressed safeguards. The AOSIS proposal,¹⁹ though not tackling such issues as

REDD+ Measurements for Success

Finance

Governmental proposals suggested a number of mechanisms including fund-based, fully fungible with carbon markets, carbon market linked, and a phased approach that moves from fund-based to market-based. Funding sources as they relate to the balance between funding from governments in the developed world and private initiatives are a major point of contention.

Reference levels

Options for developing baseline emission rates involve using only historic rates, adjusting historic rates for national circumstances, or using projected rates.

Distribution of payments

REDD+ payments are likely to be made at the national level (with each nation responsible for internal distribution) but in some cases, sub-national distribution has been suggested with the intention to scale up to national distribution over time.

Monitoring, reporting & verification (MRV)

Technical capacity and methodologies for monitoring must be decided upon, as should mechanisms for transparent reporting, and a process designed for the verification of emissions reductions.

Safeguards for forests and people

The potential co-benefits of linking biodiversity to REDD+ forest protections, the inclusion of text addressing drivers of deforestation, and the potential threat of international leakage would be discussed.

Linkage to broader UNFCCC goals

For REDD+ to succeed in reducing emissions and safeguarding forests, a legally binding agreement requiring emissions cuts from Annex I countries was necessary.

¹⁸ Little REDD book, Global Canopy Foundation, 2009. <http://www.globalcanopy.org/main.php?m=117&sm=176&t=1>.

¹⁹ Proposal by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) for the Survival of the Kyoto Protocol and a Copenhagen Protocol to enhance the implementations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, AOSIS, 2009. Date of Access: 22 December 2009. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/homepage/AOSIS1.pdf>.



financing, is strong in its concerns that indigenous peoples and local communities could be adversely affected by REDD+, and calls for their full, informed, and prior consent. The AOSIS proposal calls for safeguards on biodiversity and the need to address the demand-side drivers of deforestation. The Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN) also calls for the inclusion of safeguards.

Throughout COP15, REDD+ was lauded as a mechanism that would likely succeed with support from Annex I and Non Annex I countries alike. Yet, the details of a meaningful REDD+ agreement were debated with little consensus; the administration of forested lands differs greatly between nations due to both legal and ecological reasons.

The main debates throughout COP15 concerning REDD+ centred on the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) aspects. Additionally, financing was a major point of discussion, as transfers of funds were needed for almost all other aspects of a cohesive deal in Copenhagen outside of REDD+ (e.g. the adaptation fund). In negotiating REDD+, it was clear that the SBSTA would need to make technical decisions about the mechanism's details, while the AWG-LCA would guide policy discussions.²⁰

SBSTA

The SBSTA text under consideration had been prepared in June 2009, while REDD+ has been discussed and moved forward significantly during the following six months (June to December). Thus, in effect, the negotiations concerning REDD were occurring on two different tracks for much of Copenhagen: SBSTA technical guidance and the REDD text.

The SBSTA text lacked language concerning indigenous peoples' rights, an area in which REDD made significant progress since June 2009. In addition, the SBSTA text did not contain adequate definitions for forests, especially the differentiation between plantations and forests. The inclusion of a mandate for independent review of monitoring systems was much stronger in the SBSTA text than the original Copenhagen negotiating text. Through much negotiation, the SBSTA text was altered and merged with a more current version of the REDD text. However, important concerns, such as an explicit demand for protection of forests did not appear, nor a thorough discussion of the underlying drivers of deforestation.

Reference level concerns proved a difficult issue during the SBSTA discussions. In order to address issues of funds gained for preservation, the level upon which reference levels are determined was debated between national and regional specification. Additionally, the realism of MRV for all activities or just those being financed was called into question. Capacity building and enhanced coordination were discussed, along with the identification of activities and drivers of deforestation, as well as the use of the IPCC guidelines for MRV.

²⁰ Methods and Science, UNFCCC, (Bonn), 2009. Date of Access: 23 December 2009. http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/items/2722.php.



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AWG-LCA

The main discussions centred on the scope and overall definition of objectives for the REDD+ mechanism. Whether or not to include percentage goals within the mechanism and to which reference levels measurements should be made became contentious issues. Additionally, there was much discussion on how to standardize MRV across projects and countries. Specifically, Peru and Columbia proposed a sub-national mechanism for REDD+ during the final stages of the AWG-LCA meeting.

