After APECs confirmation of what had increasingly seemed inevitable - that the Copenhagen summit wouldn’t be the major breakthrough it was heralded to be - the chances of swift and effective action on climate change seem to have faded. But Europe has not been the leader on this issue its rhetoric would suggest. And the German example exemplifies this trend.

First, take Angela Merkel: she likes to point to Germany’s record as a leader on environmental technology and climate change policy; indeed, climate change featured prominently in her speech to the US Congress. Yet, at the same time Merkel seemed to constitute the major block against concrete EU-pledges of financial aid for climate change adaptation to developing countries at the EU summit at the end of October; and that even though the head of the German federal environmental agency (Bundesumweltamts) argues that Germany will need to spend €5 billion a year in adaptation funding to developing countries.

Another telling sign of ambiguity was her stance about attending the Copenhagen summit in person. Faced with opinion polls that show 90 percent of Germans in favour of her attending the summit, Merkel first announced she was going to attend the summit, only to have her press spokesman relativise this statement the next day, stating Merkel would only attend the summit if there were ‘chances for a significant breakthrough‘. As of this morning Merkel was once again set to attend the summit. A good sign, surely, but a week of changes to her decision can hardly be seen as a sign of unwavering commitment and belief.

The ambiguity about how much a priority climate change should be politically does not stop with Merkel. Dirk Niebel, development minister and member of the CDU’s liberal coalition partner FDP, drew widespread criticism by suggesting as early as last week that he thought a binding agreement at Copenhagen was unlikely to materialise - and placing any possible blame for this on large transitional economies like India, Brazil and Mexico. In retrospect Niebel’s perception of likely failure has been realistic, but statements like this always have a certain quality of political self-fulfillment. It certainly did not help Norbert Röttgen’s dramatic rhetorical attempts to convince other countries and the German public that ‘failure in Copenhagen is not an option‘. A new government always needs some time to speak with a unified voice and define priorities. But given the danger of outright failure in Copenhagen, Germany has certainly not played the proactive role that it could have. But it is definitely not alone in this failure.

Angela Merkel’s CDU (with their Bavarian sidekicks, the CSU) and the free-market FDP - the main winner of Germany’s federal elections - will form the next governing coalition. This is almost certainly bad news for German climate change policy - both domestically and on the international stage - but the policy setbacks in this area will arguably be more limited than what the FDP would prefer. Looking at international negotiations and energy policy as examples will show why.

1) International negotiations

Within the Grand Coalition that governed Germany for the past 4 years, Germany’s stance at international negotiations was never a hotly contested political terrain, for several reasons. Because Germany started important environmental measures earlier than other countries (and cleverly pushed for CO² emission-reduction targets to be based on 1990, before the heavily eastern German industry was mostly shut down) being progressive in contrast to international negotiating partners was never particularly hard, because it did not necessitate painful domestic policy measures. While this is changing to an extent, Germany, and indeed Europe, are not the crucial barriers to a post-Kyoto. And Angela Merkel, a former environment minister and early believer in the science behind climate change is unlikely to give up control over negotiations to an extent that would endanger a progressive German position.

Nevertheless, another danger is more real. Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), German’s environment minister had four years in which to build relationships with other negotiators and governments, get a feeling for the limits of other countries’ room for political maneouvre and learn the tricks of the trade. Given the lack of high-profile candidates in the area of environmental and climate change policy within the FDP and CDU/CSU, Gabriel successor will almost certainly struggle to make a similar impression. And, in addition, she or he will only have had three weeks at the most to get their head into an issue that is among the most complicated and tricky of any ever attempted to be dealt with by international negotiations.

2) Energy policy

While it is fair to say that climate change policy did not feature in the run-up to the federal elections at all, this is not true for energy policy. A long string of lies about nuclear energy was masterfully publicised by SPD environment minister Sigmar Gabriel. They included cover-ups about leaks in the site of Germany’s proposed site for the long-term storage of nuclear energy, high costs for cleaning up an alternative site borne by the tax-payer, the existance (and subsequent denial of this fact) of a strategy paper commissioned by an energy major and outlining communication strategies to promote nuclear energy in the election campaign (conclusion: keep quiet and point out nuclear energy’s green credentials). In addition to further accidents in a notorious north-German nuclear power plant and the emotive nature of many Germans’ thinking about nuclear energy made the CDU/CSUs and FDPs election pledge of ‘exiting-the-exit’ of nuclear energy (Ausstieg vom Ausstieg) one of the few clear dividing lines in an otherwise uneventful election campaign.

