Authors: Sabrina Chesterman & Nyla Sarwar.

As the climate talks gain pace in Bonn, progress is being made on a new text, designed to resurrect chances of a global agreement in Cancun in December. Many, including outgoing UNFCCC Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, are still hesitant about Cancun being able to achieve a deal, which was originally supposed to have been reached at Copenhagen last December. One of the Mexican negotiators, Luis Alfonso de Albo, has used the coverage at Bonn to try and instill confidence in what may be achieved there, stating a climate deal is still ‘positive’.

The Bonn meetings have brought together key negotiating groups, including;

(I)              AWG-KP – to focus on further commitments by Annex I parties, based on text prepared by the Chair

(II)            AWG-LCA – to focus on preparation of an outcome to be presented to at COP 16, based on a new text by the Chair

(III)           Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) – which will consider issues including national communications and reporting, the financial mechanism and capacity building.

(IV)          Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) – which will consider methodological issues, technology transfer and the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change.

The Bonn discussions have entered their second week with many fundamental questions still remaining regarding the legality of the proposed agreement, emission levels and temperature goals.  The big white elephant in Hotel Maritim where the discussions are being held, lingering from Copenhagen, centres on the scale of commitments by developed and developing countries. The new text aims to ameliorate the huge bridge that exist between these groups and integrate the Copenhagen Accord with the 2009 versions of the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP texts.

In regards to finance, the new text states that that all finance will be new, additional, adequate and predictable. Whilst developed countries have committed to a goal of mobilising USD$100bn/pa by 2020, there is still uncertainty about which countries will contribute towards this and how much. Discussions regarding the generation of private funds have seen suggestions of a potential international cap-and-trade system with auctioned permits. There have also been references to the creation of a Finance Board within the UNFCCC to manage the operators of the agency’s financial mechanisms (i.e the GEF and the Climate Fund), including the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (CGCF). Disillusionment regarding funding is also created due to the texts reference to the Copenhagen Adaptation Framework (CAF), implemented through international collaboration. The CAF aims to undertake 11 activities (e.g. planning, vulnerability assessments, strengthening institutional capacities, building resilience, disaster risk reduction etc.) all of which require extensive funding.  Worryingly the text remains sparse on new market mechanisms, likely to be critical to galvanise funding, especially from private and public sector partnerships.  In addition, as the EU Commissioner for Climate Change, Connie Hedegaard, made clear last week discussing the monetary agreements in lieu of the destabilised Euro does not come at an easy time, especially with money having to be drawn from the public purse.  Therefore funding remains a sensitive yet pivotal topic, especially if alliances are to be bridged between different negotiating groups.

Some aspects of the text being prepared at Bonn remain unchanged from the text prepared at Copenhagen. An example includes the issues surrounding REDD and REDD+, which was hailed as one of Copenhagen’s successes. In addition, the text regarding technology transfer remains unchanged from last year, and this section is considered to deliver a major outcome. The text suggests that establishment of a Climate Technology Centre and Network – the mechanism to support and organise the transfer of technology, encourage collaborative innovation, and skills development for developing countries. It is expected to be funded by the overarching funding mechanism and could begin as early as January 2011. Leading on from technology transfer, discussions so far at Bonn regarding capacity building have been largely inconclusive with additional brackets added to the text, and wide disagreement concerning its funding, delivery mechanism and reporting. With key uncertainties remaining, negotiators at Bonn have a lot of talking to do this week if success is to be achieved in any of these areas and a clear path to Cancun is to be laid.

South Africa’s Minister of Tourism, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, and former Minister of Environmental Affairs has emerged as one of the frontrunners to replace Yvo de Boer as chief of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UNFCCC. In the follow up to de Boer’s resignation, candidates from Indonesia, India, Costa Rica and van Schalkwyk from South Africa, were promoted for the position by their respective national leaders. As the race draws to a close, van Schalkwyk and Costa Rica’s Christiana Figueres have emerged as the key candidates for the role.

 Despite the disappointments at Copenhagen, de Boer still leaves big shoes to fill, with regards to his unwavering energy, rigour and experience he applied to coercing paradoxical sovereign interests at key climate negotiations. His successor, van Schalkwyk as predicted, or Figueres, will have to ensure that the developed – developing country divides witnessed at Copenhagen do not exacerbate. Furthermore, the new Executive Secretary will have to illicit exceptional leadership and diplomatic skills if climate negotiations are to regain credibility and have any measure of success in carving out policy to abate and adapt to climate change.

