Protests called a Global Day of Action, a march for action on climate change, in Durban, South Africa, on December 3, 2011. (Photo by: tcktcktck, Global Campaign for Climate Action)

By Climatico Contributor: Shira Honig

With the Durban climate change negotiations barely a week old, key countries are drawing their “red line” positions in the sand.

On one side of the line, where the Group of 77 (G77) + China and other developing countries firmly sit, is a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol that continues binding targets for current country signatories after the first period expires at the end of 2012 (excluding Canada, which has announced that it is pulling out of the treaty altogether). On the other is a European Union plan for a new global agreement with binding targets for all countries beginning in 2015 and in force by 2020.

Emerging today is the news that India has rejected the EU plan for a new treaty.

Leading up to Durban, the EU said it was willing to consider an extension of the current Kyoto Protocol commitments, in exchange for a broader international agreement to begin in 2015, with emerging economies under the same binding targets as western industrialized countries. Since the first day of the negotiations, Poland, who currently holds the revolving EU presidency, has clearly stated that a “Kyoto II” could be a part of a transition to a wider, post-Kyoto agreement.

Before India announced its opposition, China had already rejected the plan, saying that a new mandate before the Bali Roadmap was complete was “too much.” China, which so far has spoken on behalf of both the G77 and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) – which has concerned some negotiators – remains firm in its opposition to binding cuts at the international level. It maintains that it is pressing ahead with ambitious national plans to cut emissions, increase energy efficiency and renewable production, and decrease deforestation.

India’s rejection of the EU plan brings the opposition level to three countries, including the United States. Like China, India maintains its current position of not committing to legally binding emissions cuts. The U.S. maintains its own position that China and India must accept legally binding cuts like other western countries. Only then would it consider a new treaty. In an interview, U.S. negotiator Jonathan Pershing deflected the issue, saying that until resistance from India and China to the EU plan abates, it is not prepared to take on legally binding obligations.

Meanwhile, in its own interviews, the EU has expressed frustration that its significant efforts to reduce emissions and provide climate finance – the most ambitious of western blocs and countries – have gone unrecognized. As in Copenhagen, where it was shut out of a final deal negotiated by the U.S. and the BASIC countries, it finds itself rejected again.

Without a move on these red-line positions from one country or another, a compromise deal is unlikely. Senior ministers and heads of state will join the negotiations on Dec. 6.

The International Conference Centre in Durban, South Africa, venue of the COP17 climate change negotiations. (Photo by: Karen Lotter/Ethekwini)

By Climatico Contributor: Shira Honig

Heading into Durban and the United Nations Climate Change Conference, otherwise known as the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP-17), the G77 remains committed to its long-standing position of achieving a legally binding agreement. Given the ongoing stalemate between developed and developing countries, however, many media accounts say they are unlikely to achieve it anytime soon.

Chief among its goals, the G77 is seeking a “Kyoto II,” a second commitment period that kicks in when the current commitment phase in Kyoto expires at the end of next year.

Developed countries such as the United States and Japan, meanwhile, remain committed to their own long-standing position of refusing to accept their own legally binding targets without also including binding commitments from major emerging economies such as China and India. For its part, India in recent months has consistently refused to commit to legally binding emissions cuts without more commitments from the U.S. Alongside this, several developed countries have attempted to downplay expectations for a treaty before 2015 or even 2020, angering many in the G77 who are urgently seeking international support to deal with climate change impacts.

The G77 is a loose coalition of developing countries founded in 1964 that has now grown to 132 members. Such large numbers inevitably lead to different positions within the group, with some members splintering off into other smaller regional blocs of which they may also be members, such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) or the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). At the same time, larger numbers mean greater negotiating strength, and the G77 maintains several collective positions, including the desire for a Kyoto II. The BASIC countries issued a joint statement early November calling for a second commitment period.  

Another of G77’s main goals, and a sticking point heading into Durban, relates to climate financing flows from developed to developing countries. The G77 is looking for progress on implementation of the Green Climate Fund, as agreed to in Cancún at COP-16 last year.