The high percentage of Germans who want to exit nuclear energy doesn’t seem to have helped the SPD very much. Nor is there a clear-cut impact of nuclear policy on climate change. Nuclear energy is clean (with regards to CO² emissions), and not extending the life of nuclear power plants would almost certainly have meant building more coal powered ones, even at the breakneck speed of German renewables growth. While there is a valid argument that being able to keep written-off nuclear plants running will decrease the pressure for large energy companies to invest in renewables, this would have been equally true for investment in coal that is already happening. If the new government sticks to the CDUs election pledges of not building new nuclear and taxing nuclear providers half the extra profits they make from extending their lifetime to invest this money in renewable energy, then this may not actually be bad news for preventing climate change. Yet this is doubtful. The traditional energy companies are not friends of renewables, and their deep pockets and lobbying prowess may mean they will push further, for government-subsidised new nuclear power stations and reductions in funding for renewables. If the market knows best, skepticism may prevail. On Monday morning after the election the shares of EON and RWE jumped, while those of renewable technology producers fell sharply…

Two weeks ago, a group of 20 German companies announced they would be forming a consortium called ‘Desertec’ for an investment in solar thermal power plants in northern Africa that would provide 15 percent of Europe’s electricity needs. The companies include re-insurer Münchener Rück, technology company Siemens, as well as utilities EON and RWE. It would require an investment of 400 billion € in the next decade.

It’s a grand vision but not one without critics. Among the most prominent is Hermann Scheer, a solar energy pioneer in the Social Democratic Party (SPD). He argues that for two reasons, focusing on projects like Desertec, which require large subsidies and long time scales for realization, is not the most effective way of building up renewable energy supplies. One is the difficulty in realising a project on this scale, involving EU as well as north African countries and difficult geographical conditions would be liable to huge time and cost overruns. The second is the speed at which decentralised solar is becoming cost competitive. Scheer estimates that solar electricity will have reached cost-parity with traditional fossil and nuclear plants in the next three years and that technologies such as electric cars will solve storage problems for intermittent electricity output from solar and wind.

And indeed, a quieter ‘revolution’ may already be happening in Germany. Driven by cheap roof-top solar modules from China and Taiwan (per kW, prices have dropped nearly 30 percent over a year) and generous public subsidies, even in cloudy Germany solar power has become a paying proposition for small-scale investors. While only providing half a percent of German electricity production today, growth rates in solar deployment are high. While in 2008, 1,500 MW of new capacity was installed, this year it is likely to hit 2,000 MW, according to industry estimates.

Both Greenpeace, and the Desertec foundation argue that it is wrong to frame the argument as one between large-scale and small-scale solar energy production. Greenpeace argues that in order to hit state climate change targets it is necessary to both increase German domestic production through Germany’s renewable energy law and invest in visionary projects such as Desertec. Scheer’s argument implies a choice in which decentralised solar production will be marginalised while the long time-scale of Desertec would provide a convenient political excuse to invest in a new generation of coal or nuclear power plants. Which of these arguments is proven right will have to be seen. German citizens’ willingness to pay higher subsidies linked to a growth in domestic solar capacity AND new subsidies that would likely be necessary to finance Desertec might deteriorate in the harsher economic climate. And federal elections in September will prove decisive for crucial political decisions in energy policy, namely those on whether to delay de-commissioning of nuclear power plants and the ban on building new ones; the regulation of new coal-fired plants with regards to CCS-requirements; and the level of future funding for renewable energy sources in the renewable energy law.

The Matterhorn, as seen from Zermatt, Switzerland, March 2009. Skiing in Zermatt, Switzerland this past winter it was obvious that snow levels were decreasing at an unusual rate, as discussed in the Convention report.

A major publication from the EU’s Convention on the Protection of the Alps last week, revealed the dramatic effects of climate change on the Alps region.

The Convention on the Protection of the Alps was established in 1991 and is headquartered out of Bolzano, Italy. The Convention report published on 17 June 2009 is its second magisterial report. It reveals that the northern ranges of the Alps are suffering serious flooding while southern ranges are generally seeing huge reductions in snow fall. Average Precipitation levels have decreased 10 % in the south-east of the region.

Marco Onida, secretary general of the Convention, recognizes that “the European climate is dividing in two…the result will be havoc for the Alps and the communities and wildlife that rely on the area.” The Alps’ most famous peaks, such as Mont Blanc, The Matterhorn, and Monte Rosa, mark the division between the wet north and Italy and Slovenia in the dryer south of the region.

The current analysis of changes to be made to the Swiss-Italian border is a prime example of such geo-political changes driven by climate change. The Italian military has been tracking changes as glaciers on the border melt over the last thirty years. Italian Brig. General, Carlo Colella (Florence) suggests that in some places the border could change up to 100 m. It is also believed that Italy will gain territory as the glaciers in the Southern Alps are melting at a faster rate.

