Article by Guest Contributor: Adalberto Maluf

The fourth meeting of the BASIC country ministers (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) on climate change took place in Rio de Janeiro on the 25th and 26th of July 2010 to further discuss their common positions regarding the Copenhagen Accord.

The BASIC countries were part of the final agreement reached in Copenhagen, although, officially, they left the conference “frustrated” with the final results. The joint statement after these two days of meeting in Rio “reiterated the importance of the two pronged approach – Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments by Annex I Parties” as crucial for an “equitable and balanced outcome in Cancun”.

The joint statement also shares concerns about those sensitive issues for the developing countries regarding differential (historical) responsibility between developing and developed countries, which is related to “equitable burden sharing” of past emissions within an context of sustainable development and also “demands the implementation of ambitious financing, technological support and capacity building.”

Despite the fact that the official joint statement didn’t differ much from what these countries have formally agreed in Copenhagen, there were some advances in Rio which can’t be underestimated. Overcoming Brazilian initial opposition, they all agree to develop a common methodology to assess their total emissions. The group, led by China’s chief climate negotiator, also agreed to have a “panel of experts” which would be responsible to establish a common baseline that could be equally measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV methodology). Brazil opposed it but didn’t block the initiative.

It could be the starting point for the development of a common methodology to assess and measure the real implications of their pledges for the economic and social development of these key countries. It’s a direct response of the Chinese government to the agreement made in the last hours of the Copenhagen conference between President Obama and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, with the intermediation of India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Brazilian President Lula da Silva.

There is a common feeling inside the BASIC countries that the Kyoto protocol won’t prevail in the near future, which could mean that they would have to change their positions for future negotiations. India insisted that it is rather clear that the Kyoto protocol is no longer a feasible route. With that in mind, they should all work together towards a single, inclusive climate change agreement.

The BASIC countries are still awaiting further developments around the world before moving forward with their pledges, however, there was a common understanding that developing countries with advanced economies, like Brazil and China, would have to abandon their rhetorical demand and start discussing ways to push concrete proposals in the table. The decision on a common methodology for MRV could be the beginning of that change.

Mystery in China (Image by: **Maurice**)

China’s Copenhagen pledges, along with fifty four other nations, have recently been announced. China has pledged to reduce its carbon dioxide emission per unit of GDP by 40-45% by 2020 compared to 2005 levels, raise the level of non-fossil fuels in primary energy consumption to 15% and increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares with a rise in forest stock volume of 1.3 billion cubic metres by 2020 from 2005 levels.

How significant are these pledges? All of them are as China promised before Copenhagen got under way and as such come as no surprise. As has been much discussed elsewhere, these pledges do not amount to any reduction in carbon emissions, but rather a deceleration of rising emissions. The actual level of emissions in 2020 is therefore very difficult for anyone to predict, with some estimates suggesting that at current growth trends China could still see a doubling of emissions by 2020 with the targets. It is also interesting to note that of those countries that have made some sort of pledge, only China and India have specified emissions per unit. All others have offered some form of real cut, albeit often conditional, if they have made an offer.

A more worrying issue is that verifying these targets will be a serious problem. China has already stated that it has no intention of allowing international verification with the exception of projects that are funded with help from abroad. Without any verification it is difficult to take even these pledges seriously. Chinese statistics are notoriously poor with regular falsification from local level governments. It would therefore come as no surprise to find in the coming years that emission statistics are being falsely lowered by the local and national governments in order to meet these targets.

Moreover, in its emission pledge China reiterates the point that these pledges are on an entirely voluntary basis. This is of course true for all pledges made, but its reiteration serves to drive home how little has actually been accomplished at Copenhagen in terms of concrete emissions targets. Taking all of this into account, it seems doubtful that China will be meeting even these targets in 2020.

Environmentally friendly in Chengdu, China (image by: preetamrai)

Back in the mid-2000s China began to experiment with the notion of Green GDP as a new way of accounting for its growth in an environmental context. This was touched on in a previous blog post, but I thought a more in depth look into exactly what Green GDP showed and why it failed would provide some insight.

