The International Conference Centre in Durban, South Africa, venue of the COP17 climate change negotiations. (Photo by: Karen Lotter/Ethekwini)

By Climatico Contributor: Shira Honig

Heading into Durban and the United Nations Climate Change Conference, otherwise known as the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP-17), the G77 remains committed to its long-standing position of achieving a legally binding agreement. Given the ongoing stalemate between developed and developing countries, however, many media accounts say they are unlikely to achieve it anytime soon.

Chief among its goals, the G77 is seeking a “Kyoto II,” a second commitment period that kicks in when the current commitment phase in Kyoto expires at the end of next year.

Developed countries such as the United States and Japan, meanwhile, remain committed to their own long-standing position of refusing to accept their own legally binding targets without also including binding commitments from major emerging economies such as China and India. For its part, India in recent months has consistently refused to commit to legally binding emissions cuts without more commitments from the U.S. Alongside this, several developed countries have attempted to downplay expectations for a treaty before 2015 or even 2020, angering many in the G77 who are urgently seeking international support to deal with climate change impacts.

The G77 is a loose coalition of developing countries founded in 1964 that has now grown to 132 members. Such large numbers inevitably lead to different positions within the group, with some members splintering off into other smaller regional blocs of which they may also be members, such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS) or the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). At the same time, larger numbers mean greater negotiating strength, and the G77 maintains several collective positions, including the desire for a Kyoto II. The BASIC countries issued a joint statement early November calling for a second commitment period.  

Another of G77’s main goals, and a sticking point heading into Durban, relates to climate financing flows from developed to developing countries. The G77 is looking for progress on implementation of the Green Climate Fund, as agreed to in Cancún at COP-16 last year.

Many of its members are largely distrustful of western promises for financing, and with good reason. The rules governing development aid have long been opaque and bureaucratic, with countless requirements that developing countries generally do not have the capacity to meet. In the current round of climate negotations, at least some of what developed countries promised as “new and additional” funding through the Copenhagen Accord has not been proven to be new or additional. For example, following an announcement early November that European Union finance ministers would provide $5.5-billion in short-term funding, criticisms came from NGOs such as Oxfam, to developing country ministers, such as India’s new environment minister, Jayanthi Natarajan, who said the money was merely repackaged aid. While such criticisms are fair, today’s economic crisis in Europe – and threatening to spread far beyond – poses a critical threat to both short and long-term climate funding.

As host of COP-17, G77 member South Africa is looking for ways to minimize the ongoing rift. Its negotiators have called in Valli Moosa, former Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and now the chairperson of the board of the World Wide Fund for Nature in South Africa, to advise the South African delegation and ease tensions between countries.

With its international clout, China is also seeking ways to bring parties together.  Xie Zhenhua, China’s chief negotiator whose influence was evident in the pivotal – and negotiators would say, negative – role he played in Copenhagen, is encouraging emerging economies to increase their own commitments. Xie is asking them to present national plans that may not be legally binding under Kyoto, but that at least show they are serious about reducing emissions at the national level. It is not clear at this point whether G77 members will buy into the plan, or whether it will satisfy the U.S. and other developed countries as being enough.  

Perhaps unintentionally, Xie’s idea is similar to those of U.S. chief climate change envoy Todd Stern, who was reported as saying this past spring in New York that internationally binding emissions caps are not necessary if you have national laws and regulations instead. In fact, he added, making obligations legally binding creates a perverse incentive that “diminish the ambition of what countries are proposing to do.” No doubt he was thinking of China as he made his statement.

The G77 would certainly take issue with Stern’s statement that a treaty is not necessary for targets, or for that matter, for financing implementation. Nevertheless, if a binding outcome does not emerge from Durban, they will need to seek ways to work around this deficit.

Emissions trading is set for a key role in UN negotiations (Source: UN Climate Change)

By Climatico Contributor: Sabina Manea

With the United Nations Climate Change Conference due to start on 28 November, emissions trading is a key topic due for discussion in Durban. As one of the three Kyoto market-based mechanisms seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, emissions trading has emerged as a crucial weapon in the arsenal of climate change mitigation at the international level. It needs to be decided whether the tradable units (called assigned amount units, or AAUs) remain valid beyond 2012, or whether the surplus of AAUs currently in existence should be reduced in line with emissions reductions targets. An investigation is also necessary into possible solutions to link the various existing and emerging national and regional trading schemes.