Many of its members are largely distrustful of western promises for financing, and with good reason. The rules governing development aid have long been opaque and bureaucratic, with countless requirements that developing countries generally do not have the capacity to meet. In the current round of climate negotations, at least some of what developed countries promised as “new and additional” funding through the Copenhagen Accord has not been proven to be new or additional. For example, following an announcement early November that European Union finance ministers would provide $5.5-billion in short-term funding, criticisms came from NGOs such as Oxfam, to developing country ministers, such as India’s new environment minister, Jayanthi Natarajan, who said the money was merely repackaged aid. While such criticisms are fair, today’s economic crisis in Europe – and threatening to spread far beyond – poses a critical threat to both short and long-term climate funding.

As host of COP-17, G77 member South Africa is looking for ways to minimize the ongoing rift. Its negotiators have called in Valli Moosa, former Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and now the chairperson of the board of the World Wide Fund for Nature in South Africa, to advise the South African delegation and ease tensions between countries.

With its international clout, China is also seeking ways to bring parties together.  Xie Zhenhua, China’s chief negotiator whose influence was evident in the pivotal – and negotiators would say, negative – role he played in Copenhagen, is encouraging emerging economies to increase their own commitments. Xie is asking them to present national plans that may not be legally binding under Kyoto, but that at least show they are serious about reducing emissions at the national level. It is not clear at this point whether G77 members will buy into the plan, or whether it will satisfy the U.S. and other developed countries as being enough.  

Perhaps unintentionally, Xie’s idea is similar to those of U.S. chief climate change envoy Todd Stern, who was reported as saying this past spring in New York that internationally binding emissions caps are not necessary if you have national laws and regulations instead. In fact, he added, making obligations legally binding creates a perverse incentive that “diminish the ambition of what countries are proposing to do.” No doubt he was thinking of China as he made his statement.

The G77 would certainly take issue with Stern’s statement that a treaty is not necessary for targets, or for that matter, for financing implementation. Nevertheless, if a binding outcome does not emerge from Durban, they will need to seek ways to work around this deficit.

Disputed land (Source: Achmad Rabin Taim)

Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) credits have been receiving plenty of bad press, with the latest being reports of human rights abuses committed in Honduras over the ownership of credit-producing land. This is particularly serious as the CDM has been set up to feed into the EU ETS, which means that CDM credits find their way into the EU emissions market. Trading in credits whose origin is both legally questionable and ethically suspect does not bode well for the environmental integrity of the EU ETS.

The CDM

EU ETS regulated installations are allowed to use a set proportion of emissions reduction credits generated from CDM projects in developing countries. This is permitted as a way of linking the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms to the EU ETS. In exchange for one CDM credit a Member State has to issue and surrender one emissions allowance and then cancel the credit, which cannot itself be traded within the EU ETS. There are legislative limits on the levels of CDM credits that can be swapped for allowances.

Earning credits in this manner has proved a popular way of fulfilling EU ETS obligations due to the proliferation of CDM projects across the developing world. There are currently over 3,000 CDM projects registered with the UN.

Who owns the land?

CDM projects involve land which is owned by UN approved entities that are in charge of generating the credits. This is the case in Honduras, where the projects under fire have entailed the production of palm oil. Local farmers are protesting against the palm oil plantations and claim that they have been wrongfully evicted from their land so that the CDM projects can go ahead. There are widespread reports of worrying levels of violence against those who are trying to recover their land.

This dire situation highlights one of the key problems with the CDM. How can the ownership of the CDM credits be secure when the ownership of the credit-generating land itself has been thrown into doubt? Many of the developing countries which host these types of projects lack an adequate land registration system whereby ownership can be adequately recorded and subsequently protected. This leads to situations like the present one in Honduras, where land disputes between parties with competing claims can degenerate into something much more sinister.

Banning the “bad” CDM credits?

The CDM has brought the inadequacy of land ownership protection present in these developing legal systems into the EU’s own back yard. Not only does this render the ownership of the credits themselves disputed, but it also brings with it the allegation that the system is being built on unethical practices. While the EU is in no way responsible for these unfortunate events, the controversy is stretching to the EU ETS due to the reliance of regulated installations on CDM credits to earn emissions allowances.

There are demands from within the EU to ban those CDM credits which have been tainted by human rights abuse allegations. It is rightly perceived that the EU ETS cannot be associated with grave breaches of this nature. This kind of ban on suspect credits has happened before with Chinese CDM projects which were said to lack any environmental integrity. The projects in question involved producing a noxious gas (HCFC-22) simply to burn its equally noxious output (HFC-23) and thereby earn credits.