The Green GDP for 2004 was published in September 2006 which calculated the loss for the year at 511 billion yuan ($66 billion) or 3.05% of growth. Within that figure it was calculated that water (286 billion yuan) and air (216 billion yuan) pollution were the most significant costs, followed by solid wastes and pollution accidents at 5 billion yuan.

On its publication SEPA director Pan Yue announced that “This marks only the beginning of our efforts in a Green GDP calculation”. But of course it was the first and only year that Green GDP was calculated, its results of near zero (or worse) growth in many areas considered too politically damaging by China’s authorities.

However, the expectation at the time from many such as the World Bank was that Green GDP accounting would show a loss of GDP of between 8-12%, far higher than the actual estimate. Much of this larger estimate owed to large water shortages, air and water pollution, desertification and ecological losses.

And indeed, the SEPA admitted it was a conservative estimate, as it only included environmental pollution costs (such as healthcare for air pollution – direct and relatively easy to measure). A more accurate estimate would also have included not only the costs of environmental pollution but the ecological damage done and the costs of natural resource depletion as well. As a result problems such as soil contamination, desertification, depletion of fish stocks and wildlife etc. had all been excluded from the estimate. Further accounting issues meant that even those items included in the measure were often underestimated or not fully included due to what was described as issues with “localization of departments, limits of technologies, and the limitation of basic data”.

The estimation of Green GDP also suffered further challenges. Such practices are relatively few and far between and most countries have declined to attempt to make them. Any true measure of Green GDP would have to make estimates of goods such as forests which have no obvious market value. Compounding statistical issues is the nature of the Chinese political system. While some regions certainly stood to benefit from the calculation, seeing in it an opportunity to demand greater subsidies from the central government as their environment has been depleted. However, many more local officials objected to the scrutiny that Green GDP would put on them and as a result of pressure they placed on the central government the detailed regional breakdowns were not published.

Future Green GDP results were to attempt to correct for some of these deficiencies and as such it is perhaps not so surprising that the authorities ultimately decided to kill the project before more accurate, and more politically damaging estimates could be made of the true extent of environmental damage in China.

The elimination of Green GDP was a significant step back for the Chinese government’s attempt at environmental preservation and it exposes wider issues facing China’s attempts to repair its environment. One such issue is that any attempt to set targets or evaluate local official performance within the context of the environment is bound to meet strong resistance. At the same time, any attempt to do so is likely to be met with the challenge of insufficient data, issues of computing value and the statistical manipulation that China is notorious for.

What has been made apparent however, is that even with the very low estimates of the Green GDP report, Chinese are at best experiencing a modest improvement in their overall welfare and at the worst may, despite rising GDP, be seeing a fall in their welfare over time. While Green GDP was unpalatable to many Chinese officials, it does suggest that China’s current growth strategy may actually be doing more harm than good today and in the future.

That said, studies (and here for some results from the Index of Sustainable Welfare) into the developed world’s environmental track record (and other factors), pioneered by William Nordhaus and James Tobin in their 1973 paper, suggest that our own welfare may not be doing so much better when we factor in issues such as the environment into calculations of our GDP. While these measures are in themselves contentious and do not solely focus on the environment – the basic point is the same and as such, perhaps China’s reluctance to use Green GDP shouldn’t come as too much of a surprise.

Author: Sabrina Chesterman

Hillary Clinton announces US support for a large Climate Change Fund (Image by: Andy Revkin)

As the high level plenary rolls on, countries are disaggregated in their commitments, divided in their sovereign requirements and the bottom line remains, the COP still is no closer to a firm climate agreement.

An agreement needs to be founded in confidence and credibility, a momentous task considering over 100 different states need to be aligned.  Developing countries are fiercely protecting their national sovereignty, developed nations cannot agree on exact funding packages, tensions heighten and frustrations build as each world leader steps to the stage to present their national case and advocate for a solution to climate change, which all agree must be done at Copenhagen.