A big feather in van Schalkwyk’s cap is the expectation of a formal legally binding treaty being ready by the time COP 17 occurs in December 2011 to be hosted by South Africa. Having developing country leadership of the UNFCCC and leadership from the country hosts is viewed as one of the best chances of securing a treaty and succession to the Kyoto Protocol.

van Schalkwyk has had a chequered political history under the apartheid regime, emerging as Minister of Environmental Affairs under appointment from South Africa’s former President Mbeki in 2004. This ministerial experience has given van Schalkwyk positive standing with high profile countries in the UN. In addition, South Africa has been praised for the emissions cuts it announced in the run up to Copenhagen, although the recent approval of a $3.75 billion from the World Bank for the Medupi power station has jeopardised these target’s and South Africa’s approach to climate change mitigation. van Schalkwyk may also face opposition in the form of Figueres’ importance in encapsulating gender issues in leading climate change action. UN general secretary Ban Ki-Moon has the ultimate authority to make the appointment, expected in the near future.

Canada has slightly adjusted its mid-term climate mitigation targets to match US pledges. Canada’s Environment Minister, Jim Prentice, recently announced that Canada has changed its mitigation goals in an effort to harmonize with the Obama administration.

Canada’s new emissions reduction target for 2020 is a cut of 17% on 2005 levels. Heading into the Copenhagen meeting this past December Canada’s mid-term target was a 20% reduction on 2006 levels by 2020. This adjustment comes as countries report their national targets to the UNFCCC as outlined in the Copenhagen Accord. The new Canadian commitment has been labeled by environmental groups as being slightly less stringent than the previous target, and well outside the range of targets proposed by the European Union (20% cuts from 1990 levels by 2020, with the possibility of going up to 30%).

On the face of things, Canada’s adjusted target is just another step towards an apparent harmonization between the Canadian and US positions on climate change, something that Minister Prentice has been calling for since taking over the portfolio.

However, differences clearly remain on policy direction and actions for addressing climate change. While Canada will now follow US pledges for 2020, it is not clear if Canada will adjust its long term targets to match those included in legislation before the US Senate.  A climate bill passed by the House proposed a sharp cut of 80% on 2005 emissions levels by 2050, a target that the Canadian government does not seem to be considering.

Additionally, as previously reported on Climatico here, there is a big difference in stimulus spending on green initiatives on either side of the 49th parallel. Reports by the Pembina Institute have suggested that the U.S. is vastly outspending Canada on a per capita basis on renewable energy infrastructure.

In a recent speech in Calgary to oil executives, Minister Prentice indicated that any Canadian action on climate change was contingent on American actions. Critics have argued that this matching of American policy may result in indefinite delays as climate legislation faces an uphill battle in the US Congress.  This position has also resulted in furthering internal political divisions within Canada, as Quebec Premier Jean Charest came out strongly against the federal government policy.

If Canada is to wait for certainty in the American position it could be some time before Canada implements a comprehensive program to reduce emissions, either through a cap-and-trade scheme or through regulation.

While the Obama administration is making moves towards regulating carbon emissions through the Environmental Protection Agency it is unclear how far along Canada’s plans are to similarly regulate industry north of the border.  A plan to regulate emissions from heavy industry in Canada was due to be released last year (a deadline already shifted numerous times) but will now likely be stalled indefinitely.

Mystery in China (Image by: **Maurice**)

China’s Copenhagen pledges, along with fifty four other nations, have recently been announced. China has pledged to reduce its carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels, raise the level of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 15% and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares with a rise in forest stock volume of 1.3 billion cubic metres by 2020 from 2005 levels.

How significant are these pledges? All of them are as China promised before Copenhagen got under way and as such come as no surprise. As has been much discussed elsewhere, these pledges do not amount to any reduction in carbon emissions, but rather a deceleration of rising emissions. The actual level of emissions in 2020 is therefore very difficult for anyone to predict, with some estimates suggesting that at current growth trends China could still see a doubling of emissions by 2020 with the targets. It is also interesting to note that of those countries that have made some sort of pledge, only China and India have specified emissions per unit. All others have offered some form of real cut, albeit often conditional, if they have made an offer.

A more worrying issue is that verifying these targets will be a serious problem. China has already stated that it has no intention of allowing international verification with the exception of projects that are funded with help from abroad. Without any verification it is difficult to take even these pledges seriously. Chinese statistics are notoriously poor with regular falsification from local level governments. It would therefore come as no surprise to find in the coming years that emission statistics are being falsely lowered by the local and national governments in order to meet these targets.

