By Climatico Contributor: Nick Oakes

Durban has mixed meanings for REDD+ finance (Source: UNclimatechange)

Durban finished with the now commonplace but contradictory sense of achievement and disappointment. Achievement that something has been agreed, disappointment that because expectations are so low, any agreement seems like an achievement. REDD+, however, has finished COP17 with a less pessimistic sentiment: plenty was agreed in terms of the technicalities, with accord on the measurement of reference levels of emissions, on environmental and social safeguards, and on MRV; but, as discussed last week, the accord between Parties on these issues has caused disquiet among NGOs.

Technicalities aside, it is perhaps more interesting to think about what COP17 means for REDD+ in bigger picture terms – how can it reengage with the discussions of a legal agreement, how will it be financed and what does it mean looking towards next year?

Stranded at sea

REDD+ has for some time been stranded from the mainland of negotiations, with little clarity on how the mechanism relates back to an international agreement. Or in a more literal sense, it sits in the COP texts on its own as a mitigation action separate to NAMAs. Alas, Durban has presented a slightly clearer picture of the direction and merging of the AWG-LCA track of the AWG-KP track over the next few years, and consequently some more clarity on the context in which REDD+ will form part of a future agreement.

Although still abstract, by “context” we mean that REDD+ could, for example, function largely in the same way as the flexible mechanisms do, the CDM and JI, as addendums to a protocol, or it could be a separate, additional mitigation theme, spanning multiple sources of funding or mechanisms. The latter seems to certainly be the case following Durban, but aside from being – quite literally – separate to NAMAs within the texts, a lot more can be gleaned by looking at the dynamics of the finance discussions.

Finance creeping

Finance made a modicum of progress at Durban, although nothing much was to be expected. Various options for sourcing have yet to be formally considered and objections still arise on the inclusion of the private sector as a source of finance.

Nevertheless, there is agreement that finance should be results-based and, more interestingly, there is text referring to both market based and non-market based approaches to finance. It is generally understood that market based approaches would largely entail the sale of rights to carbon stored in or sequestered by the forest and, as we know, the development of these markets outside of the voluntary sector is moving at a sub-glacial pace.

But exactly what non-market based approaches are is less clear. It should be noted here that we talk about market or non-market based approaches largely in the context of delivery of money, not necessarily the sourcing the money, which could come, for example, from a maritime carbon tax in the non-market based approaches or, perhaps more obviously, the sale of carbon credits in the market based approaches.

Attention non-market based approaches

Envisioning non-market based approaches can be a little ambiguous, but clues can be garnered by thinking about the expenditure patterns of major REDD finance programmes, such as the UN-REDD and the FCPF.

These programmes have spent the majority of money on the development of domestic policies for REDD, whilst also providing help on MRV, reference levels and safeguards infrastructure. At the same time, it is taking – and may continue to take – many years to ensure forest countries, donor countries and the mechanisms themselves are on the same page with regard to expectations of results and finance, thus delaying implementation of REDD+ activities.

Nevertheless, based on these experiences, it seems sensible to conclude that REDD+ finance is going to spend some time yet directed towards early stage technical and human infrastructure, and policy development.

In this sense, the ambiguity surrounding non-market based finance becomes a little clearer. It is, at the moment, publicly sourced and grant-based delivery finance towards REDD+ readiness, purely because this is where it seems to be most needed. The assumption, however, that grant-based finance is inexorably channelled towards early stage REDD+ policy and infrastructure development is far from the truth. There could be non-market based mechanisms that focus on the implementation phases of REDD+, such as subsidy and concessional loan programmes, or guarantee and crediting schemes.

Innovating attendant approaches

Indeed this slight untruth about non-market based approaches, and its conflict between non-market and market based finance should guide the discussions of REDD+ over the coming year. Since there is a lack of a compliance market demand for REDD+ carbon, because most forest countries are in the early stages of REDD+ development, and as it takes years to progress through each stage, Durban could mean that non-market remains a synonym for ‘grants going to REDD readiness’. However, Parties could – and should – move it beyond this connotation and consider how non-market based approaches can evolve, financing the later implementation stages in order to keep momentum and avoid stagnation in REDD+, particularly because Parties now plan to spend four years wrangling over emissions targets and their “legal force.”