Continued validity of AAUs and linkage

The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol runs from 2008 until the end of 2012. Carrying over an unlimited amount of unused AAUs into a second commitment period is permitted under the current formulation of the Kyoto Protocol. However, there is a considerable surplus of AAUs, principally due to over-allocation to former Eastern bloc countries, whose industries shrank significantly in the 1990s. In order to pursue the targets of emissions reductions set by the Kyoto Protocol it is necessary to establish whether the surplus could be cancelled or otherwise retired from the market.

The number of national and regional emissions trading schemes is on the increase. The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the largest mandatory scheme currently in existence. California and Australia have announced plans to implement emissions trading in their respective jurisdictions. China and South Korea have also publicised their intention to run such schemes in the future. The possibility of establishing a means of linking these different schemes to one another would help establish a truly worldwide emissions market.

Reconciling conflicting interests

Countries holding surplus AAUs understandably wish to bank them into a second Kyoto commitment period. EU Member States could use these AAUs to help their industrial installations comply with the EU ETS (as AAUs are equivalent to EU emissions allowances). Unused AAUs can also be sold in the market to make substantial windfall profits.

Other countries are taking a more restrictive approach. Denmark is lobbying for AAUs not to be bankable, in line with continuing emissions reductions. As a compromise, South Africa, the host country for the UN conference, has suggested a compromise consisting of a limited 1% carry-over of spare AAUs.

AAU allocations and emissions reduction targets

The Kyoto Protocol sets caps for countries with emissions reduction commitments (Annex B Parties). These caps consist of AAUs, which are allocated to each country on the basis of historical levels of emissions. If a country requires more AAUs than provided in its initial allocation, it can buy additional ones in the market from other countries who hold excess AAUs, and vice versa.

The surpluses of AAUs held by some countries call into question the validity of their emissions reductions, which have been achieved incidentally due to economic decline, rather than actively through the development of greener technologies.

Emissions trading as an effective pillar of climate change mitigation

A firm decision on the treatment of the AAU surplus is overdue; the issue of unlimited banking was noted, but not amended at the Cancún conference in 2010. Ideally the conference in Durban would provide a clear statement regarding the extent to which AAUs are bankable into the following commitment period, as well as a plan for addressing the problem of the surplus. The international emissions market would also greatly benefit from a proposal for a system of linkage between national and regional emissions trading schemes. A variety of opinions has already surfaced on how this would work, ranging from a centralised mechanism to a decentralised network of trading links.

Tying the loose ends of the Kyoto emissions trading mechanism is vital for its continued success in the fight against climate change. The validity and internal workings of this mechanism beyond 2012 are areas which would particularly benefit from direct attention by the negotiating parties at Durban. A further step in the direction of improving interconnectivity with other emissions trading schemes would provide additional support. These important issues will therefore form the focus of coverage as the conference progresses.  

Expectations and the emerging picture of the GCF are creeping apart (source: UNclimatechange)

In advance of COP 17, the Green Climate Fund’s (GCF) Transitional Committee (TC) have passed the Parties a report, recommending it “take note” of the report’s findings. It is worth analysing this report since it  brings in to clearer focus the contrast between the expectations that some have for the fund – largely the private sector – and the the emerging picture of the fund.

Specifically, the overarching sentiment from the report is that the GCF will be a vehicle for aid-based disbursement. This is not necessarily consistent with the guiding principle of “catalyzing climate finance.” It is this apparent confliction – between the guiding principle of acting as a catalyst for climate finance, supposedly inclusive of the private sector, and the emerging picture of aid-based finance – that has recently attracted criticism from figures such as Yvo de Boer, and the frame in which we should view the suggested design of the GCF given to Parties at COP 17.

Sourcing the money

The report states that the finance will be delivered at a country level. This means that finance delivered by the GCF could, for example, be delivered to a sovereign-administered fund that lends to projects or programmes that aim to execute a particular objective arising from a national policy.

A natural consequence is that the GCF can be expected to deliver finance in much the same way as existing multilateral funds. Notably, it will place far more importance on public rather than privately sourced finance, since private investors would find it more difficult to contribute to a fund that’s lending criteria focus on promoting a particular national or regional policy, first and foremost, delivering returns as a somewhat more ancillary benefit.