Outcome

In all, many of the specific design issues for REDD+ had been discussed throughout the meetings leading up to COP15, and no design or technical issues were thus insurmountable. The negotiating texts on REDD+ from SBSTA and AWG-LCA, while not perfect, were comprehensive in comparison to the other issues being negotiated.²¹

To harness what progress there was in Copenhagen, the UNFCCC said leaders agreed to establish a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (see the Finance and Copenhagen Accord sections for more details) to help “unleash prompt action” in the absence of an overarching treaty. This fund will mobilize the promised \$30 billion funding from developed countries on REDD+ among mitigation, adaptation, technology, and capacity-building. In addition, fast track financing of \$3.5 billion from a number of developed countries (US, UK, France, Japan, Australia and Norway) specifically for REDD²² lends significant momentum going into 2010. Funding the implementation stage (2013-2020) is expected to cost between \$20 and \$35 billion.

Most of the major questions for the details of the REDD+ mechanism have been addressed and this is apparent in the draft LCA text. Concerns over the rights of indigenous people and local forest communities have also been addressed, though require more detail to make safeguards truly robust. However, hard targets are missing from the text in its final version. The various options on the table throughout the negotiations were: a target to reduce deforestation by 50 per cent by 2020, by 25 per cent from current levels by 2015, or halt it entirely by 2030.

The general UN timetable for REDD projects the mechanism starting in earnest in 2013.²³

²¹ Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the convention, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention, 15 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/l07a06.pdf>.

²² REDD may yet survive Copenhagen failures, Date of Access: 22 December 2009. <http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1786>.

²³ REDD must address corruption to save rainforests in Indonesia, says report, Forest for Climate, 14 January 2010. Date of Access: 25 December 2009. <http://www.forestforclimate.org/Forest-REDD/>.



CDM and Joint Implementation

Background

The Kyoto Protocol established three flexible mechanisms to help industrialized countries to meet their emission reduction targets: Emissions Trading (also called “the carbon market”), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI).

Both CDM and JI are project-based mechanisms in which individual projects are financed with the goal of reducing GHG emissions. These mechanisms then feed the carbon market – the key tool through which global emissions are reduced.



Under the Kyoto Protocol, the onus of emissions reduction rests on Annex I countries. In order to avoid the high costs of reducing emissions at home, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation mechanisms allow firms in developed countries the option to gain emissions reduction credits by financing green development projects. Non Annex I countries – even large emitters such as China, India, and Brazil – are not obliged to engage in any emissions reduction.

JI is utilized by Annex I countries with capped GHG emissions while CDM is implemented in Non Annex I countries who hold no obligation to reduce their GHG emissions. JI allows Annex I countries to carry out projects with other developed countries (or countries with their economies in transition) and receive in return credits in the form of “Emission Reduction Units” (ERUs) in order to enable either governments to meet their Kyoto targets or companies to meet their Emissions Trading Scheme allocations. CDM involves the investment by an Annex I country in emission reduction projects in Non Annex I countries in exchange for certified emission reduction (CER) credits which can then be traded, sold, or used by Annex I countries in order to help them reach their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.

While both mechanisms were developed to help countries reach their emissions reduction targets, there has been debate about the effectiveness of these projects: both in terms of achieving development and effectively lowering emissions.

Copenhagen

The CDM and JI mechanisms were discussed in Copenhagen during COP/MOP meetings while side events were held congruently during which stakeholders (such as NGOs and industry) reflected upon the effectiveness and equity of the mechanisms.

Main issues discussed regarding CDM:

- Improving efficiency, transparency and consistency of its decision-making



- Regional distribution of CDM projects, particularly as it relates to Africa's CDM participation
- Baselines and monitoring
- Inclusion of Carbon Capture and Sequestration/Storage (CCS) under the CDM

Main issues discussed regarding JI:

- Resources for the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee (JISC)
 - JI management and budget plans
 - Predictable and adequate funding needed
 - Guidance to the JISC as appropriate
- Guidance regarding the JI Track 1 procedure

At the conference, two key negotiating blocs emerged: developed countries and industry, and developing states and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs). The UNFCCC also presented opinions on the mechanisms, which hovered between the opinions of the two blocs. The status quo was often favoured by developed countries and industry while reform was often favoured by developing countries and ENGOs.