Increased vigilance is needed

The controversy that surrounds the CDM is not fading away very easily. This is because the UN’s monitoring powers in respect of projects which are spread worldwide are not sufficiently strong to prevent the system from being abused. The EU ETS is suffering the consequences, which may well add to the volatility of the emissions market. The EU needs to be especially vigilant. Having to ban a new type of offending credit on a regular basis is cumbersome, but the more sweeping alternative of seriously questioning the CDM has not been seriously put on the table so far.

Are these emissions real? (Source: Pavel Ahmed)

Emissions trading continues to court controversy following recent events which have seen Romania, an EU ETS country, suspended from trading its Kyoto Protocol emissions units by the UN. The knock-on effect has been to exclude Romania from the spot market in EU ETS allowances (EUAs) for a predicted period of six months.

This incident highlights the ease with which EUAs can be fashioned out of unverified emissions. In Romania’s case, a substantial surplus of Kyoto units (which can translate into EUAs) was created on the basis of inadequately reported emissions. It is therefore understandable that the UN has stepped in to prevent flooding the market with these “tainted” instruments. However, the actual existence of the units in the first place raises questions as to the verifiability of what feeds into the EU ETS.

Emissions reporting failures

The UN’s Kyoto Protocol enforcement branch found that Romania’s standards for monitoring and verifying projects which generated emissions units fell short of the UN-mandated requirements. Estimating emissions from forest management was identified as a particularly serious issue as they formed the bulk of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions.

As previously discussed on Climatico, the EU ETS has already experienced a host of problems generated by Member States’ shortcomings in adequately administering the trading of EUAs. However, the problem goes even deeper: the very emissions on which the EUAs are based are not always properly monitored. This means that EUAs do not necessarily guarantee the existence of corresponding efforts to cut down the release of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. On the basis of figures not backed by properly verified and transparent reporting, Romania would have been able to use some of its allocated Kyoto units for compliance with the EU ETS. This could have had serious negative consequences for the scheme’s emissions reduction credentials.

Damage to the EU emissions market

The failures in verification have a potentially wider impact on the EU emissions market. The UN’s suspension of Kyoto units trading translates into Romania’s exclusion from spot trading of EUAs under the EU ETS. This may turn out to have grave effects on the EU emissions market as it causes uncertainty (since the date for lifting the suspension has not yet been firmly set) and could undermine general investor confidence in the market, according to the Joint Implementation Action Group. Since the viability of the EU ETS is premised on a liquid and functioning emissions market, this could deal another serious blow to its environmental goals.

More specifically, the suspension also hurts Romanian firms which are regulated by the EU ETS. This regime aims to incentivise polluters to reduce their emissions by allowing them to do so at the lowest cost. In theory at least, regulated firms can choose to cut emissions either by installing greener technologies or by trading EUAs in the market in order to cover their greenhouse gas output. Since a substantial part of the Kyoto units would have been allocated to Romanian firms for use within the EU ETS, the suspension has the effect of temporarily excluding these firms from the emissions market and thus damaging their reputation as market participants. This is another way to damage the EU emissions market as a whole by depriving it of valuable and much needed volumes of trade.

What is the alternative?

The UN’s apparently drastic response can be justified in view of the blow that would have been dealt to the Kyoto Protocol if unverified (and potentially ungrounded) emissions units would have been allowed into the market. On the other hand, credible arguments have been made that the damaging effects of this decision on the international market in emissions and the EU ETS far outweigh the risk of affecting the Protocol’s environmental integrity. Each path comes with its own caveats. It must not be underestimated how difficult it is to achieve a generally acceptable trade-off between successful environmental protection and a viable emissions market.

Guest Editorial by: Matt Williams, UK Youth Climate Coalition

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres during a press briefing (Image by: IISD Reporting Services)

The UNFCCC process has been mired in something of a quandary since the high hopes around Copenhagen in 2009 were quickly dashed when countries failed to come up with a second global, legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (due to expire in 2012). But the meeting in Cancun in late 2010 repaired some of the damage.

In Bonn, it quickly became clear to me that there are still a lot of big gaps in the negotiations. The talks are now over but these gaps remain unresolved ahead of the talks in Durban in December.

One such gap is a concern around the Green Climate Fund, agreed upon in Cancun. This body which aims to provide $100bn a year by 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation faces problems concerning its funding in the medium term (2012-2020). While kick-start funding currently stands at $10bn a year, Parties must increase their public climate finance commitments to ensure that the Green Climate Fund moves forward. There is a lack of clarity about how it will reach its 2020 target. The funding gap between now and 2012 still looms large.

