Ed Miliband hailed the G8 Declaration as a “real breakthrough”. For the first time, it seemed, the ‘Outreach 5′ states were putting aside their differences on international mitigation action and joining the G8 to commit to a 2 C warming target. However, in India these moves have not been universally accepted or endorsed, suggesting that the G8 Declaration has still failed to answer the key question: who is going to do what to reach the 2 C by 2050 target.

An article appearing yesterday in India’s centre-orientated Hindustan Times quotes a member of the Indian UNFCCC negotiating team suggesting that India has not modified its position on the need for Annex 1 mid-term targets. For the 2050 goal to be realistic, he argues, there must be mid-term targets by rich nations.

There has also been much consternation within the wider Indian policy-making community more broadly since Manmohan Singh signed the Declaration in Italy. A range of newspaper articles and TV items have pointed to the strong opposition to mitigation action that a) harms economic growth and b) is not part of a financial transfer mechanism from Annex 1 countries.

The Hindustan Times article, for example:

What this suggests, it seems, is that while India is happy to agree to the goal in question, the means of getting there is an issue on which there has been little movement, despite Manmohan Singh’s signature in Italy.  Indeed, as my colleague Ian Ross notes, Hillary Clinton’s visit to India has not been the smooth ride that her press secretary valiantly continues to tell us it has been.  Several media sources report that Clinton engaged in a blunt exchange with a member of India’s Ministry of Science and Environment, which houses the negotiating team.  India, Clinton was told, will not be accepting cuts or limits.

This is nothing new; I could have been writing this blog six months ago.  However, what has changed is the USA’s persistence that action by India is required for a “successful” negotiation in December, and that they remain confident they will get it.  From this week’s events in the media and in Hillary Clinton’s meetings, that does not seem immediately likely at present.

So, what would this mean?  What if India will not budge on the issue of burden sharing to reach 2 C?

Well, the ball would be back with the US.  Would they strap in and go for an agreement anyway, risking a rejection in the Senate when ratification comes around?  Would they push for a watered down treaty, preferring instead to focus efforts on the domestic legislation they have moving through?  I think that neither of these are politically palatable options–the first domestically, the second internationally.  The US Government have pledged action at both levels to both groups of stakeholders.

As a results, some kind of middle way may well be the most likely option.  And there are a number of opportunities here.  It is coincidental, for instance, that Hillary Clinton is also in India promoting American nuclear investment in India; could there be room for manauvering the much-discussed international ‘Green Fund’ (see Ian’s post) to send more US technology to India in return for an Indian energy generation target? This would have the advantage of pleasing both sides, especially the US nuclear lobby.  It may, though, not be possible when all 190 other parties are involved.

Another alternative maybe the ‘no-lose’ targets (which Dafydd Elis posted on last month).  If the US becomes a buyer of international carbon credits (which the draft domestic legislation would allow) then India potentially has much to gain from selling its ‘no lose’ credits on a presumably buoyant international market.  It would then set a mitigation baseline.  Again, though, we come back to domestic legislation that will not be finalised before December and on which India would be committing itself.

Should Barak Obama’s the worst case scenario come to pass–where no agreement can be reached in advance of Copenhagen–then much will rest on the political pressure in December itself.  Incidental media pressure, possible horse-trading with other policy areas, and the other domestic issues of the day.  From a climate policy perspective, this is not ideal, as it often takes several years to work out how to make last-minute ideas into workable policies (I think here of the CDM, which was added to Kyoto with hours to go and was not finalised until the Marrakesh Accords 2 years later).  And there is always the possibility that nothing will be agreed, although I think that unlikely.

The key issue here is what options are on the table that could serve as tools for a compromise–both now and then.  Nuclear, no-lose, US emission purchases, domestic legislation, a Green Fund: in some combination it is these that are likely to be the deal breakers.  Manmohan Singh’s coincidental state visit to the US in mid-November is sure to be an important date in the respective climate delegations’ calendars.

The Context of Bonn

On Monday the interim meetings of the UNFCCC began in Bonn, Germany. The negotiations, which are scheduled to last for the next two weeks, are both a legal and political forerunner to now infamous ‘Copenhagen Meeting’ in December this year.