The border in question was last changed in 1861 when Italy became a unified state. Now the Italian government is involved in changing their national legislation to allow such a border change; Switzerland requires no such change to law. Colella acknowledges that “after the border change with Switzerland, the Italian-French border will come under consideration.”

Outside of creating complex border issues, climate change in the Alps has begun to have profound implications for agriculture and tourism. Northern villages already face flooding and water shortages and decreased snowfall in the south have already started to hit the tourism industry. Additionally, Alpine species are being driven further up the mountains; thus, exotic and invasive plant species are starting to take hold lower down in the Alpine system.

The Convention report points to the environmental burden, especially with regards to expediting climate change, from the increased demand for artificial snow by the tourism industry. This is a necessary step in order to sustain the winter sports industry, which is the economic mainstay of the area. But it is a catch-22 scenario, under which generation of artificial snow further burdens already stressed water and energy supplies.

Ultimately, changing patterns of rain and snowfall, shrinking glaciers, and raising temperatures are seen by the Convention report as the greatest challenges to Alpine villages. The Convention report cites Italy’s 178 mile-long Tagliamento (in the northeast of the country) as the only Alpine river to not suffer drastic modifications to date. Dr. Onida said that “the Alps are the water tower of Europe, but much of the water is no longer reaching the places downstream where it is actually needed for ecosystem [stability], agriculture, and energy [generation].” He does acknowledge the very real struggle between agriculture and tourism for scarce water supplies.

Only time will tell how national borders will change and whether climate change will lead to intense battles between tourism and the survival of Alpine villages. The eight Alpine countries – France, Italy, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Slovenia, and Hungary – are taking action through the Alpine Convention. There may be time and the means to manage and mitigate some of the most extreme effects of climate change in the Alps.

Proponents of Carbon-Capture-and-Storage (CCS) have long hailed the technology as the silver bullet that will enable the world to both fight climate change and keep using coal reserves. In Germany, the debate about the merits and pitfalls of this approach has once again surfaced. It highlights three key problems with using CCS to solve the climate crisis. Ordered from least to most damaging to the proponents of CCS, they can be summarised as: 1) The technological challenges in bringing the technology to large-scale applicability and the amount of money needed to reach this point. 2) The economic uncertainties over the competitiveness of CCS-generated energy vis-a-vis other forms of energy. 3) The opportunity costs of investing in CCS given the proven potential and fast growth rates of other renewable energy sources.

1) The technological challenges in bringing the technology to large-scale applicability and the amount of money needed to reach this point.

To deploy CCS technologies to a degree necessary to substantially reduce CO² emissions from coal-based energy generation will require not the creation of an infrastructure similar in scale and technological complexity to that of the oil- and gas-supply. Furthermore, it will require sustained investments by governments and energy producers in fitting and possibly retro-fitting existing plants. This combination of the costliness of the infrastructure necessary and the technological challenges involved means that the technology will be deployed too late, when the peak of coal-based energy production has already been reached, argues Richard Heinberg, from the Post Carbon Institute.

2) The economic uncertainties over the competitiveness of CCS-generated energy vis-a-vis other forms of energy

Caused in part by uncertainties about the costs and feasibility of CCS, in part by uncertainties about future supplies and cost changes of other renewables, there is considerable uncertainty about the economic prospects of CCS-generated energy. Richard Heinberg argues that deploying CCS will lead to strong increases in electricity prices, because a) CCS will be deployed after coal production has peaked, and b) because the technology lowers the efficiency of energy production.

Long-term considerations aside, in Germany doubts about the economics of CCS have appeared from unusual quarters. Johannes Lambertz, head of RWE Power, stated that with increasing construction costs and the potential costs for CCS the economic case for constructing coal-fired power stations was hard if to make.

3) The opportunity costs of investing in CCS given the proven potential and fast growth rates of other renewable energy sources.

While the points made above merely express scepticism about the chances of successfully fighting climate change using CCS technology, they don’t seem to justify to not at least try (we should try everything, after all, if we take climate change seriously). But this misses the crucial point of the case against CCS - opportunity costs: The cost of an alternative that must be forgone in order to pursue a certain action. The question is, would investment in other forms of renewable energy or measures not make more out of public and private investment?

Axel Berg, deputy energy spokesman of the SPD-Fraktion, is one making this argument. He argues that while using CCS sustains an outdated mode of energy creation based on large utilities running large power plants, the technology cannot easily be exported, especially not to developing countries, and shift attention away from policies focusing on energy efficiency measures and new renewables technologies, the only sustainable solutions to climate change.