The second potential gap concerns the Kyoto Protocol. This is the legally binding global deal which commits some countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions between 2008-2012. The commitments concern only 37 Parties, the wealthier countries in the world (with some notable exceptions – the US still hasn’t ratified the Kyoto Protocol). Nonetheless it has been a key part of moving global climate negotiations forward. In 2012 the Kyoto Protocol will expire and there is currently no new deal on the table to replace it. Any amendment to extend or replace the Kyoto Protocol would require all countries to independently ratify it by 31 December 2012 to prevent there being any gap. It is almost too late for this now, and so a regulatory gap is almost a certainty. Indeed, in a meeting with young people in Bonn which I was lucky enough to attend, Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, said that a regulatory gap is inevitable.

Coming up with a new deal is high on everyone’s list of priorities, but remains a contentious issue. It is made particularly difficult by questions over the involvement of emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, who are unwilling to limit their economic progress, but whose involvement will be vital before countries such as Canada and the US will even begin to discuss entering a new deal. However, there are signs that the EU and the G77 might be beginning to talk behind the scenes about how a new deal could be struck. What such a deal would avoid is a so-called “pledge and review” system whereby countries would essentially go it alone and commitments would not be part of a global legally binding framework.

Finally, the ambition gap is probably the best known of all the gaps. Outside of the Kyoto Protocol, countries discuss their pledges to reduce emissions in the long-term. The ambition gap can be defined as the difference between the emissions reductions countries are committed to and the emissions reductions the science requires in order to keep global warming to safe levels. The science tells us that there is a big gap between the amount of emissions that would be saved by current pledges on the one hand and the need to limit warming to 2C on the other.

What’s more, at the opening of the talks last week, Oxfam released a report showing that two thirds of emissions reduction efforts currently on the table are those made by developing countries (those countries with the least historical responsibility for climate change and with fewer means to make emissions reductions). This revelation puts wealthier developed nations to shame and shows that a second ambition gap is opening up, between developed and developing country Parties.

The negotiations in Bonn were frustrating. Positive options are still on the table, but countries did little to move towards them at these talks. The space remains open for many countries to show leadership on a number of issues in Durban and to move the world towards a clean, fair future.

Matt Williams is part of UK Youth Climate Coalition’s (UKYCC) youth delegation to the UN climate talks (un.ukycc.org) and is currently interning with the ClientEarth communications team.

This story originally appeared on ClientEarth.

UNFCCC Bonn conference – June 2011. (Image by: Adopt a Negotiator)

The UN Climate Change Conference kicks off this week in Bonn, Germany as governments continue framework discussions in preparation for the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP17) to be held in Durban, South Africa, at the end of the year. Over three thousand participants representing 183 countries are attending the conference in Bonn from June 6-17, including government delegates, business and industry representatives, environmental organizations, and research bodies.

Speaking on the first day of the conference, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres reminded governments that they hold an unavoidable responsibility to make clear progress towards the 2011 climate objectives agreed to at COP16 in Cancun.

“Governments lit a beacon in Cancun towards a low-emission world which is resilient to climate change. They committed themselves to a maximum global average temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius, with further consideration of a 1.5 degree maximum. Now, more than ever, it is critical that all efforts are mobilized towards living up to this commitment.”

Ms. Figueres expects that the meeting in Bonn should provide clarity on the architecture of the future international climate change regime to reduce global emissions. In addition, negotiators will focus on the design of the finance, technology and adaptation institutions agreed to in Cancun which will allow developing countries to successfully adapt to climate change while still building their own sustainable futures.

The conference comes amid a backdrop of new warnings from the International Energy Agency (IEA) of a sharp rise in the volume and concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. The IEA announced last week that 2010 emissions from global energy generation have returned to record highs, marking an unexpectedly sharp rebound from the reduced emission levels caused by the financial crisis. Reports now show that carbon dioxide concentrations have once again peaked at just under 395 parts per million (ppm).

The two week conference includes the thirty-fourth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 34) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 34), the sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 16), and the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 14).

New items under discussion include: SBI’s consideration of proposed items on work programmes relating to reporting by Annex I and non-Annex I countries, adaptation, and response measures, as well as SBSTA’s consideration of the work programme on agriculture, the impacts of climate change on water and water resource management, and the initiation of a new work programme on issues regarding reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) identified within the Cancun Agreements.