By Climatico Contributor: Jean-Benoit Fournier

Container Ship (Source: Muhammad Mahdi Karim)

Much work has been – and is currently being – put into agreeing on the format of the much anticipated Green Climate Fund (GCF), a facility that would funnel public and private money to tackle both climate change mitigation and adaptation in developing countries. As mentioned in previous articles, the control of the funds (i.e. the precise mechanisms through which funds would be allocated) has been the subject of heated debates.

While an agreement on the format seems like the least one can expect from the intense negotiations at Durban, the actual funding of the fund is less straight-forward. Cash-strapped nations, and most notably those vulnerable to political pressure, are keen on calling on the private sector for investments. However, the funding of adaptation measures is of less appeal to the private sector than climate change mitigation ones, since they consist mainly of defensive expenditures (that is, expenditures that do not create conventional economic return on investment, but creates value through hedging nations, populations and environments from potential losses). It is unavoidable that the public sector has to chip in if necessary sums of money are to be leveraged.

Another difficulty that adaptation faces as an issue at Durban is the heavy attention that mitigation receives. In the words of one negotiator cited in IISD’s Daily Coverage (Dec. 5^th edition), “it’s time we start discussing adaptation”, as opposed to focusing almost exclusively on ways to reduce GHGs. While the two issues are not formally linked to each other in the UNFCCC arena, commitments on either issue are effectively used as bargaining chips by both developing and developed countries.

Some signs of hope came about recently, as a document circulated at the Conference mentioned the potential contribution to the Green Climate Fund of an international levy on bunker fuels used by be shipping industry. Thanks to the leadership of the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), the shipping industry is reportedly “broadly supportive of such a scheme as long as it is applie[s] globally”. The contribution of the sector could be significant, providing the GCF with something near 10% of its $100b by 2020 objective.

Will other governments step in at this early stage to promise funding or wait for the precise GCF (fund control) mechanism to be agreed on? Will opening on mitigation efforts by developing nations constitute a big enough “carrot” for the developed nations to loosen up their wallets? As prior mentioned in this publication and elsewhere, the UNFCCC’s is a process where nothing is agreed on until everything is agreed on. The shipping industry’s recent move, however, has operated a breach in the catch-22 of the negotiations on adaptation funding. The end of the week will tell if this will have helped catalyzing international public investments in adaptation and thus provide some wind for the adaptation funding ship to sail at last. 

Emerging patchwork of supply important for REDD (source: Ken Bosma)

Last month, the second edition of State of the Forest Carbon Markets,was released. All in all, the report painted a positive picture for the forest carbon markets: the volumes, transaction value and average prices in 2010 were all up on the previous year at, respectively, 30.1MtCO₂e, $178 million and $5.50/tCO₂e.

Notably, REDD based transactions dominated the total volume contracted in the primary market – 67% of the 29MtCO₂e primary market, due to the methodologies developed for the voluntary market – whilst afforestation/reforestation projects declined in transactions across every primary and secondary market.

Moving away from multilateralism

Latin America contracted more than half of all projects in 2010, with the EU as the largest source of demand. Of interest, however, is the increase in localised demand: outside of Europe, most of the demand for a region’s credits was from within that region. In North America, for example, demand nearly equalled supply from the region.

This to be expected, if considered in the context of the wider move towards a patchwork approach to climate policy. The patchwork approach is the increasing preference to enact a patchwork of policies to tackle climate change on a sub-national, national and regional level. These efforts are, arguably, being prioritised over the global, multilateral efforts to address climate change by many countries. It seems that forest carbon is no exception; indeed this approach is becoming increasingly important for REDD.

A patchwork of supply

The report finishes by projecting a growth in supply to 373.1Mt over the period 2011-15, of which REDD projects will supply 335.3Mt, stating that the emerging picture is “fundamentally about a small—but growing—cadre of forward-looking buyers and investors making big bets on the future of the forest carbon markets.”

This is true; the bets are certainly “big”. However, with many countries moving towards a patchwork approach to climate policy, the international compliance market-mechanisms look increasingly unlikely to create significant demand – and in turn supply – for REDD, any time soon. In the Panama climate talks, for example, the focus of discussion still appeared to be on the how market-based mechanisms for REDD are to be included, if at all; demonstrating the absence of globally coordinated efforts to source REDD finance and the gap in financial mechanisms.

It’s possible, then, that “bets” are being made on the growth in REDD supply coming almost entirely from the voluntary markets and a patchwork of non-UNFCCC led unilateral or bilateral compliance mechanisms. The voluntary market is already seeing some significant movement in this area, as the report above demonstrates. In the case of unilateral or bilateral compliance mechanisms, however, the growth is more difficult to envision, precisely because it is a patchwork of mechanisms providing supply, but also because their existence is dependent on the need to offset emissions, i.e. the presence of an emissions cap.