Legally, the parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change were slightly caught unawares back in March when it emerged that, under the details of the Kyoto Protocol, any new negotiating texts and amendments must be agreed six months prior to their intended signature and final agreement.  Far from giving a full twelve months of negotiations between Poznan in late 2008 and Copenhagen, then, negotiators now find themselves in something of a scramble to agree to at least a skeleton document by the end of the next week.

Politically, there is such pressure on parties for Copenhagen that there is little scope for delaying agreement, thus making Bonn an unavoidable cram.  While much of this pressure is coming from NGOs and outside observers, a significant portion is also from the parties themselves.  Since the G8 Summit in Hokkaido, Japan, in July 2008, the major developed countries have constantly deflected difficult questions about meeting agreement to Copenhagen.  Indeed, in his press conference at the G20 in April 2009, UK Climate Change Minister Ed Miliband redirected almost all questions to the UNFCCC process.  As a result, then, the importance of Copenhagen has grown significantly, and so, because of the legal issues above, has that of Bonn.

Opening Days

Signs, at present at least, look positive.  The UNFCCC released draft texts in mid-May into which targets, mechanisms, and implementation details can now be slotted.  Moreover, Monday and Tuesday appear to be ‘off to a good start’, according to one UK negotiator speaking with me yesterday.

Of most interest are the two Bali Action Plan working groups–one (the KP) working out what can be taken forward from Kyoto and the second (the LCA) drafting a new text on ‘long-term, cooperative action’.  In practice this division breaks down to a discussion of targets and mechanisms under the KP and discussion of who should take on commitments and ‘new’ issues like adaptation under the LCA.  So far, both groups have hosted their opening sessions in Bonn.

Post-Kyoto Discussions

The LCA–traditionally the more contentious forum–has opened with a frank discussion on the plethora of proposals submitted by parties over the past few months.  The African Group, for example, expressed concern about a number of the more ‘radical’ proposals–especially the suggestion of a more fluid boundary between developed and developing countries in terms of emissions targets.  Indeed, the classic divisions that tend to emerge at UNFCCC meetings, such as the African Group’s position, do not appear to have been put aside completely in the effort to reach a deal.  Indeed, some of the major middle income countries, including China, India, Saudi Arabia, and the Philippines, all expressed concern about the suggestion of developing country targets–an issue for which there are many many options outlined in developed party submissions.

A particular problem here is the structure of the UNFCCC treaty under which the Kyoto Protocol falls.  The treaty document clearly preserves the common but differentiated responsibility and right to develop of developing countries.  While clearly important provisions, these principles hold the UNFCCC in something of a permanent tension between extending global mitigation action as the economic situation in middle income countries changes and abiding by the treaty text.  Indeed, during Tuesday open session of the LCA group, both China and India suggested that possibilities for compulsory developing country action–either with targets or not–were not in line with the Framework Convention itself, and so could not be included.  This continues to grate with the USA’s on-going position (see the Luagr-Biden Resolution) that such countries should take on some commitments.  Japan has also added to the chorus, suggesting that a simply continuation of Kyoto divisions is not acceptable.

Reform and Reuse of Current Kyoto Provisions

Within the KP group of the Bali Action Plan discussion is largely focussed around the level of targets in an amended protocol.  Regardless of who takes these commitments on (something discussed by the LCA, above), the actual numbers are always a point of contention.  As per the usual for an opening meeting, non-Annex I countries were highly critical of ballpark figures for Annex I in 2020; the Assoc. of Small Island States (AOSIS) argued that major Annex I cuts were need immediately, suggesting that the UNFCCC was on the verge of missing the 2 C target.

The Weeks Ahead

It is my expectation that the focus on these two groups will shift as the Bonn talks progress.  While the LCA currently seems to be where most of the action is taking place, it is the KP that brings the fireworks when it comes to agreeing numbers.