No Gas (sourced from: The U.S. National Archives)

The United Nation’s flexible mechanisms were introduced as a cost-effective and efficient method to help poorer countries develop sustainably, whilst providing developed countries another option to meet commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) have progressed at different rates, with different levels of engagement and varying degrees of scope in the ensuing emission reductions. One project sector has benefited more than others and recently, has come under fire for its environmental credibility. But what is the issue and why is it so politically toxic?

A Failure or Success?

The Montreal Protocol was established to regulate a certain type of gas: ones that are believed to be responsible for ozone depletion. Difluoromonochloromethane, better known as HCFC-22, is one such gas that is still used in refrigeration and air conditioning processes in many developing countries. It is a by-product of HCFC-22 in which we are interested: HFC-23 (another hydrogen-based gas also called fluoroform).

HFC-23 has a 100-year global warming potential of between 11,700 (UN) and 14,800 (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), meaning that over 100 years, one metric tonne of this gas has the equivalent global warming impact of 11,700 tonnes of carbon dioxide. Its use is not currently governed by the Montreal Protocol, but the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) realised that the potential impact to the atmosphere was too significant to ignore. As a result, they chose to include the destruction of HFC-23 in the CDM and JI via the Kyoto Protocol.

Because reducing one tonne of CO₂ equivalent by a project generates one Certified Emission Reduction (CER – the currency of the CDM), destroying one tonne of HFC-23 generates 11,700 CERs. Consequently, the emission reductions generated through the CDM by destroying HFC-23 have outstripped all others: out of the 421 million CERs issued to date, HFC-23 contributes 52% from only 18 projects.

To some, CDM projects that destroy HFC-23 have been a great success, by increasing liquidity and bulking up the volume of CERs that are generated. But to others, the vast amounts of CERs which have been generated are windfall profits to polluters, and can perversely incentivise the increased production of HFC-23.

Rocking the Boat

Environmental NGO, CDM-Watch, proposed last month an amendment to the methodology which CDM HFC-23 projects conform. CDM-Watch alleged that some operators of HFC-23 projects could be “gaming” the system in order to gain more CERs (which on the secondary traded market are currently worth approximately €12).

The group questions the adequacy of the ratio of HCFC-22 to HFC-23 that is used by projects to calculate their emission reductions. Currently, the rules set the maximum ratio at 3%, so 0.03 tonnes of HFC-23 to 1 tonne of HCFC-22. But the proposal sees this reduced to a minimum of 0.2%

The CDM’s Methodology Panel, the body charged with overseeing the methodologies of the CDM, chose to ask the higher-profile CDM Executive Board (EB) to decide on the issue. There remains a good chance that the EB fails to reach a verdict and instead passes the issue up to the UNFCCC because of how politically charged this topic has become.

Indeed, CDM-Watch appears more than aware of the politically sensitivity that surrounds the HFC-23 controversy. CDM-Watch warned that EB members from China, India, Netherlands, UK, Japan and Norway should abstain from voting on the proposed methodology revision due to conflicts of interest. These countries either host the projects or have vested interest in the CER generation.

In any case, the proposal has caused a stir in the CDM and participants are looking for certainty. The EU and the US have both made suggestions that offsets generated by the destruction of HFC-23 may be banned from their respective carbon reduction plans after 2012 (if one is ever enacted in the US). So investors in HFC-23 reduction projects are right to be concerned.

If restrictions are approved, it is still unclear when they will take place. Current project contractual agreements indicate that the EB may have to wait until a project requests an extension to their crediting period (usually seven years, with the possibility of two extensions) before amending the methodology. In fact, a request to extend the crediting of a certain HFC-23 in South Korea was postponed last month by the EB until a later date, certainly until something more concrete has been decided.

It seems that the workhorse of the CDM is under threat. Just less than 50% the world’s HFC-23 is included in the CDM (since no HFC-23 projects were eligible after 2004). A proposed amendment to the Montreal Protocol could cover the rest, essentially sealing off HFC from further commercial interest. But how the CDM, JI and their participants react to its current piece-of-the-pie remains to be seen.

The Bonn UN Climate Change Talks in Bonn, Germany is taking place between 31 May – 11 June 2010. Representatives from 182 governments are in attendance, picking up on unresolved issues left over from the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen (COP 15) this past December and putting forward a path for the implementation of international climate change action.