The report, however, does state that the GCF should have a private sector facility that employs the private sector in fund contributions. It is unclear if the reference to a separate “facility” should be interpreted to mean that the privately sourced finance will be disbursed through mechanisms separate to those for public sector finance, nor if such a distinction should emerge, how the private finance will be delivered.

Disbursing the money

Inspecting the financial instruments recommended for disbursement of the funds gives perhaps no clearer demonstration of an aid-based picture. Disbursal will be focussed on grants and concessional lending. The instruments will be used to finance the additionality gap – taking the risky investments that the private won’t take alone in order to get a programme or project off the ground.

Clearly, grant-based disbursal limits the involvement of the private sector in the fund’s capitalisation. This also extends the earlier question: will concessional lending on a country level attract private investors to the fund, and if not, will the private sector facility employ delivery mechanisms that are different to grants and concessional lending.

A stark contrast

In contrast to the emerging picture of the GCF, the Green Climate Finance Framework (GCFF) suggested by BNEF is a manifestation of the expectations of the private sector. In this proposal the public sector contributions make up around 10% of the fund, are delivered by aid-based finance and used to leverage the remaining 90% from the private sector, i.e. fulfilling the mandate of catalysing finance for climate change from the outset.

It could be argued that the difference between the GCF and the GCFF is based largely on the level of the involvement of the private sector, and that both can catalyse finance by funding the additionality gap. This is true, but a design like the GCFF does far more catalysing from the outset, precisely because it is leveraging nine times more private than public sector capital.

The GCF, as it stands now, is the inverse of the GCFF – predominantly aid-based delivery of finance at a country level, with a small, but “non-negligible,” role for the private sector. This set-up, if justified properly, is not in-and-of itself objectionable. It is, however, of concern that the emerging picture of the GCF seems to contrast sharply with the expectations of the private sector, whilst also limiting the fund’s ability to catalyse private sector finance from the outset.

GCF needed for more than mitigation (Image by: USFWS Headquarters)

One of the purported successes of the talks in Cancun last year was the creation of the Green Climate Fund (GCF). This year the GCF’s Transitional Committee (TC) was created, with forty members, twenty-five of which are from developing countries. The TC is tasked with no less than designing the GCF itself. It must be an institution that is capable of handling vast sums of “new and additional” funding from the $100 billion promised annually by 2020, and that can target investment across many different fields of climate change related investment.

The GCF as a “recipe for failure”

The TC has agreed on some guiding principles, one of which is that the GCF should be designed in a way that subordinates private sector finance to public sector funding. This is the approach favoured by many developing countries and is line with the GCF’s objectives of providing more direct, reliable and streamlined access to climate finance. Last week, however, Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) released a white paper that forcefully argues the TC’s current approach is “a recipe for failure.”

The paper’s author, Michael Liebreich, claims that the GCF will never be able to raise a large portion of the $100 billion from the public sector. This, Liebreich states, is because many of the donor countries are under extreme fiscal strains and because many would face political difficulties in passing the revenue raising mechanisms in to law.

Liebreich argues that instead efforts should be focussed on the creation of a Green Climate Finance Framework (GCFF). The GCFF would raise approximately ninety percent of funds from the private sector, channelling money through existing financial mechanisms, whilst investment is largely used to target mitigation or, more specifically, infrastructure projects. The GCF still exists in Liebreich’s scenario, but plays a smaller role, administering the funds needed to leverage private sector money – in this case subsidising the gap left between the cost of clean and dirty energy.

A more complex issue

Liebreich’s arguments are compelling, but there are four immediate objections. First, although donor countries are indeed facing fiscal constraints, the funds they are capable of contributing is unclear. The ambiguity surrounding availability, or willingness, of funding is part of a larger problem: the lack of follow through on financial commitments by developed countries.

It seems premature – or even far-fetched – to state unequivocally at this stage that donor countries are incapable of providing the finance, although the author is correct to draw attention to the difficulty in ensuring the pledged funds are in fact received and spent, and to reaffirm the contention that the private sector will have to play a non-negligible part.

Second, many in the TC may disagree with the sentiment that a large majority of GCF expenditure should be on mitigation. Adaptation is under-funded yet considered equally important as mitigation by developing countries. Moreover, adaption activities are far less likely to be funded by the private sector on a large scale, since they are unlikely to generate revenues – if any at all – of the same scale, stability and longevity as mitigation projects. As the role of the private sector increases in the GCF, the available funding for adaptation decreases.