Contentious Issues

Ji concerns were relatively muted, being held largely to procedural and budgetary concerns. CDM, on the other hand, held greater areas of contention and, thus, garnered more attention. We have detailed some of these CDM concerns below.

Improving efficiency, transparency and consistency of its decision-making

The UN suspended approvals for Chinese wind farms over concerns that the country had been deliberately lowering subsidies in order to qualify for funding. However, China expressed their objections to the Executive Board's decision to reject China's wind power projects, calling it both "unfair" and "non-transparent".²⁴

Regional Distribution

Several African countries expressed their concern that CDM projects were not well distributed and that this led African countries to be poorly represented within the list of participants. Of the 1500 CDM projects registered within developing countries, only a few dozen are in Africa while the majority of CDM credits have been concentrated in China – a country that holds perhaps the least need for financing under the CDM. Some countries noted that participation was difficult due to lack of capacity and others felt that the approval procedure needed improvement.

One proposed solution to this regional distribution problem included measures to simplify project registration as well as the promotion of African Designated Operational Entities (DOEs) put forth by Niger. Swaziland further proposed that the CDM Executive Board prioritize a review of methodologies that may promote CDM projects in Africa.

²⁴ International Institute for Sustainable Development. (n.d.). Copenhagen Highlights - Wednesday, 9 December 2009 - Copenhagen - Denmark. Date of Access: 6 January 2009: <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12451e.html>



Baselines

Countries have expressed their concern over a lack of standardized baselines. Brazil, China, and Russia, among others, expressed their desire that reference to these baselines be deleted from the final text. However, the EU, Switzerland and Ethiopia opposed such deletion. The International Emissions Trading Association (IETA) was also in favour of standardized baselines arguing that this would help improve regional distribution.

CCS

Saudi Arabia and Norway (along with other oil exporters) have been negotiating for the inclusion of CCS as a means by which developed countries can offset their emissions through the CDM.²⁵ However, Brazil, Paraguay, and Grenada (on behalf of AOSIS) opposed the CCS inclusion. Ghana offered an alternative proposal for the establishment of CCS as a mitigation technology and activity. Other nations, such as Brazil whose rainforests serve as a major carbon sink, have argued that delegating funding to CCS projects may reduce available monies for that state's efforts at renewable energy deployment and forest protection. Thus far, SBSTA has not seriously considered the proposal due to concern registered by other states and stakeholders over the long-term liability for the storage site and seepage.

Outcome

The final JI decision encourages increased transparency and efficient verification procedures and addresses JISC budgeting and funding concerns. However, the CDM decisions adopted by the COP/MOP were a bit more substantial than the JI text. Highlights of those decisions as they relate to our outlined areas of contention follow:

Improving efficiency, transparency and consistency of its decision-making: Within the COP/MOP decision was a direct request to the Board to “significantly improve transparency, consistency and impartiality in its work.”

Regional distribution: The COP/MOP recommended that the Executive Board develop top-down methodologies with particular consideration of the application of countries that hold fewer than ten CDM projects. DOEs should also be indicated in annual activity reports. Financial resources through interest accrued through the CDM Trust Fund and through voluntary donor contributions have also been recommended for designation to countries with fewer than ten registered CDM projects.

Baselines: The COP/MOP requested that the SBSTA develop standardized baselines along with monitoring methodologies in order to improve efficiency.

CCS: The COP/MOP notes the importance of CCS and requests that the SBSTA continue its work to include CCS within the geographical formations of the CDM. However, no agreement has been reached and a formal decision has thus been pushed back to COP16 or COP17.

²⁵ Carbon Capture Plan Faces Dim Prospects, The National, (Copenhagen), 8 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 December 2009. <http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20091208/BUSINESS/712089926/1118>.



Technology Transfer

The technology transfer concept has been embodied in the UNFCCC's goals since it came into force in 1994.²⁶ Several initiatives and mechanisms are already in place to deploy climate technologies in the developing world. This is one of the aims of the CDM, for example, although the amount of genuine technology transfer that has occurred under the mechanism is the subject of vigorous debate. COP13 in Bali commissioned the GEF to develop a strategic programme to deliver technology transfer to developing countries; this became known as the Poznań Strategic Program on Technology Transfer,²⁷ which has recently started to distribute funds to evaluate the technology needs of some developing countries and implement technology transfer initiatives.