Moreover, in its emission pledge China reiterates the point that these pledges are on an entirely voluntary basis. This is of course true for all pledges made, but its reiteration serves to drive home how little has actually been accomplished at Copenhagen in terms of concrete emissions targets. Taking all of this into account, it seems doubtful that China will be meeting even these targets in 2020.

Climatico has just released its latest report entitled, “Copenhagen De-briefing: An Analysis of COP15 for Long-term Cooperation”

This report analyses key issues under discussion in Copenhagen including: finance, technology transfer, REDD+, CDM and JI, as well as the ongoing conflicts between Annex I and Non Annex I countries. The Copenhagen Accord is also discussed along with its potential effect on future negotiations.

Download the report

With the dust barely settled from the Copenhagen talks, critics within Canada have been scathing of its approach to the talks. They note Canada’s failure to take any leadership, its humiliation at the hands of the Yes Men (although there, Canada is hardly alone) in recent times, as well as the recipient of a fossil award, for lack of leadership as an industrialized country. When leaders came out of Copenhagen with an underwhelming accord, many in Canada were quick to point the finger at their own government’s failure.

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Guest Author: Bettina Wittneben

The Copenhagen Accord is a beautifully written document and full of good intentions. I encourage everyone to read it. It can be found on the UNFCCC website, is quite short and touches on many of the contentious issues in climate change policy. Unfortunately, it is almost entirely lacking of any consequence or even content. Today, this document is literally empty: it contains two tables that are intentionally blank. Let’s have a closer look.

The WHAT

This is the first UN document that mentions the 2 degree target. This aim of keeping the temperature rise below 2 degrees from pre-industrial times has been championed by the EU and others for a while but was never formally adopted. Over the past year, however, voices have become stronger that temperature rise should really be kept below 1.5 degrees rather than 2 degrees to save human lives and many species from extinction. This challenge of the initial magic 2 degrees target might actually have made it acceptable for mainstream politics to acknowledge a 2 degree target rather than going with the more stringent 1.5 degree target. How we can prevent temperatures from rising above 2 degrees globally and what that means in terms of limiting greenhouse gas emissions today remains unresolved. It is a comfortable goal for policy makers, because it remains fairly vague. That is, of course, not according to the IPCC report which prescribes a radical reduction of emissions urgently to stay below 2 degrees. But who will be held liable when temperatures surge beyond 2 degrees? Will the signatories to the Copenhagen Accord be dragged in front of an environmental court? Right now, we are already at a one degree temperature increase. It is almost a farce that the agreement states to review a 1.5 degree goal in 2015. By then, given that we are not lowering emissions, it is difficult to imagine that we would be able to keep temperature rise below 1.5 degrees.

Further figures are in relation to funding adaptation and mitigation measures in developing countries. The sum of $30bn is to be provided within the period from 2010 to 2012. This money is to be new and additional and to be provided by industrialized countries. This figure is similar to what has been promised by the EU and the US earlier in the negotiations.  More significantly, the agreement promises developing countries $100bn per year starting in 2020. This money, however, is to “come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance.” After the financial crisis the imagination is left to run wild on what alternative sources of finance could be. This latter money is to be managed through a newly established Copenhagen Green Climate Fund. Note here that the Adaptation Fund of the Kyoto Protocol took more than a decade to set up, even though its financial implications are not as wide reaching as this new fund.

The reporting requirements of the Copenhagen Accord are not very different from what the Convention set out 17 years ago. The frequency of reporting has increased since then  (from ‘periodically’ to ‘every two years’) but the content of national reports by rapidly industrialized countries do not require more stringent attention as emphasised by the US and exact guidelines are to be decided on within the Conference of Parties process.

The Copenhagen Accord also appeals to the forces of the market. “We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions.”  It is a very hollow commitment to the belief that the market will lower costs of mitigation action. After a decade of experimenting with market mechanisms and debating their flaws, falling for fraudulent behaviour and being exposed to years of arbitrage, this sentence seems to be a weak declaration that market approaches to climate action can still be seen as useful.

Surprisingly, the Kyoto Protocol is mentioned in the agreement. “Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol.” Does that mean that somehow, miraculously, the emission reductions promises delivered for information purposes only to the Copenhagen Accord next month will transform into a second commitment period? It is not clear.