Third, the guiding principles of the GCF – which reflects the sentiment of those creating the fund – states that recipients wish to use the funding to promote ownership of climate activities within their countries. Although this can be interpreted in many different ways, one is to say that recipient countries wish to ensure the money is spent in a way that does not entrench dependence on foreign money and expertise.

However, since the majority of programmes and projects in a GCFF would be financed and/or owned by private investors, likely to be overseas investors, and that capacity building and technology transfer are both understandably unlikely to be funded by the private sector, domestic ownership of climate change related activities is significantly undermined.

Finally, a guiding principle of the GCF is the desire to make delivery of finance results-based, whilst ensuring it is not wholly conditional on results. Clearly, the delivery of finance by the private sector is based almost entirely on results, and thus runs contrary to the sentiment of those participating in the creation of a climate finance mechanism.

There is no reason why a GCFF cannot be created; indeed it is a good idea. However, suggesting that it should replace the GCF entirely – and therefore that the majority of the $100 billion should come from the private sector – would result in only a sub-section of the types of projects in need of funding, receiving funding. Moreover, it opposes the sentiment and guiding principles of those attempting to create a climate finance mechanism, in that it reduces the domestic ownership of emissions reductions activities and ensures that delivery of finance is almost entirely conditional on results.

Guest Editorial by: Matt Williams, UK Youth Climate Coalition

UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres during a press briefing (Image by: IISD Reporting Services)

The UNFCCC process has been mired in something of a quandary since the high hopes around Copenhagen in 2009 were quickly dashed when countries failed to come up with a second global, legally binding agreement to replace the Kyoto Protocol (due to expire in 2012). But the meeting in Cancun in late 2010 repaired some of the damage.

In Bonn, it quickly became clear to me that there are still a lot of big gaps in the negotiations. The talks are now over but these gaps remain unresolved ahead of the talks in Durban in December.

One such gap is a concern around the Green Climate Fund, agreed upon in Cancun. This body which aims to provide $100bn a year by 2020 for climate change mitigation and adaptation faces problems concerning its funding in the medium term (2012-2020). While kick-start funding currently stands at $10bn a year, Parties must increase their public climate finance commitments to ensure that the Green Climate Fund moves forward. There is a lack of clarity about how it will reach its 2020 target. The funding gap between now and 2012 still looms large.

The second potential gap concerns the Kyoto Protocol. This is the legally binding global deal which commits some countries to reduce their carbon dioxide emissions between 2008-2012. The commitments concern only 37 Parties, the wealthier countries in the world (with some notable exceptions – the US still hasn’t ratified the Kyoto Protocol). Nonetheless it has been a key part of moving global climate negotiations forward. In 2012 the Kyoto Protocol will expire and there is currently no new deal on the table to replace it. Any amendment to extend or replace the Kyoto Protocol would require all countries to independently ratify it by 31 December 2012 to prevent there being any gap. It is almost too late for this now, and so a regulatory gap is almost a certainty. Indeed, in a meeting with young people in Bonn which I was lucky enough to attend, Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, said that a regulatory gap is inevitable.

Coming up with a new deal is high on everyone’s list of priorities, but remains a contentious issue. It is made particularly difficult by questions over the involvement of emerging economies such as China, Brazil and India, who are unwilling to limit their economic progress, but whose involvement will be vital before countries such as Canada and the US will even begin to discuss entering a new deal. However, there are signs that the EU and the G77 might be beginning to talk behind the scenes about how a new deal could be struck. What such a deal would avoid is a so-called “pledge and review” system whereby countries would essentially go it alone and commitments would not be part of a global legally binding framework.

Finally, the ambition gap is probably the best known of all the gaps. Outside of the Kyoto Protocol, countries discuss their pledges to reduce emissions in the long-term. The ambition gap can be defined as the difference between the emissions reductions countries are committed to and the emissions reductions the science requires in order to keep global warming to safe levels. The science tells us that there is a big gap between the amount of emissions that would be saved by current pledges on the one hand and the need to limit warming to 2C on the other.

What’s more, at the opening of the talks last week, Oxfam released a report showing that two thirds of emissions reduction efforts currently on the table are those made by developing countries (those countries with the least historical responsibility for climate change and with fewer means to make emissions reductions). This revelation puts wealthier developed nations to shame and shows that a second ambition gap is opening up, between developed and developing country Parties.

