Author: Kelly M. McManus

REDD+ is considered as one of the more actionable items on the COP agenda, and it is predicted that a binding agreement on forests may be one of few substantive outcomes of the Copenhagen summit. However, REDD+ is widely criticized by most stakeholders, from broad calls for the three “E”s-equity, efficiency, and equality, concerns that have carried over from Poznan, to admonition of REDD+ as “carbon colonialism” by indigenous peoples who have seen their lands and livelihoods usurped in the name of the CDM.    Despite these criticisms, an acknowledgement of the critical need to halt deforestation, which garners support not only on the basis of emissions reductions, but also as a strategy for protecting biodiversity and providing essential ecosystem services, drives the REDD+ process along.

But can REDD+ deliver on its essential task of reducing emissions? New research suggests that deforestation probably accounts for around 12% of global carbon emissions, both because deforestation rates have decreased in real terms and other sources of carbon emissions have increased in proportion to deforestation emissions (Van der Werf, et al., 2009).   The significant challenges of implementing REDD+ mean that actual emissions reductions from deforestation will be somewhat less than this. Substantial issues have been raised in determining appropriate baseline levels of deforestation, developing methods to prevent “leakage“-i.e. deforestation displaced from forests under REDD+ governance to those which are not , and ensuring that compensation is only given to projects that are truly additional, that is, forests that would be deforested without the injection of REDD+ monies.   None of these are simple questions, and what is appropriate in one nation or for one driver of forest conversion, may be disastrous in another.

Furthermore, long-term ecological modeling studies in the Amazon suggest that under conditions of drought and higher average temperatures, forest dieback may switch the forest from being a carbon sink to a carbon source (Cox et al., 2004).

The uncertainties on REDD+ extend beyond emissions reductions.  REDD+ represents the largest potential financial investment into mitigating deforestation that has ever been undertaken.  This investment will be delivered to developing nations for avoided deforestation (RED), forest degradation (REDD), maintenance of existing forest stocks (PINC), and/or enhancement of standing forest carbon stocks (REDD+), or some combination of these options, depending upon which proposal is ultimately adopted.  If REDD+ (or RED or REDD) prioritizes carbon storage above all other currently non-market forest services (e.g. biodiversity, hydrological and nutrient cycling), it will create trade-offs between these services that may prove to be ecologically-and economically, if the critical role of water and nutrient cycling are to agriculture and human systems-unsound.    

To counter these very real challenges, we have added ‘D’s and ‘+’s and ‘PINC’s and a plethora of caveats to what started as a relatively simple economic, though potentially dangerous, economic tool. We have created a REDD giant.

Given the high stakes and high uncertainty associated with REDD+, it is necessary that we critically evaluate the potential  that the current market-based proposed REDD+ mechanism may ultimately cost too much, do too little, and have adverse impacts on biological and social systems.

These are not easy questions, and the political momentum behind REDD+, after literally years of negotiations and consensus-building, makes it unlikely that delegates will want to reopen this Pandora’s box.  But if they were to just take a quick peek inside, they might be well advised to consider one aspect of deforestation that is becoming increasingly more clear-the increasing proportion of deforestation that is caused by export-driven commodity markets, namely cattle ranching, soya production, and oil palm plantations.  If the problem with deforestation were narrowed to simply commercial markets for these commodities (albeit admittedly leaving the smaller but important problem of poverty-based deforestation for another, perhaps aid-based, mechanism) deforestation could conceivably be addressed through a trade-based, demand-side solution, akin to the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (EU FLEGT) Program.  Perhaps the market that needs to be regulated is not the one that does not yet exist for forest carbon, but the very well established markets for global “deforestation” commodities.   The thought of changing course so late in the game may seem the type of thing to send a delegation into a frenzy, but fear not, we merely need to add on a consonant. Ladies and gentlemen, meet REDD+T.

©MIT Press

It is a long-held truth that China will inevitably stride on to the centre stage of world affairs as it grows in power and influence. China has no doubt become a major player in trade, development and the environment. More crucially for the topic at hand, China became the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007, overtaking the United States for the honour and in the last two years has only widened the gap. As one of the largest contributors to climate change Chinese consent is clearly crucial to any agreement (however limited) in Copenhagen and its now necessary successors. However, does this all add up to make China the linchpin of Copenhagen? In short, no.

China has a lot to gain from any potential agreement that will be reached. While Chinese emissions are clearly of enormous damage to the global environment they are no less deleterious to the Chinese themselves. Plenty of statistics are available that illustrate just how much of a problem this is for China. A 2007 paper (free summary) found that the loss in GDP due to losses in national health were 1.8% in 1997 with thousands dying prematurely each year. The paper further argued that pollution controls could actually raise China’s growth rate. While a more up to date World Bank report in conjunction with the Chinese SEPA (State Environmental Protection Agency) found that water and air pollution in China has cost the country 3.5%-3.8% of its GDP in public health costs and premature deaths.

China’s own independent attempt to measure the damage caused was also a shock for its leadership. ‘Green GDP’ was first calculated for 2004 and was an attempt to include environmental damage in growth rates. That damage was estimated to be in excess of $510 billion Yuan (or 3% of China’s economy). So damaging were these estimates that in 2007 the entire project was scrapped for lowering growth rates to levels considered politically unacceptable by the Chinese government.

All of this paints a clear picture of a tremendous cost to China in its quest for growth, costs that it has found increasingly difficult to ignore, taking some, though generally tentative, steps toward addressing. Copenhagen represents a potential boon for China; the perceived necessity for the developed world to pay the developing world would give China the chance to be at least partly compensated for steps that it increasingly acknowledges it must take. The biggest hurdle is exactly how much that final sum of money will be and how much China will have to cut its emissions by to get it. But at the same time, the cut in pollution for China, while costly, will also have a beneficial effect on its citizen’s health and its own growth rate.

Looking to Copenhagen and beyond, the ball is very much in the court of the developed world. China wants an agreement and very much needs to start cutting its emissions for its own sake and benefit. While the developed world certainly has its own motivations to ensure cuts in world emissions, most justifications tend to look some way into the future and the dangers of a temperature rise beyond two degrees. China’s environmental costs are very much in the here and now for it to tackle.