The WHO

Here, the writers of the Copenhagen Accord take a rain check: watch this space after 31 January 2010. Until then, countries have time to enlist (literally, sign up to the currently empty list) and express their intentions. Industrialized countries need to state their emission reduction goal for 2020 and the baseyear they calculate that on. Developing countries need to state their mitigation actions, including a wish list of actions that need financing from the wealthier nations.

The SO WHAT

• Countries still need to sign on.
• Emission targets still need to be set.
• Mitigation actions in developing countries still need to be declared.
• The finances still need to be sorted out.
• The extent of the market mechanisms still needs to be determined.
• The reporting still needs to be improved.
• The planet still needs to be saved.

The Copenhagen Accord does not go beyond the Kyoto Protocol. More ambitious targets including a broader group of countries, more stringent rules on the market mechanisms and limits to using credits as alternatives to reductions could have all been negotiated under a second commitment period. Was it really necessary to start with a new agreement from scratch?

The Bottom Line

All seemed lost in Copenhagen when the Copenhagen Accord was agreed on as a last ditch effort to come up with something that had the word ‘Copenhagen’ in it. Since many of my American colleagues already call the Kyoto Protocol the Kyoto Accord, this name seems most agreeable to an American public. Whether this document can be called a treaty is another matter. The climate summit in Copenhagen has been marred by poor organization, posturing and arrogance as well as the usual political divisions and struggles. After two years of almost continuous negotiating since Bali, we would have been left with nothing were it not for the Copenhagen Accord. The world leaders have saved the day – just not the planet. One thing is clear: there is a whole lot more work to do. Luckily. The climate conference caravan can now move on. We already have dates for the next COPs – see you in 2010 in Mexico and 2011 in South Africa. In the meantime, climate change will take its toll and irreversible climate chaos is becoming inevitable.

Authors: Nyla Sarwar & Sabrina Chesterman

Secretary General Ban Ki-moon during the final hours at COP15

As the climate demonstrators started to pack away their banners and the Christmas shoppers descended on a freezing Copenhagen (-7C), over 100 leaders and statesmen headed back to their various countries. Many are left to now ponder about what has actually been achieved, except a huge carbon footprint created by the tens of thousands of people who travelled to Denmark in the anticipation of being part of an expected key moment in history.

“The conference of the parties takes note of the Copenhagen Accord,” says a final decision on Saturday 19^th December 2009.

The Copenhagen Accord (see final text here) was negotiated on the basis of political superpowers asserting their national sovereignty and many have pointed the finger at China for being so dogged in their approach to the negotiations. The head of the Chinese delegation, Xie Zhenhua and Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiaboa, remained resolute in their refusal to discuss and put on the table figures for emissions cuts. Although Obama may hail the drafting of the Accord as a success over China, there are huge loopholes. Developing nation delegates, exhausted, frustrated and now worried, returning to countries on the front line of climate change with no clear guarantee or safeguard that climate change can be slowed or its worst effects abated.

The agreement, drawn up by US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa, lacks any legally binding commitments, or interim targets for developed or least developing countries, removed at the last minute to appease disgruntled negotiators.

Several texts had been presented to the delegations over the course of the 10-day conference in Copenhagen, including two surprise Danish texts, which were both angrily rejected by developing countries, which questioned the transparency of the proposal having worked on the same text over the last 2 years.

On Day 9, Hilary Clinton delivered a press conference to bolster hopes of a positive contribution from the US in ongoing negotiations. She announced that the US was in support of the $100bn/pa fast start fund for adaptation in developing countries, and the US’s contribution was later announced to be $3.6bn pa annum by 2020, to support the $10bn/pa from Europe and the $15bn/pa from Japan.

Day 10 began with optimism, as over 120 Heads of State gathered in one location, to discuss the threat of climate change, for the first time since the Second World War.

Obama’s 8am arrival on Air Force One, into Copenhagen fuelled hopes for a positive breakthrough in negotiations at the conference. As the world’s largest economy and second largest emitter, the US had (as always) a very powerful position in the negotiations. However, Obama failed to provide any further commitments in the chaotic final phase of negotiations, and knocked heads with the Chinese Premier Wen Jibao and Brazilian President Lula in intense meetings upon arrival. Saying he was “here not to talk but to act” he failed to provide any further commitments from the US and did not even press the Senate to move ahead on climate change legislation, which environmental organisations have been urging for months.

His disappointing, lackluster speech was frustrating for conference delegates and heavily criticized by many, including Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez.