In the period leading up to COP15, the Contact Group on Enhanced Action on Development and Transfer of Technology debated a range of options for the governance and funding of technology transfer under a post-2012 agreement.

A number of proposals emerged as a result of these discussions.²⁸ Most of these envisaged some kind of central entity performing a strategic role while coordinating a network of regional and technology-specific organisations to deliver the technology transfer assistance and engage in technology development.

Negotiating blocs disagreed on a number of issues, including how the technology transfer mechanism should be financed – whether there should be a specific technology transfer fund and, if so, what form it should take and how much power the technology transfer organisations should wield. Intellectual property (IP) rights are also a concern for several parties: some see patents and other IP devices as vital to stimulating innovation; others perceive them to be a barrier to technology deployment in developing countries.

A successful agreement on technology transfer in COP15 would need to resolve these areas of contention while creating a robust and adequately-financed institutional framework for technology transfer beyond 2012.



²⁶ UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 4.1(c), Article 4.3, Article 4.5. UNFCCC, (Bonn), 9 May 1992. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/background/items/1349.php.

²⁷ Poznań Strategic Programme on Technology Transfer, UNFCCC, (Bonn), Undated. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. http://unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/in_focus/items/4760.php.

²⁸ Gersetter, Christiane; Marcinello, Dominic, 2009, 'The Current Proposals on the Transfer of Climate Technology in the International Climate Negotiations – An assessment'. Washington DC: Ecologic Institute.



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Copenhagen

Discussions on technology transfer progressed relatively well during COP15, with insiders including Yvo de Boer citing them as an encouraging area of the negotiations as early as the end of the first week of the conference.²⁹

The first official draft text produced during COP15³⁰ did little more than formally articulate the areas of agreement and disagreement on technology transfer. It proposed an Executive Body on Technology or a Technology Action Committee with overall responsibility for accelerating the development and transfer of climate-related technologies. This would be accompanied by a Consultative Network for Climate Technology, supported by regional technology centres, to provide technical assistance to developing countries. On finance, the text left all of the options – including a separate mechanism for technology transfer – on the table. Given the sensitivity of the financing issue this wasn't surprising.

A second official draft³¹ reflected progress made early in the second week of the COP. It proposed that the high-level body would be known as the Technology Executive Committee. The draft was accompanied by an addendum³² that provided a considerable amount of detail. The addendum proposed that the Executive Committee would be responsible for directing technology transfer activities (including developing technology road maps, performing policy analysis, and developing criteria for financial support capacity building), while the Technology Network would be used to deliver support and advise developing countries on the use and development of new technologies.

A number of square brackets appeared in the text – particularly within the section on IP rights - and the financing arrangements still appeared to be decidedly unclear: the draft high-level text contained proposals for a Finance Board, a Finance Fund, or a Finance Facility, as well as a review or reform of the GEF.

²⁹ Press Conference with UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer at COP 15, (Copenhagen), 10 December 2009. Date of Access: 29 December 2009.

³⁰ Chair's proposed draft text on the outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (Draft Version), UNFCCC, (Copenhagen), 11 December 2009. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/11/copenhagen-draft-text>.

³¹ Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention: draft conclusions proposed by the Chair FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Rev.1, UNFCCC, (Copenhagen), 16 December 2009. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/l07r01.pdf>.

³² Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention: draft conclusions proposed by the Chair – Addendum: Draft decision -/CP.15 Enhanced action on technology development and transfer FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/L.7/Add.3, UNFCCC, (Copenhagen), 15 December 2009. Date of Access: 29 December 2009. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/awglca8/eng/l07a03.pdf>.