What is clear from the opening two days is that party lines remain firmly inscribed in the process.  This gives all the more importance to the various adjunct issues that are also to be finalised during Bonn: REDD+, CDM, No-lose targets (if not in the CDM), technology transfer, and so on.  I think it is likely that these issues will not only grow in importance in their own right but will become the major system of bartering and ‘horse trading’ by which the larger disagreements are overcome.  Thinking back to 1997 and the Kyoto Negotiations, it was the inclusion of the CDM in the closing hours that sealed the deal rather than a substantial shift in existing policy.  Watch these newer issues, then, as they are the currency in which old, stock UNFCCC disputes are traded off.

There has been a huge amount of coverage of conferences so far this year, the G20 foremost among them. There was another conference that took place last week that was important to anyone interested in climate change policy but you would be forgiven for missing it. The Western press, in a fit of parochialism, ignored a meeting that could have far-reaching consequences for climate change policy, namely the World Ocean Conference held in Manado, Indonesia (read my previous post about the lead-up to the conference here).

Initiated by the Government of Indonesia, it brought together representatives from 80 developing and developed countries to discuss the role of the oceans in climate change. Among the topics discussed and pledges made:

• The current lack of knowledge about what role oceans can play in mitigating climate change. In this context the US announced plans to give a grant of 0,000 to Indonesia to support ocean exploration;
• To acknowledge that coastal communities are going to be adversely affected by climate change and that adaptation needs to start now. It was suggested that funding for adaptation and mitigation would go through the Global Environment Facility (GEF);
• The signing of the Coral Triangle Initiative between Indonesia, Solomon Islands, Malaysia, Timor Leste, Papua New Guinea and the Philippines to protect the coral reefs in their respective countries. The importance of coral protection should not be underestimated – the WWF estimates that around 100 million people’s livelihoods depend on these coastal environments, environments that are under threat from climate change.

Changing the rules of the game

Perhaps the most significant development from a climate change policy perspective however was the creation of a ‘roadmap’ to get the Manado Ocean Declaration (MOD) tabled in Bonn in June with a view to being incorporated into the Copenhagen negotiations. Indonesia, by taking the lead, has gained an enormous amount of prestige and by potentially adding oceans to the agenda, Indonesia stands to gain financially: not only will Indonesia gain from the REDD scheme but also by being the world’s largest archipelago, any financial deal that involves ocean as carbon sinks would benefit Indonesia enormously.

It is pleasing to see Indonesia take the lead in an issue which has been dangerously neglected. While the motivation maybe merely another source of revenue for the government of Indonesia, this conference can only be good for promoting climate change policies within Indonesia. There are a number of struggles ahead of course: it is by no means certain that the MOD will become part of the Copenhagen negotiations, and even then practical issues like the lack of scientific knowledge about the role of oceans as carbon sinks, could prevent them from becoming part of the post-Kyoto deal. Even so, this conference has helped raise awareness of this issue. Well in some places it has.

© EFE

The G20 summit is in full swing and the world is looking to London for a whole range of solutions. The shouts of the protesters and the presence of high-level politicians eclipse the (admittedly less sexy) seventh session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 7) and the fifth meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 5) that are currently taking place in Bonn, Germany. This meeting is the first out of three planned negotiating sessions before the important 15th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in December 2009. In other words, these meetings will define the nitty-gritty parts of any future climate change commitments and will give actual flesh (or not) to the statements made by political leaders at the G20 summit. Ultimately, these meetings will show how prepared countries are to turn their grand words into actual responsibilities.

Mexico has moved into the spotlight of climate change negotiations. As first emerging economy announcing emissions reductions (50% by 2050), it caught international attention at COP-14 in Poznan. AND, it has reiterated this target in its long awaited and recently released second draft of its Special Programme on Climate Change. Of course, the realization of this commitment does not come unconditional. Yet, interestingly and in contrast to other countries, rather than making its emissions reductions conditional upon equivalent emissions targets from other (emerging) economies, Mexico demands an improved international system of climate change financing that sets the right economic incentives. In President Calderon’s words “The problem are the not the objectives themselves. The problem is that we do not have the right instruments for the job, meaning that there is no point wasting another five years discussing what the right objectives are.” In this respect, Mexico has repeatedly proposed a so called Green Fund, but for the first time, he actually specified details of this suggested mechanism on his visit to London: The fund would be financed through a system of quotas, similar to institutions like the International Monetary Fund, which would dictate how much each country paid into the pot. The size of a country’s contribution would be determined by factors such as income per capita, gross domestic product, total carbon emissions, or emissions per capita. Countries will then be able to draw money to cover costs of mitigation and adaptation programmes. Countries that lack environmental conscience will not get money back from their quota.