Despite ongoing tensions and disagreements behind the scenes, Obama made the announcement of a ‘deal’ before his departure at around 6pm on Friday for his Christmas holidays. He delivered a press conference to highlight the ‘agreement that had been reached’, which China and many other developing countries vehemently rejected in the plenary session later.

The Copenhagen Accord was reached from the depths of desperation on Saturday morning, stating that average global temperature increases should be limited to 2C, but no legally binding targets for emissions reduction were set to achieve this. This a major blow for many LDCs and small island states, who pushed for a global temperature increase to be limited to just 1.5C, which they believed to be crucial for their survival.

Developing nations, and notably Africa, have presented themselves as a key power force in an era of supposed global climate governance. The big emerging economies, India, China, Brazil and South Africa allied to prevent a developed country domination of the negotiations. Success was made in terms of the fast start finance of $30 billion/year from next year to 2012, and the long-term pledge of $100 billion/year to 2020. Although President Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, representing the African country block was criticised for accepting this deal, his ‘compromise’ on this issue ensured it was formalised in the Copenhagen Accord.  The efforts of Chavez and the block of Bolivia, Nicaragua, Sudan and Saudi Arabia, attempted a last minute block to the talks just as it seemed the Copenhagen Accord would be agreed upon.  Although with the help of UK Energy & Climate Change Minister, Ed Miliband this move was averted, many question the viability of Chavez and others in their fidelity to finding a common ground to climate changes, instead using their speeches in the High Level plenary to lament on the silent ‘ghost’ of capitalism driven by Obama, Nobel man of war, that was the root cause of climate change.

Attempts to kill the Kyoto Protocol also dominated the negotiations at Copenhagen, with LDCs furious at the suggestion of a new agreement, which opens up the possibility of them being required to measure and report their emissions (which only Annex I countries are required to do under the conventions of Kyoto). Several developed countries have begun to back the idea of creating a new treaty which would clean the slate and start again addressing emissions from both developed and developing countries. These divergent views led to wasted hours of precious negotiating time at the conference and significantly weakened the Copenhagen Accord, with many agenda items simply postponed for discussion at COP 16 in Mexico City next year.

Some organisations felt that the deal was a positive start, and a successful outcome that we can strengthen in future negotiations.

“This deal provides a solid foundation for international action, including emissions targets, a new financial mechanism and transparent reporting and review to assess countries’ performance,” said Jennifer Morgan, Director of WRI’s Climate and Energy Program.

“But more is needed to ensure a functioning legal instrument, and the ambition of the emission cuts still falls far short of what the science indicates. The agreement will need to be strengthened over time.”

The UN process was also disputed, with many arguing that it had become totally unworkable and impossible to forge consensus among disparate countries fighting over environmental guilt, future costs, and who should referee the results. It might therefore be more likely going forward that discussions about tackling climate change are raised at other forums – the G8, G20 – where approximately 30 countries are likely to represent over 90% of global emissions. This smaller group of nations will tackle a narrower agenda of issues, like technology sharing or the merging of carbon trading markets, without the chaos and posturing of the United Nations process. A version of this already exists in the 17-nation Major Economies Forum, which has been a model of decorum and progress compared with what the world saw unfold at the climate talks.

We would argue that the whole concept of consensus agreement, as enshrined in the convention, is totally flawed and close to impossible for a contentious and political agreement of this sort. Majority votes may sideline those most vulnerable, but might encourage more unity in negotiations. However, Copenhagen has already represented some of the divisions and back-stabbing that prevails with deep disputes occurring within groups like the G77, Association of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the African Group. The process is fundamentally driven by politics, not the science, to deliver short-term economic and political gains, rather than what the planet demands.

The torturous path to the Copenhagen Accord was dismissed by speaker after speaker from the developing world, denouncing the deal as a sham process fashioned behind closed doors by a club of rich countries and large emerging powers. The NY Times reported that the heated debate even saw the Sudanese delegate likening the effect of the accord on poor nations to the Holocaust.

It is unclear how many delegates will sign up to the Accord. The EU, AOSIS, Japan and the African Group all urged delegates to adopt the Accord, though the Latin American countries and Sudan are believed to be in angry opposition.

As the air hung thick in the Bella Centre, one NGO representative commented, just as we emerged from the plenary, “You’re in there with the presidents, I work with the poor. We all know who the real heroes of climate change are.”

Yvo de Boer, UNFCCC Executive Secretary, highlighted that the challenges now remain in attempts to ‘move towards something real, measurable and verifiable.’ Watch out Bonn and Mexico City, the circus is coming.