The Copenhagen Accord

On the final day of the COP15 meeting in Copenhagen, as talks remained deadlocked and it became obvious that no agreement was about to be signed, the COP president, Danish PM Lars Løkke Rasmussen, invited about 25 heads of state to a “Friends of the Chair” group for private negotiations. These late negotiations resulted in a minimalistic document now referred to as the Copenhagen Accord.³³

The “Friends of the Chair” is a known UN device where a small number of negotiators meet separately from the main negotiations and try to overcome an impasse on a specific issue. Participants are usually chosen by the main negotiating body; however, in this case, many delegates in the COP plenary were opposed to forming another negotiating track, and it is not quite clear how much was known to other delegations and leaders about the final composition of the group, its goals, and even whether or not it was indeed meeting.³⁴

There is no official publication stating which countries participated in these meetings. The most comprehensive list available was provided by the representative of Grenada who mentioned on the floor of the COP plenary that the group included Sweden (outgoing President of the EU), Spain (incoming President of the EU), Saudi Arabia (head representative for OPEC), the Russian Federation, Norway (leader in climate funding), Maldives, Lesotho (head representative for Least Developing Countries), South Africa, Bangladesh, Algeria (head representative of the Africa Group), Mexico (COP16 President), Germany, France, UK, Ethiopia (head representative for the African Union), Colombia, Korea, China, India, US, Brazil and Grenada (head representative for AOSIS).³⁵ Also present was the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, although the meeting was considered informal.

Content of the Accord

Signatories to the Copenhagen Accord recognise that climate change is “one of the greatest challenges of our time”, and stress their strong political will to fight it. Science is recognised as the basis for the actions needed in order to avoid dangerous climate change and the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report is cited as providing such information. Consequently, the Accord twice recognises the need to reduce global emissions enough to prevent global temperatures from rising beyond 2 degrees Celsius.

It is recognised and agreed that combating climate change will be based upon the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. In that light, the Accord calls for emissions to peak as soon as possible (though there is no mention of exactly when), and that it

³³ Copenhagen Accord, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, (Bonn), 18 December 2009. Date of Access: 21 December 2009. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/application/pdf/cop15_cph_auv.pdf.

³⁴ Summary of the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, 7-19 December 2009, IISD, (UK), 22 December 2009. Date of Access: 2 January 2010. <http://www.iisd.ca/vol12/enb12459e.html>.

³⁵ Conference of the Parties (COP) resumed 9th Meeting. COP 15 on-demand webcast, UNFCCC, 19 December 2009. Date of access – 27 December 2009. http://www7.cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongressmain=1&theme=cop15&id_kongresssession=2761.



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should happen sooner in developed countries than in developing ones to allow developing countries more time for economic development and poverty eradication.

Mitigation

Both developed and developing countries are to submit to the secretariat their emission targets for 2020 by 31 January 2010, which will then be attached to the accord as two appendices. However, while developed countries are to “commit to implement” mitigation actions, developing ones need only to “implement”. For Least Developing Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS), these actions are voluntary and depend on them receiving financial support. There is no mention in the Accord of long-term mitigation targets (emission reductions for the year 2050).

Adaptation

The signatories to the Accord recognise that all countries will need to take adaptation measures. This will require enhanced international cooperation, especially in supporting developing countries. International assistance – especially for the most vulnerable countries – will come from developed countries that should provide financial resources for adaptation, technology, and capacity building.

Finance

Funding will be available to developing countries to enable mitigation actions (including REDD actions), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building. For the short-term, developed countries collectively commit to a sum approaching USD 30 billion for the years 2010-2012, with adaptation funding prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries. Developed countries also commit to a goal of collectively providing USD 100 billion per year by 2020. This money will come from various sources, both public and private.

The Accord stresses that funding for developing countries has to be “adequate, predictable and sustainable” and that it will come from new and additional sources (rather than money already available and allocated for international aid).

A ‘Copenhagen Green Climate Fund’ will be established to deal with the flow of funding. As such, it will become “an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity building, technology development and transfer.”

The Copenhagen Accord is silent about details regarding administration and management of the fund, therefore, nothing can be said about the efficiency and effectiveness with which the money will be

What is the legal status of the Copenhagen Accord?

By the end of the last COP plenary, nearly all of the 193 countries agreed to sign the Accord. However it was rejected by Venezuela, Sudan, Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Cuba, and therefore, as the UNFCCC is a consensus process, it cannot be an official COP decision.