Gordon Brown called it the task of statesmanship for politics to overcome the obstacles. As the hours tick away, and statesman, presidents and prime minister advocate for an equitable outcome, do we start losing hope that endless talks and speeches prepared and written, perhaps weeks before Copenhagen and tweaked before delivery is not the most constructive use of time? One hopes as statesmen advocate their key messages on the plenary stage, senior negotiators are putting the texts into a workable and politically acceptable agreement behind closes doors.

In the continual roll call of world leaders at the high level plenary, a few developing countries have established their arguments with eloquence and established a useful commentary.  It is clear there is a mutual understanding of the common but differentiated responsibility with regards to existing emissions. Some leaders have not distinguished along the Annex I (developed) and Annex II (developing) country basis, as is done under the Kyoto Protocol.  Instead, as Hilary Clinton referred to, ‘major economies’ need to commit to funding and emissions cuts to their greatest extent.

As contract groups convene behind closed doors, developing countries remain firm in the support for Kyoto. As Yvo de Boer, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, rightly pointed out in his press conference, why wouldn’t developing countries advocate for a continuation of Kyoto, it’s the only framework that currently exists which compels developed countries who have ratified the protocol, to make emissions cuts?

Hilary Clinton affirmed the United States was prepared to join others to help raise 100 billion dollars a year by 2020. However, the reluctance of China to make firm statements this afternoon has made the chances of a unanimous pact appear unlikely. President of Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo, highlighted the fundamental need for China to engage in final decisions. He used their example of innovation, in allowing millions of Chinese people to shift from a poverty status. Jagdeo challenged China as an indispensible actor to make sure Copenhagen doesn’t become the gravest failure of democratic statesmanship.

The week has been hampered by discussions focusing on procedure rather than substance and leaders know decisions made in the next 24 hours will mean they will be blessed or blamed for generations to come.

Author: Maša Kovič

(Image by: Bigger Picture)

The G77+China group of states is the largest negotiating bloc at the COP15 in Copenhagen. It currently consists of 130 developing countries and was established in 1964 to promote the collective economic interests of the developing countries and increase their negotiating powers within the United Nations. The G77 countries and China as a group, call for a legally binding agreement, stabilization of temperature increases at 2°C, urgent and predictable financial resources for adaptation from the developed countries, and US joining the Kyoto Protocol. While the G77+China is the largest group of countries, it is also the most diverse group. This diversity has been the reason for several twists and misunderstandings within the group at the Copenhagen conference. The issue of financing for adaptation is in the center of these “disputes”.

The fact that all the countries of the G77 are developing countries nowadays seems to be the only common element of this group. Namely, it consists of the leased developed states, small island states, African states, countries members of the OPEC group and major developing economies. Their interests and especially needs for financial resources for adaptation vary immensely, with the OPEC countries even questioning the causes of global warming. During the past week several events have affected these interests and created a divide between the least developed states and the major developing economies of the G77+China group.

The first event was the leakage of the “Danish text”. The “Danish text” establishes a special category of the most vulnerable countries, which would receive the majority of financial assistance for adaptation, and places emission reduction targets on developing states, especially the major developing economies. The response to this text was not a strong position of the G77+China, but the filing of three separate proposals of draft texts. The first proposal was by the major developing economies (Brazil, China, India and South Africa – the BASIC group). The second and third proposal was from the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and from the African Group, claiming that the proposal by major developing economies inadequately addresses the needs of the least developed countries. According to their proposal, the least developed states have “special needs and priorities,” and their “special position has been agreed in the UNFCCC.” The proposal by the emerging developing economies however, denies any differentiation between the developing countries.  Ambassador Lumumba Di-Aping, at the press conference tried to deny a split between the G77+China, focusing his comments on the lack of responsibility of the developed countries for their climate debt. However, the fact that several separate proposals were created speaks for itself: the G77+China have a difficulty bringing their interests together.