The Governors’ Climate and Forests Taskforce (GCF) is attempting to create such a mechanism. The purpose of the GCF is to create compliance grade REDD credits, such that the entity complying with a cap will buy those emissions reductions in the future. This type of mechanism, whereby the sub-national or national entity that intends to cap emissions helps create methodologies for REDD project types, will become increasingly important for REDD over the coming years. This is because the GCF should, hopefully, demonstrate how REDD can work for projects in the compliance markets, but most importantly, it does so in the context of the emerging patchwork approach.

From the perspective of international climate policy, it may look ungainly, and be more difficult to quantify the emissions reductions on a global scale, but if national and sub-national entities with emissions caps and offsetting rules begin to create similar bilateral mechanisms to that being attempted by the GCF, the REDD market will develop far beyond that offered by voluntary markets alone, bridge some of the finance/supply gap left by the absence of a multilateral mechanism, and do so in the context of the bottom-up, patchwork growth in the REDD space.

GCF needed for more than mitigation (Image by: USFWS Headquarters)

One of the purported successes of the talks in Cancun last year was the creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). This year the GCF’s Transitional Committee (TC) was created, with forty members, twenty-five of which are from developing countries. The TC is tasked with no less than designing the GCF itself. It must be an institution that is capable of handling vast sums of “new and additional” funding from the $100 billion promised annually by 2020, and that can target investment across many different fields of climate change related investment.

The GCF as a “recipe for failure”

The TC has agreed on some guiding principles, one of which is that the GCF should be designed in a way that subordinates private sector finance to public sector funding. This is the approach favoured by many developing countries and is line with the GCF’s objectives of providing more direct, reliable and streamlined access to climate finance. Last week, however, Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) released a white paper that forcefully argues the TC’s current approach is “a recipe for failure.”

The paper’s author, Michael Liebreich, claims that the GCF will never be able to raise a large portion of the $100 billion from the public sector. This, Liebreich states, is because many of the donor countries are under extreme fiscal strains and because many would face political difficulties in passing the revenue raising mechanisms in to law.

Liebreich argues that instead efforts should be focussed on the creation of a Green Climate Finance Framework (GCFF). The GCFF would raise approximately ninety percent of funds from the private sector, channelling money through existing financial mechanisms, whilst investment is largely used to target mitigation or, more specifically, infrastructure projects. The GCF still exists in Liebreich’s scenario, but plays a smaller role, administering the funds needed to leverage private sector money – in this case subsidising the gap left between the cost of clean and dirty energy.

A more complex issue

Liebreich’s arguments are compelling, but there are four immediate objections. First, although donor countries are indeed facing fiscal constraints, the funds they are capable of contributing is unclear. The ambiguity surrounding availability, or willingness, of funding is part of a larger problem: the lack of follow through on financial commitments by developed countries.

It seems premature – or even far-fetched – to state unequivocally at this stage that donor countries are incapable of providing the finance, although the author is correct to draw attention to the difficulty in ensuring the pledged funds are in fact received and spent, and to reaffirm the contention that the private sector will have to play a non-negligible part.

Second, many in the TC may disagree with the sentiment that a large majority of GCF expenditure should be on mitigation. Adaptation is under-funded yet considered equally important as mitigation by developing countries. Moreover, adaption activities are far less likely to be funded by the private sector on a large scale, since they are unlikely to generate revenues – if any at all – of the same scale, stability and longevity as mitigation projects. As the role of the private sector increases in the GCF, the available funding for adaptation decreases.

Third, the guiding principles of the GCF – which reflects the sentiment of those creating the fund – states that recipients wish to use the funding to promote ownership of climate activities within their countries. Although this can be interpreted in many different ways, one is to say that recipient countries wish to ensure the money is spent in a way that does not entrench dependence on foreign money and expertise.

However, since the majority of programmes and projects in a GCFF would be financed and/or owned by private investors, likely to be overseas investors, and that capacity building and technology transfer are both understandably unlikely to be funded by the private sector, domestic ownership of climate change related activities is significantly undermined.

Finally, a guiding principle of the GCF is the desire to make delivery of finance results-based, whilst ensuring it is not wholly conditional on results. Clearly, the delivery of finance by the private sector is based almost entirely on results, and thus runs contrary to the sentiment of those participating in the creation of a climate finance mechanism.