The negotiations in Bonn were frustrating. Positive options are still on the table, but countries did little to move towards them at these talks. The space remains open for many countries to show leadership on a number of issues in Durban and to move the world towards a clean, fair future.

Matt Williams is part of UK Youth Climate Coalition’s (UKYCC) youth delegation to the UN climate talks (un.ukycc.org) and is currently interning with the ClientEarth communications team.

This story originally appeared on ClientEarth.

Even with the world map turned upside down, the Marshall Islands and other tiny Pacific nations are hard to find. What if climate change alters the map? (Image from MapCenter.com)

Questions of statehood and statelessness are generally laden with controversy and emotion, yet with Pacific islands such as the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) at risk of becoming gradually uninhabitable and entirely submerged under rising seas, along with losing their sovereignty and lucrative marine rights, there is an urgent need for legal solutions. Solutions are available, even if uncertainties surrounding precedents and current options mean they will depend as much on politics as they will on law.

According to customary international law as codified in the 1933 Montevideo Convention, a state must have a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with the other states to be considered sovereign. Nevertheless, even without climate change taken into account, not all recognized states today conform to all these requirements, and some academics have long argued that the definition is inadequate.

With regard to climate change, there is no precedent for a state losing its territory for any reason other than war, annexation or the sale of land. One option for a state threatened with submersion to retain its sovereignty is to purchase new territory if it is available. For example, the Indonesian government has agreed to rent out one of its thousands of uninhabited islands for the Maldives. Another possibility could be the resettlement of the state’s citizens into a receiving state, in which they would retain some autonomy. This option, however, is fraught with political difficulties, and so far, it is mostly unprecedented, as movements tend to be within one country rather than between countries – for example, in Papua New Guinea, the Carteret Islanders have begun relocating to higher ground in Bougainville, an autonomous region 50 miles away.

There are two kinds of state independence: factual, which is the set of four elements above, and legal, a status conferred by the international community and based on fundamental, inviolable jus cogens norms. Even if an uninhabitable island is no longer factually independent, it can still be recognized by other states as legally independent as long as it maintains a “population nucleus” of 50 or more people – or, in the case of complete submersion, if it maintains a functioning government, even one located in another state, that claims continued statehood. Only if the majority of the world’s states decided not to recognize it any longer would the island no longer be legally independent, but that is an unlikely scenario. Morally, other countries have an obligation to support the islands’ continued existence. Politically, many would want to avoid setting dangerous new precedents.

Other options include a trusteeship run by the islanders with financing from other countries, a “nation ex situ” that can hold a scattered Pacific island diaspora together and would align well with today’s global, cross-border citizenships and rich online communities. Yet the trustneeship known as the United Nations Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, administered by the United States between 1947 and 1986, caused significant problems before RMI became independent in 1979. During that time, America conducted 66 nuclear test explosions, leading to the Marshallese peoples’ first exposure to radiation – and relocation. The effects of that radiation and relocation still linger in the form of more than 35 severe medical conditions, such as cancer of the bone, and destroyed homes and property. If a trusteeship were the answer, then, it would have to work entirely differently from how it has in the past. But it also remains unclear how an island diaspora would work without the land and resources that form the basis of its cultural identity.

This one example highlights the difficulty surrounding possible solutions to safeguard the islanders’ statehood if the worst-case scenario becomes a reality – a reality that is extraordinarily challenging for Pacific islanders like the Marshallese to contemplate, not least because today’s generation may be challenged by a statehood they struggled to achieve only 25 years ago. But if discussing legal theories in advance of submersion prepares the world for such changes and smooths inevitable political difficulties, that statehood – while hardly ideal – will at least not be lost.

This piece is based partially on presentations made by Maxine Burkett of the University of Hawaii and Jenny Grote Stoutenburg of the University of California, Berkeley, as well as comments made by RMI Ambassador Phillip Muller, all at the Columbia University’s law school conference, Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate.

UNFCCC Bonn conference – June 2011. (Image by: Adopt a Negotiator)

The UN Climate Change Conference kicks off this week in Bonn, Germany as governments continue framework discussions in preparation for the Seventeenth Conference of Parties (COP17) to be held in Durban, South Africa, at the end of the year. Over three thousand participants representing 183 countries are attending the conference in Bonn from June 6-17, including government delegates, business and industry representatives, environmental organizations, and research bodies.