A further punch to the unity of the G77+China was the press conference of the Chief US negotiator Todd Stern. Stern committed that the US will provide a fair share of financial resources for adaptation actions. However, he emphasised that the US public funds for adaptation cannot be given to major emerging economies, such as China. These resources should be available only to the leased developed countries. This position was supported by the EU leaders. They committed to USD 3.6 billion a year up to 2012 for adaptation for the most vulnerable countries, especially on the African continent. While the Chinese lead negotiator Su Wei refused to comment the US position, Di-Aping found US as “lacking common sense” and EU leaders “acting as if they were climate sceptics.”

The need of the least developed countries for the major share of the financial resources for adaptation was confirmed on Saturday by the Bangladesh State Minister for Environment and Forest Hasan Mahmud. Mahmud called for the allocation of the financial resources for adaptation according to the percentage of the population affected by climate change in the developing countries, adding that 15% of them live in Bangladesh. This reflects the belief of several least developing countries within the G77+China group, that their more developed co-members should do more in the fight against climate change.

The denial of the separate category of least developed states by the major developing economies puts the unity of the G77+China in question. It also puts the adoption of the Copenhagen agreement in question, as the least developing countries are becoming more vocal about their demands. On the other hand the emerging economies are firm with their positions that without key financial resources for adaptation, the major developing economies will not commit to emission targets. Without their commitment to emission targets the developed countries will neither commit to emission reduction, nor to providing financial resources for developing countries for adaptation. The least developed countries are thus caught in the middle of the negotiations that more and more seem to reflect the question of what comes first – the egg or the hen. The outcome of this revolving circle after the first week of negotiations is more likely a failed agreement, which would not bring new financial assistance for the adaptation projects neither for the most vulnerable states, nor for the emerging economies.

The second week of negotiations will be a test of the real unity of the G77+China bloc. Can the developing countries oversee their differences and step together as a solid bloc in negotiations with the developed countries?

©MIT Press

It is a long-held truth that China will inevitably stride on to the centre stage of world affairs as it grows in power and influence. China has no doubt become a major player in trade, development and the environment. More crucially for the topic at hand, China became the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007, overtaking the United States for the honour and in the last two years has only widened the gap. As one of the largest contributors to climate change Chinese consent is clearly crucial to any agreement (however limited) in Copenhagen and its now necessary successors. However, does this all add up to make China the linchpin of Copenhagen? In short, no.

China has a lot to gain from any potential agreement that will be reached. While Chinese emissions are clearly of enormous damage to the global environment they are no less deleterious to the Chinese themselves. Plenty of statistics are available that illustrate just how much of a problem this is for China. A 2007 paper (free summary) found that the loss in GDP due to losses in national health were 1.8% in 1997 with thousands dying prematurely each year. The paper further argued that pollution controls could actually raise China’s growth rate. While a more up to date World Bank report in conjunction with the Chinese SEPA (State Environmental Protection Agency) found that water and air pollution in China has cost the country 3.5%-3.8% of its GDP in public health costs and premature deaths.

China’s own independent attempt to measure the damage caused was also a shock for its leadership. ‘Green GDP’ was first calculated for 2004 and was an attempt to include environmental damage in growth rates. That damage was estimated to be in excess of $510 billion Yuan (or 3% of China’s economy). So damaging were these estimates that in 2007 the entire project was scrapped for lowering growth rates to levels considered politically unacceptable by the Chinese government.

All of this paints a clear picture of a tremendous cost to China in its quest for growth, costs that it has found increasingly difficult to ignore, taking some, though generally tentative, steps toward addressing. Copenhagen represents a potential boon for China; the perceived necessity for the developed world to pay the developing world would give China the chance to be at least partly compensated for steps that it increasingly acknowledges it must take. The biggest hurdle is exactly how much that final sum of money will be and how much China will have to cut its emissions by to get it. But at the same time, the cut in pollution for China, while costly, will also have a beneficial effect on its citizen’s health and its own growth rate.