Day 1

The first day of the Bonn Climate Change Talks were dedicated to the SBI and SBSTA opening plenaries. The flexibilities mechanisms were discussed under the SBSTA, with disagreements voiced regarding carbon capture and storage (CCS) and exhausted forests under the CDM, although standardized baselines under the CDM will be discussed.

Yvo de Boer spoke to the press, emphasizing that the two week negotiations will remain on track as long as participating nations maintain their focus on finding a common way forward towards a concrete and realistic goal for the UN Climate Change Conference (COP 16) in Cancún later this year. In addition, he warned that a postponed outcome at the Copenhagen meeting last December does not mean that the impacts of climate change had also been postponed.

A reception hosted by the German government was held later in the evening on Monday to celebrate Yvo de Boer’s tenure as Executive Secretary and wish him farewell.

Day 2

Tuesday marked the opening of meetings for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the UNFCCC (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). In addition, contact groups met to discuss technology transfer under the SBI/SBSTA, non-Annex I communications under the SBI, and other issues including documentation on LULUCF, flexibility mechanisms, and methodological issues.

Under the AWG-LCA, the Chair’s draft text was introduced and several parties noted that it was a good basis for beginning the discussions.  However, some delegates noted concern over the loss of a separate section on finance, perceived imbalance, and the potential for a significant growth in text length, as well as the possible impact of time spent in contact groups on the available negotiating time.

Yvo de Boer also addressed the conference, highlighting Copenhagen’s progress toward a technology mechanism, including a climate Technology Centre supported by regional units, raising the potential for partnership opportunities between governments and the private sector.

Day 3

Wednesday’s schedule consisted of contact group meetings and informal consultations. Issues under discussion included national communications, LDCs, the financial mechanism, capacity building, privileges and immunities, Annex I emission reductions, preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3) under the AWG-LCA, and other issues under the AWG-KP.

Finance was a hot topic of the day, under discussion during the AWG-LCA contact group meeting. The AWG-LCA Chair provided a list of questions regarding the enhanced provision of financial resources which was then discussed during both the morning and afternoon group meetings. Many delegates noted a positive and constructive tone to the discussions, although complaints included discussions going in circles, parties maintaining their pre-Copenhagen positions, and the role of the UNFCCC being threatened by various parallel initiatives.

Day 4

On Thursday, delegates met together for contact groups as well as informal consultations. Issues under discussion included a review of the Adaptation Fund, intergovernmental meetings and capacity building, Annex I emission reductions, research dialogue, the Buenos Aires programme of work (decision 1/CP.10), and preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3).

The fourth day of negotiations took on a positive tone with signs of progress. A proposal put forth by AOSIS and backed by several other developing countries called for joint discussions between the two AWGs of Annex I emission reductions (limited to Annex I countries). This proposal was well received although broader joint discussions on the topic of mitigation still face large opposition. In addition, the US and some other developing countries might not be on board with the AOSIS proposal. Also making headway, the LULUCF submission by developing countries received positive response along with the agreement to reconstitute the legal issues group under the AWG-KP.

Day 5

On the fifth day of negotiations, the AWG-KP plenary took place and contact groups and informal consultations occurred. Topics under consideration included Annex I national communications, Annex I emission reductions, arrangements for intergovernmental meetings, preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3), technology transfer, and the focal point forum under the NWP convened.

Discussion over COP16 and side event arrangements took place and speculation arose over the still-undeclared location of the negotiating session taking place this autumn ahead of Cancún. The hope for joint discussions between the two AWGs was not as strong as the day prior. However, the energy may rise again when delegates meet for the final week of the Bonn climate talks.

Day 6

The second week of negotiations on Monday began with more contact groups and informal sessions. Under discussion: the Buenos Aires program of work (Decision 1/CP.10), preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3), capacity building, the scientific, technical and socio-economic elements of mitigation, and Annex I emission reductions.

The topic of the joint meeting of the two AWGs arose again following the weekend hiatus. Of focus on Monday was the issue of common space for the AWGs, but no consensus has yet been reached. Despite support from AOSIS and various countries in Latin America, the US had not indicated that it would get behind such a meeting and some countries amongst the G-77/China remained in opposition.