Speaking on the first day of the conference, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Christiana Figueres reminded governments that they hold an unavoidable responsibility to make clear progress towards the 2011 climate objectives agreed to at COP16 in Cancun.

“Governments lit a beacon in Cancun towards a low-emission world which is resilient to climate change. They committed themselves to a maximum global average temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius, with further consideration of a 1.5 degree maximum. Now, more than ever, it is critical that all efforts are mobilized towards living up to this commitment.”

Ms. Figueres expects that the meeting in Bonn should provide clarity on the architecture of the future international climate change regime to reduce global emissions. In addition, negotiators will focus on the design of the finance, technology and adaptation institutions agreed to in Cancun which will allow developing countries to successfully adapt to climate change while still building their own sustainable futures.

The conference comes amid a backdrop of new warnings from the International Energy Agency (IEA) of a sharp rise in the volume and concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere. The IEA announced last week that 2010 emissions from global energy generation have returned to record highs, marking an unexpectedly sharp rebound from the reduced emission levels caused by the financial crisis. Reports now show that carbon dioxide concentrations have once again peaked at just under 395 parts per million (ppm).

The two week conference includes the thirty-fourth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA 34) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI 34), the sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 16), and the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA 14).

New items under discussion include: SBI’s consideration of proposed items on work programmes relating to reporting by Annex I and non-Annex I countries, adaptation, and response measures, as well as SBSTA’s consideration of the work programme on agriculture, the impacts of climate change on water and water resource management, and the initiation of a new work programme on issues regarding reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD+) identified within the Cancun Agreements.

Kwajalein Atoll – Marshall Islands. (Image by: Vanderberg Witness)

Citizens from small island nations in the Pacific Ocean have known for decades that their geographic isolation, heavy coastal infrastructure, population dispersion across many islands, and low-lying atolls only meters above sea level make them the most vulnerable countries to climate change in the world. However, now changes in the global climate are accelerating, and the shorelines of countries such as the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of Nauru and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) are increasingly battered with severe storm, coastal erosion and sea-level rise. Frustrated with the lack of progress at the United Nations climate change negotiations, and mindful that they need to be prepared for the possibility the sea may soon submerge their homelands, these islanders have brought their case – and unprecedented legal and policy questions – to the world community.

A conference late May at Columbia University’s Center for Climate Change Law, Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate, organized at the request of the Marshall Islands government, brought together academics from institutions such as Columbia, NYU and the University of New South Wales; diplomatic groups such as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS); and NGOs such as Islands First to explore complex and unusual questions on state sovereignty, marine rights, international treaties, and migration and resettlement. For those like myself who have worked with small island nations, this public discussion, as well as the burgeoning of academic papers on these subjects, were largely new.

Climate change and the highly likely scenario that small islands will disappear in the near future – even if emission levels stabilize at current levels, according to the IPCC’s 2007 Summary for Policymakers – challenge many aspects of international, and domestic, law and policy as we know them today. The host of new issues never before addressed includes what options are available for a state, deterritorialized due to climate change, to maintain its sovereignty; how to treat ambulatory coastlines in international law, which has implications for a country’s marine rights; and how to deal with the possible relocation and resettlement of thousands of individuals. These questions need to be balanced with the ongoing challenges of assigning responsibility for emissions and of developing countries accessing sorely needed mitigation and adaptation funding.

After three days of presentations and discussions among legal, science and social science scholars, it was clear that there are few easy answers. Some issues, such as statelessness and resettlement, are fraught with emotion and uncertainty. Others, such as migration due to climate change, are characterized by a lack of credible evidence. The conference wavered between, on the one hand, rallying the many lawyers in attendance into using the law to help the small island nations, and on the other hand, recognizing the limits of the law to provide that assistance.

Diplomats from small islands also issued their own rallying cries. RMI Ambassador Phillip Muller, said the fact his government had to organize this conference was nothing to celebrate because it highlighted the failure of the international community to address climate change urgently. Yet he also was buoyed by the media and academic attention, and hopeful that there was still time to save his tiny low-lying country. RMI Minister of Foreign Affairs John Silk said the conference represented his country’s first steps to finding solutions to difficult problems rather than acting as “passive or silent victims. “We, the Marshallese and all nations and people at the front lines of vulnerability,” he said, “should be more actively defining our future in all eventualities instead of letting others write it for us.”