Looking to Copenhagen and beyond, the ball is very much in the court of the developed world. China wants an agreement and very much needs to start cutting its emissions for its own sake and benefit. While the developed world certainly has its own motivations to ensure cuts in world emissions, most justifications tend to look some way into the future and the dangers of a temperature rise beyond two degrees. China’s environmental costs are very much in the here and now for it to tackle.

The clock is ticking. The UNFCCC’s Copenhagen summit is just 7 days away, and recent reports have been encouraging. Shortly after China and the US made announcements on commitments to reduce their GHGS, Commonwealth leaders backed a $10bn Climate Change fund. Proposed by UK PM Gordon Brown, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, the fund seeks to provide immediate financial support to those States most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change.

UK PM Gordon Brown said on Friday that half of the fund should be aimed at helping the most vulnerable states to adapt to climate change, whilst the other half should be targeted at measures to reduce GHGs in the least developed countries.

The first funding would be made available early next year, before any international agreement could take effect, whilst there are suggestions that funds for the most vulnerable small island states would be fast-tracked and made available immediately.

This agreement by the Commonwealth demonstrates how climate change can unite different countries – small/large, rich or poor to find a resolution; and delivers some promise for next week’s summit.

The Commonwealth leaders also agreed to seek a legally binding international agreement, though it is widely believed that “a full legally binding outcome” might have to wait to 2010.

The Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, added that any commitments they would announce would be “ambitious”, though it is highly likely that will be subject to significant commitments by other influential nations too.  This prisoner’s dilemma characterises the negotiations, and also represents the biggest threat to a global deal.  However, the recent flurry of announcements for GHG reduction commitments from many of the key players has sparked hope that all is not lost yet.

The countdown begins. I will attend the final week of negotiations with a focus on proposals from the developed nations.

A woman builds a fuel-efficient stove in DRC (credit: worldvision.org.uk)

There was a meeting on climate technology transfer in Delhi a few weeks ago, and the G77+China made their feelings known that an agreement on technology transfer is crucial to a fair global deal.

At issue is the fact that rich countries are demanding that poorer countries like India and China reduce their emissions, even while their per capita emissions are far, far lower than theirs. Part of rich countries’ side of the bargain, therefore, has to be to help provide these low-carbon technologies to poor countries. By low-carbon technologies, I’m talking about CCS, fuel-efficient stoves, solar water heating – anything that is a tool in the journey towards low carbon economies across the world.

Whilst India’s emissions are rising fast, and the highest-profile climate disputes have been between the US and India, we should remember that 400 million Indians still live without electricity, some 25% (!) of world’s total. Technology, and sometimes technology transfer, will need to be part of the solution.

It sounds easy, but actually it is quite hard for poor countries to even assess their needs. Foreign technologies do not necessarily fit different contexts (this has been a long and hard lesson learnt in the water supply sector)

NGOs often trumpet the superiority of “indigenous technologies”, and usually rightly so. But they also always face the perennial problem of scaling up, and scaling up fast. “Upward” dissemination of successful technology options is often fragmented. Furthermore, it must be remembered that this isn’t simply the case of funding a few research institutes to come up with gizmos and then the money running out, but also training the next generation of local technicians.

So, perhaps it’s wrong to talk about technology “transfer”. Collaboration is probably a better way to put it, especially since much of the best new “cleantech” is coming out of the global south. India has suggested a network of climate or technology innovation centres in developing countries (the kind of south-south technology collaboration I wrote about here). These centres could identify locally relevant technologies, deploy them faster, and build capacity.

Furthermore, this isn’t only about the poorest countries and relatively simple technologies. Recent research carried out in China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand found that there wasn’t enough R+D going on in the fields of clean coal, biofuels and solar power. This was due to a number of reasons, but particularly due to skills, high capital costs, intellectual property rights, and cost. Copenhagen needs to address the latter, at least to a degree.

In the end, it doesn’t matter where the technology comes from (transferred, collaborated upon, or indigenous) as long as it is appropriate and the price is right!