The UNFCCC plenary ‘took note’ of the Accord, meaning that it formally acknowledges its existence, and, as a result of a motion from several delegations during the last plenary, the COP has the mandate to follow up on its implementation.¹

However, as it is not a COP decision, mechanisms that the Accord places under the Convention – such as the “Copenhagen Green Climate Fund” - cannot come into force until the Accord is agreed on by all parties. If that does not happen, these mechanisms will have to exist outside the Convention.



allocated, or when the fund will be set up and ready to disburse. Ultimately, the key question at stake is who will control the new funds. While the US favours the World Bank as trustee, the developing nations want a new body directly under the control of the UNFCCC.³⁶

Verification

The Accord outlines an agreed verification mechanism, where the developed countries' mitigating actions, as well as pledged finances, will be subjected to international verification in a transparent way, on the basis of MRV (measurement, reporting and verification). Mitigation actions in Non Annex I countries will also be subject to MRV, but to a domestic mechanism, and will be reported every two years. However, mitigation actions that receive international support will be subjected to international MRV.

REDD+

The Accord recognises the importance of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and supports a REDD+ mechanism. It also supports using markets to promote mitigation and the need to have financial incentives for developing nations to develop in a low carbon direction.

Technology Transfer

Technology transfer features twice in the Copenhagen Accord. The accord features a Technology Mechanism, "to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities." The Accord also named technology transfer as one of the areas that would be supported by finance from the proposed Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. As with the rest of the content of the Accord, the details of the fund or the mechanism are few.

The Accord closes with a call to assess its implementation by 2015, during which time the goal of limiting a global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius will be considered.

Analysis

Finance

The annual USD 100 billion falls far short of the USD 400 billion per year that negotiators of the G77+China called for earlier during the conference. Developing countries, especially AOSIS, considered this global amount "woefully inadequate".³⁷

Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping, chair of the G77, demanded that developed nations should donate up to five per cent of their GNP to long-term financing.³⁸ More moderately, Oxfam International argued that the pledged USD 100 billion per year is only half of what developing countries will need.³⁹

³⁶ Fight to control Copenhagen Climate Change Fund, BBC, (Copenhagen), 17 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8419048.stm>.

³⁷ EU Climate Cash Pledge "not enough" say small nations, BBC, (Copenhagen), 11 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8408821.stm>.

³⁸ Developing countries set tougher targets, Climate Change Media Partnership, 14 December 2009. Date of Access: 9 January 2010. <http://www.climatemediapartnership.org/reporting/stories/developing-countries-set-tougher-targets/>.



REDD+

COP15 in Copenhagen did not produce a legally binding REDD+ agreement but the structure of the mechanism was outlined more thoroughly amongst participating countries. There was clear intent in the Copenhagen Accord to get REDD going without further delay. Among the commitments in the last-minute deal, the Accord called for the “immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus.” Ultimately, the deal to arrest deforestation’s contribution to global climate change did not get over the line, but this was generally a by-product of the stalemate over the wider questions for a comprehensive climate deal.

CDM/JI

The Kyoto mechanisms faced additional criticisms that were not covered in meetings in Copenhagen or within this report. While the Kyoto mechanisms may not be without their flaws, nations and other stakeholders are speaking up with the hope of improving the mechanisms in their current form and these recommendations are gradually assuming a role on the global policy agenda. Many divergent opinions about how to improve the mechanisms exist, and it is therefore likely that policy progress will be slow and incremental.

Technology Transfer

While some progress was made at COP15, a number of central issues remain unresolved. In the post-Copenhagen period, the one main factor that will determine the ambition of the post-2012 arrangements for technology transfer is the level of funding available specifically for technology transfer activities.

The sums required to set up and maintain technology transfer institutions are relatively small compared to funding for adaptation and mitigation: a recent study estimated that the proposals on the table at the beginning of COP15 would cost between USD 150 million and 11 billion per annum, depending on the ambitiousness of the technology transfer arrangements.⁴⁰ This figure, whenever it is decided, will reveal a lot about the seriousness with which technology transfer is treated in any post-2012 arrangements.

Besides this main question of funding, a number of other issues need to be resolved. Some of these, like the structure, scope and governance of the Technology Network, will be decided within the UNFCCC process. For others, such as intellectual property, it is likely that a series of bilateral or multilateral agreements outside the UNFCCC will be required, given the complexity of reaching a single arrangement for a range of technologies and contexts.

³⁹ Copenhagen’s One Real Accomplishment: Getting Some Money Flowing. New York Times, (New York), 20 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/business/energy-environment/21iht-green21.html>.