There is no reason why a GCFF cannot be created; indeed it is a good idea. However, suggesting that it should replace the GCF entirely – and therefore that the majority of the $100 billion should come from the private sector – would result in only a sub-section of the types of projects in need of funding, receiving funding. Moreover, it opposes the sentiment and guiding principles of those attempting to create a climate finance mechanism, in that it reduces the domestic ownership of emissions reductions activities and ensures that delivery of finance is almost entirely conditional on results.

Remembering the rainforests (Image by: Ben Britten)

As the number of public sector financial mechanisms targeting REDD+ has increased, and consequently the volume of money flowing in to REDD+, observers are increasingly pointing out that the public sector alone cannot supply the huge sums of money needed to combat deforestation. The private sector is thus needed to share the cost and supply some of the money.

The most commonly proposed mechanism of engaging the private sector is via some sort of carbon market offsetting scheme. However, the world’s largest emissions trading scheme (ETS), the EU ETS, explicitly disallows the use of REDD+ offsets as compliance units in the EU ETS, and seems unwilling to allow offsetting for REDD+ on a large scale before 2020.

This is largely because the EU ETS is concerned that monetising the huge sums of carbon stored in tropical forests could quickly flood the carbon markets with credits, pushing down the price of carbon and further compounding the EU ETS’ ongoing price issues.

Despite this objection, there is still a large drive to engage the private sector in REDD+ financing as soon as possible. Much of the discussion for attracting private finance has focused on creating investable conditions for private actors. High transaction costs, political and regulatory risk, and the absence of any clarity on the monetary value of credits within a compliance carbon market post-2012 must be mitigated, it is said, before private money will flow to REDD+.

However, much less attention has been given to the safeguards that must be put in place to ensure that private sector engagement does not compromise the environmental integrity of a project, credit, or damage the reputational issues of the financial mechanism.

Reputational and Functional Problems

The CDM is an example of how these exact problems have materialised. The reputation of the CDM has been compromised by private sector participants that previously increased the generation of pollutant gases – and subsequently destroyed them – in order to generate more credits. Moreover, the environmental integrity of the credit has been undermined since the credit is treated – although not necessarily priced – in the same way as a credit generated from a project that is genuinely contributing to sustainable development.

Although the specific problems with the CDM are not directly transferable, abstract slightly from the CDM, and the potential for similar problems with a market-based REDD+ mechanism become fairly evident.

First, should perverse incentives exist, they will be exploited. For example, assuming that REDD+ payments can override the opportunity costs of logging, palm oil, mining, etc., there still remains the possibility that virgin forest could be logged and replaced with trees that have higher carbon content, are easier to measure or have a dual revenue stream, such as plantations. The proper restrictions must be in place to ensure the forest’s existence prior to monetisation.

Second, exposing deforestation reductions to market price volatility – often subject to the whims of speculative traders – can quickly result in the revenue gained from a REDD+ project shifting in favour of alternative forms of revenue generation. This causes investors to pull out of projects and private sector funding to slow down. Indeed this is happening right now in the CDM: the exchange-traded price is dropping below the price that project developers are willing to sell the credit, squeezing profit margins for buyers of credits and halting new funding of CDM projects.

Third, limits would need to be put in place to avoid supply-induced price suppression. Limitless offsetting via REDD+ would result in an oversupply as developers attempt to monetise the vast volume of carbon stored in existing forests, causing the exact problem that the EU ETS is concerned with, and resulting, again, in alternative uses of land becoming more profitable. A REDD+ based crediting scheme would thus require a carefully thought-out limit on REDD+ offsets so as to not depress the price of carbon – and in turn deter additional REDD+ projects – simply by its inclusion.

The momentum behind the discussion on the private sector’s inclusion in REDD+ finance is gaining. However, without serious attempts to mitigate the problem highlighted above, the momentum can quite easily be turned on its head. It therefore seems sensible to posit that REDD+ will be reliant on public sector funding for some time, not just because the private sector is hesitant about investing in an unknown market, but because the regulators are unsure of how to adequately overcome these concerns.

(Image by: Green Antilles)

In recent years the transfer of climate finance has emerged as a policy response to equitably addressing climate change mitigation and adaption in developing countries. Much attention has been given to setting up the multilateral or bilateral mechanisms needed to classify, transfer and disburse the funds pledged by donor countries. Of those that have sprung up, thirteen out of the twenty-four major funds focus on REDD+ as the sole or a major objective.