Taking this as starting point, subsequent blogs will focus on analysing Mexico’s determination to consolidate its leadership position in actual commitments, and its role and ability, as emerging economy, to move the international community towards a successful outcome in Copenhagen.

Climatico’s Jennifer Helgeson gives her impressions and conclusions from this week’s Climate Congress

The science that will direct the UN Climate Change Conference to be hosted by the Danish Government in December 2009 was discussed by more than 2500 delegates from almost 80 countries from 10-12 March 2009 in at the Copenhagen Climate Congress. The 3 days were jam-packed with 58 parallel focused discussion sessions, hundreds of poster presentations, and a series of plenary meetings lead by some of the most well known players in the field of climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The Congress’ Scientific Writing Team has identified six key messages, which were publicly presented to the Danish Prime Minister, Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen. The “Big 6″ are presented in short below.

The output of the conference is now in preparation, and will be published by Cambridge University Press as a point of reference for the academic community. A report of the Congress is to be prepared by June 2009 and handed over to the key decision makers before the December COP meeting.

And here are the “Big 6″ Key Messages of the Congress:

1. Climatic Trends: Things are not looking so good. The worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories (or even worse) are being realized. The risk of irreversible climatic shifts are increasing…

2. Social Disruption: Recent observational studies report that societies are vulnerable to even very modest levels of climatic change. Poor nations / communities are particularly at risk…

3. Long-term Strategy: we need stringent and binding targets now and long into the future. Due to the issue of stocks of carbon dioxide, delay in initiating effective mitigation significantly increases long-term social and economic costs for mitigation and adaptation.

4. Equity Dimensions: Effective, well-funded adaptation safety nets are required for those most vulnerable to climate change effects. A common, but differentiated mitigation strategy is needed to protect the poor and most vulnerable.

5. Inaction is Inexcusable: A wide range of benefits will flow from a concerted effort to alter our energy economy now, including sustainable energy job growth, reductions in the health and economic costs of climate change, and the restoration of ecosystems and revitalization of ecosystem services.

6. Meeting the Challenge: we have to seize critical opportunities and engage society in the transition to norms and practice that foster sustainability as a “way of life.”

I was truly impressed by the consideration the Congress took for input from top researchers in the science of climate change (e.g. physics) but also the social sciences and even philosophy. For me there were three messages that harkened throughout discussions by all keynote speakers, who ranged from Dr. Rajendra Pachuri, Chairman of the IPCC to Lord Nicolas Stern, the lead author of the 2006 groundbreaking Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change. Firstly, the decisions at the COP 15 made by politicians must be guided completely by the science findings (this was hardly agreed to by PM Rasmussen). Secondly, there was a huge push for the fact that the current economic downturn is actually a golden opportunity to redefine our world in a low carbon manner. Finally, just about every speaker and session touched on the question of equity in addressing climate change, from discussions of new brands of climate change insurance to roles of forests and agriculture.

Though there were some negative reports, like the fact that we are indeed on the path to realizing the worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories, there was a true sense of hope and optimism about what December negotiations may bring.

After all, how couldn’t we feel hopeful leaving the Bella Center, windmill generated energy right out front of the building? But then again, when it started to sleet, an awful lot of Congress contributors turned to taxis rather than reduced carbon public transport…

And with my hat as Climatico’s France Analyst on:  French researchers were well represented at the Congress, talking on how to synchronize world carbon markets to philosopher views of climate change and why the public may avoid realizing the real magnitude of danger.

Also on the docket for France: How may joining NATO affect climate issues, if at all? And how did the recent “International Standards to Promote Energy Efficiency and Reduce Carbon Emissions” workshop held in the OECD Conference Centre, Paris go? More soon…