This is the first in a series of posts on the conference at Columbia University, “Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate”. In upcoming posts, I will explore in greater detail the issues of statelessness, marine rights, ocean acidification, and migration and resettlement.

Building a wind turbine (image by: Bill Ward)

Financial assistance and green collar apprenticeships are two of the pillars of regional policy in New South Wales (NSW) aimed at encouraging the education and training people will need to succeed in the emerging green economy.

In my previous post on skills shortages, I noted that we do not have time to wait for favourable policies that will facilitate the transition and so should encourage grass roots initiatives focussed on training workers in different sectors. At the same time, we must not ignore the progressive policies that are being developed and implemented more quickly in some parts of the world, the exceptions that will bolster the grass-roots initiatives. The regional policies in NSW are a case in point.

The need for change in training and education varies greatly across countries, sectors and occupations. For example, training for many jobs in sectors such as energy, construction and manufacturing will be fundamentally transformed while environmental components will be integrated into the existing education for more generic or cross-sector jobs in consulting, risk management or IT. Some adjustments will be made in response to new technologies or government regulations while others will be made to meet demand in new markets.

Researchers at the International Labour Organisation and the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training found that skills shortages exist for a number of reasons including a critical lack of scientists and engineers in both developing and developed countries, national education systems that cannot meet demand for green skills, underestimated growth for example in low carbon technologies and the low status of certain occupations in many countries.

The NSW Department of Education and Training has a ‘Green Skills and Energy Efficiency Strategy’ that provides subsidies for ‘accredited training that improves the environmental impacts of NSW business operations, products and services’. Businesses in sectors such as energy, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, hospitality and health can access the subsidised training.

Owners and managers, as well as workers and job seekers, can take a range of courses, for example in the design, installation and running of energy efficient technology, the delivery and marketing of environmentally-friendly goods and services, or the assessment of energy, water and resources use and savings. The formal training component for NSW apprenticeships and traineeships is free and individuals can receive additional assistance with travel and accommodation, or help for those who lost their jobs in the economic downturn.

Case studies bring to life the benefits of filling skills gaps in a variety of business activities from organic macadamia farming to resource-efficient printing to environmentally-friendly real estate development. They also highlight the need for staff engagement on all levels from owners to managers to workers.

This is the second in a series of posts that will explore different aspects of the challenge we face in providing the education and training for jobs in the low-carbon green economy. If the subject is of interest to you, don’t forget to check back over the next few weeks for further installments.

Article by Guest Contributor: Joelle Westlund

As the COP16 comes to a final close, developing countries have yet to see extended commitments towards the Kyoto Protocol.

Japan has reiterated its position on the future of Kyoto, arguing that China, India and the United States must fulfill their obligations to emission reductions through the signing of a new treaty. In stark contrast, Bolivian President Morales has given an ultimatum: “There are two ways: either capitalism dies or Mother Earth dies.”

World Bank President Robert Zoellick has said that China and India have complicated the bifurcation between rich and poor nations since both countries are developing and responsible for much of today’s global emissions.

India, on the other hand, appears to shifting its position on signing a legally binding agreement to achieve a compromise. Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh stated “All countries must make binding commitments in appropriate legal form… I have nuanced our position.”

The proposed “Green Fund” which would gather and distribute funds running to perhaps $100bn per year by 2020, was outright rejected by some developing countries on the basis that it was a ‘western-run’ institution. For highly vulnerable nations, especially island nations, want to see the fund established as soon as possible.

A World Bank report has estimated that the cost of climate adaptation in the developing world would amount to $75-100bn per year. Yet proposals that have been put forward have continuously been dismissed by opposing parties. Perceived ‘western’ proposals, have been the basis for rejection by many developing countries, especially those in Latin America. Other developing countries were not impressed with the hard-line stance that countries like Bolivia have taken.

The negotiations of this annual meeting has been deemed a “zombie process” with a lack of successful outcome and the unwillingness for an effective compromise to be made between developing and developed countries. And while “The new document is strong on acknowledging the scale of the problem, [it] does not commit parties to new measures to curb emissions”, said environment correspondent Richard Black.