For some observers it has been difficult to keep track of the progress made by the new funds, not least because all thirteen emerged in the space of three years. Nevertheless, using the UK government’s recently commissioned analysis of existing REDD+ targeted funds as a springboard, some preliminary analysis on the progress made by the REDD+ targeted funds can be carried out.

What is being financed?

As a starting point, progress can be defined as the stage at which the most funding for REDD+ has been applied. The three phases that denote the proximity of a country to full implementation of REDD+ based emission reductions are readiness, demonstration and roll out at scale.

At present there has been very little funding applied beyond phase one, with only three countries – Norway, Australia and the USA – targeting phase two, and one country – Norway – targeting the final phase. Rather than an inherent unwillingness to fund beyond readiness, however, this is likely a result of the fact that both the bilateral and multilateral mechanisms have a strategic focus largely on the first two phases.

How much has been spent?

The level of disbursement at each phase perhaps gives a greater insight in to the progress being made. For the multilateral funds the disbursement has a range from zero to twenty per cent of the funds committed, with the Global Environment Facility at zero and the UN-REDD programme at twenty per cent, with all other multilateral funds lying in-between.

The multilateral fund to which the largest amount has been pledged, the Forest Investment Programme, has disbursed a total of £2 million or 3% of the total £335 million pledged. The World Bank’s flagship REDD+ fund, the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, with its Readiness Fund dedicated to investing in phase one and the Carbon Fund dedicated to investing in phases two and three, has spent 11.4% of its Readiness Fund and none of its Carbon Fund as of FY10.

When considering the rates of disbursement, it is worth remembering that disbursement does not necessarily mean expenditure. As an example, take the UN-REDD programme. Funds are disbursed to the forest country offices of the United Nations Environment Programme, Food and Agriculture Organisation and United Nations Environment Programme, who then administer expenditure on behalf of the UN-REDD programme.

The move away from multilateralism

Possibly in response to the slow progress made by multilateral mechanisms, or perhaps due to domestic political motivations, bilateral approaches seem to be emerging as the preferred funding channel for REDD+. According to the UK government’s analysis, to date 67% of committed REDD+ funding has passed through bilateral mechanisms.

The implementation of phases II and III also appears to be moving ahead much quicker through bilateral mechanisms. Take Norway’s Internal Climate and Forest Initiative as an example: it’s currently developing a results-based payment scheme whereby the government of Guyana can receive up to US$250 million over 5 years from 2010 for REDD+ based emissions reductions.

Scratching at the surface

The reasons for low funding levels and the move towards bilateralism are unclear. Multilaterals often cite poor forest governance and a difficulty in establishing clear monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) guidelines as the prime reasons for the low funding follow through. The move away from multilaterals is often attributed to ill-equipped organisations with anachronistic disbursement procedures.

However, the greater speed of implementation of phases II and III through bilateral mechanisms, the apparent preference for bilateral funds and the slow progress made by multilateral funds suggest that the reasons above only scratch at the surface. Moreover, they hint towards the idea that determining the real reasons may require some introspective analysis by the funds themselves.

Climatico has just released its latest report entitled, “Copenhagen De-briefing: An Analysis of COP15 for Long-term Cooperation”

This report analyses key issues under discussion in Copenhagen including: finance, technology transfer, REDD+, CDM and JI, as well as the ongoing conflicts between Annex I and Non Annex I countries. The Copenhagen Accord is also discussed along with its potential effect on future negotiations.

Download the report

Author: Sabrina Chesterman

Hillary Clinton announces US support for a large Climate Change Fund (Image by: Andy Revkin)

As the high level plenary rolls on, countries are disaggregated in their commitments, divided in their sovereign requirements and the bottom line remains, the COP still is no closer to a firm climate agreement.

An agreement needs to be founded in confidence and credibility, a momentous task considering over 100 different states need to be aligned.  Developing countries are fiercely protecting their national sovereignty, developed nations cannot agree on exact funding packages, tensions heighten and frustrations build as each world leader steps to the stage to present their national case and advocate for a solution to climate change, which all agree must be done at Copenhagen.