LULUCF has also been receiving attention this week: transparency in LULUCF accounting is appearing to gain headway, a common position on reference levels was taken by the G-77/China, and reference constructions are showing signs of opening up.

Day 7

The topics of discussion during Tuesday’s contact groups and informal consultations included: the financial mechanism, capacity building, national communications, review of the Adaptation Fund, preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3), and Annex I emission reductions.

With closing plenaries taking place on Wednesday, not much new was presented as delegates worked hard to wrap up issues under consideration over the past week. At noon, an informal briefing took place by the UN Secretary General’s High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing (AGF) in which members announced that  potential finance sources are currently being prepared in a report which is hope to be completed and presented before COP16 in November.

Day 8

Wednesday marked the end of the climate talks in Bonn. Contact groups and informal consultations took place during the day to discuss Annex I emission reductions and the preparation of an outcome for presentation at COP16 (Item 3). Later in the day, the SBI and SBSTA convened for their closing plenaries.

On Wednesday afternoon, a joint SBI/SBSTA session took place in order to say farewell to the outgoing UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer. Thanking the negotiators, IGOs, NGOs, industry, and his colleagues for their work over the past fourteen years, de Boer stated that “we do not have another fourteen years” to show that the UNFCCC can deliver progress. He noted that as negotiators work towards a legally binding agreement, there are divergences over the meaning of “legally binding” which serves as an advantage as it enables a broad definition. He further emphasized that agreements on several complex subjects cannot be reached with “15,000 people in the room” but through a “clear mandate to work in a smaller group and report back to the COP.” In his closing remarks, de Boer concluded that negotiators “will not only try, but also succeed.”

Read Yvo de Boer’s farewell statement here.

Further Reading

Bridging the road from Copenhagen to Cancún – Can the Bonn Climate talks lay any firm foundations? (Posted 31 May 2010 by Sabrina Chesterman)

France has prepared for positive Bonn outcome (Posted 6 June 2010 by Jennifer Helgeson)

Bonn Climate Talks: Paving the way to Cancún (Posted 8 June 2010 by Sabrina Chesterman and Nyla Sarwar)

As the 32^nd session of the UNFCCC Convention subsidiary body gets underway at the Hotel Maritim in Bonn, many will be hoping the talks can deliver some measure of mediation between parties and begin carving a real path towards Cancun. Outgoing Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, had urged all Parties to ‘overcome differences and work for greater clarity on what can be agreed to by all Parties for Cancun in December.’  The UN’s top climate change official, who will be replaced by Christiana Figueres from Costa Rica after the Bonn meeting, has promoted negotiators to gain finality on the architecture that will launch inclusive and effective global climate action. In an attempt to prevent deadlock in the talks, as witnessed at Copenhagen, do Boer has focused specifically on the need to conclude on “mitigation targets and action, a package on adaptation, a new technology mechanism, financial arrangements, ways to deal with deforestation and a capacity building framework”.

Making allies rather than enemies will be crucial if the talks at Bonn are to proceed. A strong coalition is the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), supported by more than 100 Parties, has already asserted it will not shift from its position centred on mitigating global temperatures to a 1.5 degree rise above pre-industrial levels to stabilise atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations below 350ppm. Grenada, on behalf of AOSIS, has already affirmed that this goal must be reflected in the draft negotiating text. These small island states, some of the most vulnerable to continued climatic change and associated implications such as sea level rise, have been resolute in their demands that pledges of 2°C will not be sufficient.

It is expected the US will be an important voice with their negotiating team having already flagged to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long Term Co-operative Action (AWG-LCA), one of the two subsidiary bodies of the UNFCCC, that it does not recognise the current text proposed as a basis for negotiations. Although the Copenhagen Accord was not formally adopted by the Conference of the Parties, 120 of the 194 UNFCCC parties have signed the Accord, consequently countries like the US are pushing for the Accord to progress under the Convention. The official position of the Secretariat coming into the Bonn meeting was the fact the Accord can be used as part of the negotiation process. This has come under fire from India and China, countries pivotal to the negotiations, citing that the talks should be based on the existing UN tracks namely the Kyoto Protocol and Long Term Cooperative Action (LCA). The task at Bonn is to try and find a medium between these and come up with a new draft that adequately integrates the Accord as well as the existing tracks.