⁴⁰ Financial assessment of the technology proposals under UNFCCC, E3G, 3 November 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://www.e3g.org/index.php/programmes/climate-articles/financial-assessment-of-the-technology-proposals-under-the-unfccc-an-e3g-ec/>



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Implications of the Accord on Global Climate Policy

The Copenhagen Accord as it stands is a weak document, which fails to fulfill the UN's requirements of consensus among the 192 members to the Conference of Parties (COP), but also falls short of requirements for a robust global climate policy framework, with contributions from both developed and developing nations.

The Accord, drawn up by the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, got the eventual backing of the EU. However, it was dismissed by the developing countries, who felt excluded from the negotiating process. In consequence, many delegations argued that the UN process had become completely unworkable, making it impossible to forge consensus among disparate countries debating the contentious fundamental requirements of a global climate change agreement.

As a result, it's likely that future discussions about tackling climate change might be more effectively raised at other forums – the G8/G20 meetings for example – where approximately 30 countries are likely to represent over 90% of global emissions.⁴¹ This smaller group of nations will tackle a narrower agenda of issues, like technology sharing or the merging of carbon trading markets, without the chaos and posturing of the United Nations process. A version of this already exists in the 17-nation Major Economies Forum, which has been a model of decorum and progress compared with what the world saw unfold at the climate talks in Copenhagen.

⁴¹ Copenhagen: Key questions on climate deal, Guardian, (UK), 19 December 2009. Date of Access: 10 January 2010. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-key-questions-climate-deal>.



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Conclusion

UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, US President Barack Obama and EU leaders have described the Copenhagen Accord as a "first step" to dealing with global warming, though they admit that as it stands, it isn't enough to address the problem. Many environmental stakeholders have been bitterly disappointed with the outcome, which they argue falls short of the ambitious legally binding commitments that the planet demands in the face of fatal climate change impacts.

Fundamental requirements for a successful global climate change treaty will need to ensure legally binding, mid- and long-term targets for emissions reduction to limit global average temperature increases to at least 2 degrees Celsius, a sizeable and transparent funding package with strong governance to address adaptation and mitigation in the most vulnerable countries, and support technology transfer and low carbon developed among the least developed countries. The urgency for an agreement which is implemented immediately to reduce costs and impacts of climate change must be reflected in the ambitious deal adopted globally; and world leaders, delegates and NGOs at COP15 are well versed in understanding the political contentions associated with reaching such consensus.

If this is the criterion we were hoping to tick off in Copenhagen, then it is safe to say that COP15 hasn't delivered the deal the world was hoping for - a legally binding treaty with emissions cuts for developed countries (as well as some measures for developing countries), and a detailed finance package; and several contentious issues have simply been postponed to COP16 in Mexico.

The success of COP15 may be better judged in hindsight at the end of 2010, when it is expected that both developed and developing countries will have presented their pledges for tackling climate change, and the world may be closer to the possibility of a legally binding treaty developed from the Copenhagen Accord. However, the likelihood of taking this weak agreement to a stronger legal treaty is likely to be a challenging path full of hurdles and saboteurs.



Acronyms

AOSIS: Association of Small Island States

AWG-KP: Ad-hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol

AWG-LCA: Ad-hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention

CDM: Clean Development Mechanism

COP: The Conference of Parties

COP/MOP: The Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

CCS: Carbon Capture and Storage/Sequestration

DOE: Designated Operational Entity

ENGO: Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations

GEF: Global Environment Facility

IETA: International Emissions Trading Association

JI: Joint Implementation

LDCs: Least Developed Countries

LDCF: Least Developed Countries Fund

NAPA: National Adaptation Programmes of Action

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

SBSTA: The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice

SBI: Subsidiary Body for Implementation

UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change



About Climatico

Climatico is an independent network of researchers and climate change experts that analyse and report on the latest developments in climate change policy around the world. Climatico originally focused its analysis on the Group of Twenty (G-20) countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Union) but is now expanding its ambit to incorporate policy analysis in additional regional blocs such as Africa, Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The group assesses government policies addressing mitigation and adaptation to climate change, including the underlying rationale and drivers of action and non-action.

In addition, Climatico focuses on the most important international issues under discussion at high-level climate policy forums and venues (G8, UNFCCC, G-20, etc.). The International Team analyses the success and wider role of these multilateral negotiating forums on climate change and often takes a more thematic approach by monitoring policy trends and developments regarding Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry (LULUCF), adaptation, CDM, emissions targets and sustainable energy.

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