Gordon Brown called it the task of statesmanship for politics to overcome the obstacles. As the hours tick away, and statesman, presidents and prime minister advocate for an equitable outcome, do we start losing hope that endless talks and speeches prepared and written, perhaps weeks before Copenhagen and tweaked before delivery is not the most constructive use of time? One hopes as statesmen advocate their key messages on the plenary stage, senior negotiators are putting the texts into a workable and politically acceptable agreement behind closes doors.

In the continual roll call of world leaders at the high level plenary, a few developing countries have established their arguments with eloquence and established a useful commentary.  It is clear there is a mutual understanding of the common but differentiated responsibility with regards to existing emissions. Some leaders have not distinguished along the Annex I (developed) and Annex II (developing) country basis, as is done under the Kyoto Protocol.  Instead, as Hilary Clinton referred to, ‘major economies’ need to commit to funding and emissions cuts to their greatest extent.

As contract groups convene behind closed doors, developing countries remain firm in the support for Kyoto. As Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, rightly pointed out in his press conference, why wouldn’t developing countries advocate for a continuation of Kyoto, it’s the only framework that currently exists which compels developed countries who have ratified the protocol, to make emissions cuts?

Hilary Clinton affirmed the United States was prepared to join others to help raise 100 billion dollars a year by 2020. However, the reluctance of China to make firm statements this afternoon has made the chances of a unanimous pact appear unlikely. President of Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo, highlighted the fundamental need for China to engage in final decisions. He used their example of innovation, in allowing millions of Chinese people to shift from a poverty status. Jagdeo challenged China as an indispensible actor to make sure Copenhagen doesn’t become the gravest failure of democratic statesmanship.

The week has been hampered by discussions focusing on procedure rather than substance and leaders know decisions made in the next 24 hours will mean they will be blessed or blamed for generations to come.

The clock is ticking. The UNFCCC’s Copenhagen summit is just 7 days away, and recent reports have been encouraging. Shortly after China and the US made announcements on commitments to reduce their GHGS, Commonwealth leaders backed a $10bn Climate Change fund. Proposed by UK PM Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the fund seeks to provide immediate financial support to those States most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

UK PM Gordon Brown said on Friday that half of the fund should be aimed at helping the most vulnerable states to adapt to climate change, whilst the other half should be targeted at measures to reduce GHGs in the least developed countries.

The first funding would be made available early next year, before any international agreement could take effect, whilst there are suggestions that funds for the most vulnerable small island states would be fast-tracked and made available immediately.

This agreement by the Commonwealth demonstrates how climate change can unite different countries – small/large, rich or poor to find a resolution; and delivers some promise for next week’s summit.

The Commonwealth leaders also agreed to seek a legally binding international agreement, though it is widely believed that “a full legally binding outcome” might have to wait to 2010.

The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, added that any commitments they would announce would be “ambitious”, though it is highly likely that will be subject to significant commitments by other influential nations too.  This prisoner’s dilemma characterises the negotiations, and also represents the biggest threat to a global deal.  However, the recent flurry of announcements for GHG reduction commitments from many of the key players has sparked hope that all is not lost yet.

The countdown begins. I will attend the final week of negotiations with a focus on proposals from the developed nations.

expect more photos like this…

“Unless we see an advance on ambitious industrialised country targets and significant finance on the table, it is very difficult for negotiators in this process to continue their work in good faith” – that’s how Yvo de Boer summarised the current situation today.

But what’s frustrating de Boer (and I’m inclined to agree) is that most rich countries are letting negotiations go to the wire. They’re holding back their final positions, for fear of losing an advantage in the negotiations. And that’s despite poorer countries, most notably the BRICS+, putting lots of constructive stuff on the table. Here’s just a few:

• Brazil – 80% percent reduction in deforestation by 2020
• Indonesia – 26% percent by 2020 from “business as usual” levels
• China – carbon intensity reduced “by a notable margin” by 2020 on 2005 levels.

It’s fine to keep your cards close to your chest during the fun and games a year before the summit, but now there’s only the Barcelona meeting to go before Copenhagen. That’s really not very much negotiating time left… and there’s still no consensus on emissions cuts or a serious commitment on finance on the table.

Admittedly Gordon Brown got the ball rolling a few months ago by putting a figure on it, but there is still no agreement on the size of climate funds or how to manage them.

And there’s no sign of things changing any time soon, especially with Waxman-Markey unlikely to pass through the senate before Copenhagen. So, I’m sure we’ll be seeing many more photos like above one over the next few months. But with initiatives like this currently rumbling back in the House of Representatives, perhaps that’s a good thing?