Financing mechanism will also be high on the agenda, with the 26 developed countries that drew up the Copenhagen Accord pushing for the establishment of a Green Climate Change Fund. The Fund, proposed as one financial entity of the Convention supports projects and policies relating to mitigation for example REDD plus as well as adaptation projects through support, capacity building and technology transfer. A priority for the Bonn talks will be to shape how the US$30 billion pledged by industrialised countries at Copenhagen can be utilised in the near term (up until 2010) to kick-start climate action in developing countries. Issues of contention include the governance and leadership of the Fund, currently suggested to be under a board nominated by the Conference of the Parties, however many developing countries are hesitant with this notion. It is essential this promise of funding is met, and a clear road ahead until 2012 is made to regain some trust between the developed and developing nation negotiation blocks. It is essential a transparent and agreed upon methodology is employed to prioritise the most vulnerable countries and appropriately apportion financing through the Fund in this manner.

The UN climate change body has come up with a new draft which has elements of the Copenhagen Accord as alternative options for the nations to agree.  The Chair of the LCA group will be hoping to bridge these contrasting views, especially mediating talks between the small island states, China and India and the developed nation block. An indicative roadmap has already been proposed to guide the road to Cancun in December, however major speed bumps include issues related to mitigation, finance, measurement, reporting and verification. The greatest block is the global temperature targets and according emission limits, and negotiators at Bonn will have to grapple between either committing to deep cuts in the near term or setting up a longer term more ambitious global reduction plan.

Top priority on the agenda is the preparation of an outcome from the Bonn talks which can be to be presented to the Conference of the Parties in Cancun for adoption to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention. In addition developing countries will be focusing on the need for cooperative action now, up to and beyond 2012, especially with regards to clarity on the future of the Kyoto Protocol. The crux is again likely to occur with the US wanting a legally binding agreement for all relevant parties, especially China, the greatest emitter of CO₂ with the developing countries likely to reiterate their stance on historical responsibility.

The two week Bonn session represents a significant portion of the remaining negotiating time before Cancun and therefore priority needs to be on finalising the architecture around the fast-track funding and ensuring funds can be efficiently and equitably distributed as laid on in the Accord. In addition do Boer needs to try and align political leadership and iron out political instabilities to try and ensure Figueres can captain and floating ship to Cancun. Almost all the Parties agree there is an urgent need to conclude a legally binding agreement, therefore the Bonn talks need to ensure a comprehensive implementation package is making its way to the table.

Climatico analysts will be following the progression of the meeting through daily updates as well as a concluding analysis.

South Africa’s Minister of Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, and former Minister of Environmental Affairs has emerged as one of the frontrunners to replace Yvo de Boer as chief of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC. In the follow up to de Boer’s resignation, candidates from Indonesia, India, Costa Rica and van Schalkwyk from South Africa, were promoted for the position by their respective national leaders. As the race draws to a close, van Schalkwyk and Costa Rica’s Christiana Figueres have emerged as the key candidates for the role.

 Despite the disappointments at Copenhagen, de Boer still leaves big shoes to fill, with regards to his unwavering energy, rigour and experience he applied to coercing paradoxical sovereign interests at key climate negotiations. His successor, van Schalkwyk as predicted, or Figueres, will have to ensure that the developed – developing country divides witnessed at Copenhagen do not exacerbate. Furthermore, the new Executive Secretary will have to illicit exceptional leadership and diplomatic skills if climate negotiations are to regain credibility and have any measure of success in carving out policy to abate and adapt to climate change.

A big feather in van Schalkwyk’s cap is the expectation of a formal legally binding treaty being ready by the time COP 17 occurs in December 2011 to be hosted by South Africa. Having developing country leadership of the UNFCCC and leadership from the country hosts is viewed as one of the best chances of securing a treaty and succession to the Kyoto Protocol.

van Schalkwyk has had a chequered political history under the apartheid regime, emerging as Minister of Environmental Affairs under appointment from South Africa’s former President Mbeki in 2004. This ministerial experience has given van Schalkwyk positive standing with high profile countries in the UN. In addition, South Africa has been praised for the emissions cuts it announced in the run up to Copenhagen, although the recent approval of a $3.75 billion from the World Bank for the Medupi power station has jeopardised these target’s and South Africa’s approach to climate change mitigation. van Schalkwyk may also face opposition in the form of Figueres’ importance in encapsulating gender issues in leading climate change action. UN general secretary Ban Ki-Moon has the ultimate authority to make the appointment, expected in the near future.