Overall, the debate around CCS will continue, and it is likely that it will play at least some part in policies addressing climate change. But there are serious problems linked with its use - it is not the silver bullet.

Seven years ago, Hamburg sold its municipal energy provider to the Swedish utility Vattenfall. Yesterday, in a telling example of changed thinking on energy policy, Hamburg’s Green environment minister announced the start of construction for the first (admittedly tiny) windpark operated by the city’s newly created municipal energy provider. The re-claiming of political control over energy production and supply by municipal providers, in line with developments elsewhere in Germany, highlights three issues. First, that for environmental and economic reasons political control over energy production and supply might be desirable. Second, that Green and Conservative politicians can make pragmatic policy. And third, that ‘greening’ energy supply might be a paying proposition for a city like Hamburg.

To provide more competition and therefore choice for citizens; to have an energy provider taking responsibility for fighting climate change; and to have an energy provider that operates in Hamburg, re-invests profits and represents the city’s interests; these are are the goals Anja Hajduk, Hamburg’s Green environment minister names for the creation of the new state-owned energy utility. They are to be achieved, in the medium-term, by Hamburg Energy, the new company by not only producing its own renewable energy, but also re-taking control over the heat- and gas-grids currently operated by Vattenfall and providing its customers with exclusively non-coal-non-nuclear electricity.

Hamburg Energie’s creation was first announced last autumn, at the same time as the government - legally obliged - granted Vattenfall the right to operate a coal-fired power station in the city. And while the Left party in the city characterizes the move as a cynical political ploy, it is more likely the expression of a spectacularly unspectacular Conservative-Green coalition’s pragmatic approach. Apart from announcing the creation of a municipal rival to Vattenfall, Hajduk - faced with her party’s discontent but legally obliged to grant the plant’s construction - also placed stringent regulatory limits on its size and the amount of cooling water from the river Elbe it is allowed to withdraw. And while traditionally seen as big-business friendly, Hamburg’s CDU members of government have so far gone along which a majority of the Green’s environmental policy - in striking contrast to the constant quarreling observers are used to from Red-Green coalition days.

And there is evidence that the optimism placed in renewable energy has sound economic footing. For example, in an unrelated - but not accidental move - Siemens announced the creation of a European sales and project execution headquarter in Hamburg. For northern German manufacturing, mostly rural and hurt by the demise of the ship-building industry from the 70s onwards, wind turbines have long provided a dynamic and fast-growing engine of job creation and economic growth. Siemens’ announcement, part of a wider trend of growth in renewable-energy related services in northern Germany and Denmark, show that this industry can create white-collar jobs in the city as well. The creation of Hamburg Energie is a sign that this message has been understood.

Introduced as a seemingly small addition to make the Germany’s economic stimulus package seem more specific in helping consumers and the automotive industry, the wrecking bonus has become a breathtaking success. It’s formula is very simple: anyone who buys a new car which meets EURO IV exhaust limits gets 2500€ from the government as long as the old car is not sold on but destroyed. The initial 1,5 billion € (enough for 600.000 cars) was quickly used up, and under the pressure of car owners, many of whom had already bought a new car and now faced uncertainty about whether they would receive the bonus - was extended to 5 billion € and until the end of 2009.

The wrecking bonus was clearly successful in some ways: 1.4 million Germans put in claims for the wrecking bonus so far. In the days after the online system for claims went online 200.000 to 300.000 claims a day reached the agency in charge of administering the wrecking bonus, crashing their website and forcing them to employ extra staff to deal with the backlog. The association of automotive producers’ figures show that car sales from January to April 2009 in Germany exceeded those of the year before by nearly 20 percent. Yet despite stimulating car sales, the wrecking bonus is not environmentally friendly, and looking at the opportunity cost of the money spent - the side-effects, and the hang-over that might follow from it, show how.

The question of how ‘green’ the wrecking bonus is has been discussed here before. While Sigmar Gabriel, minister for the environment, likes to call it ‘Umweltprämie’ (environmental bonus), producing new cars and wrecking old ones is energy and ressource intensive. Furthermore, there is no clear incentive in the wrecking bonus to buy environmentally friendly cars, as EURO IV is mandatory anyway and cars don’t have to fulfil more. It also does not create a greater incentive for those wrecking especially polluting vehicles and exchanging them for especially clean ones. Nevertheless, the wrecking bonus has led to a shift towards buying cheaper and (therefore) cleaner cars, creating the political paradox of leading to domestic producers of large cars (Mercedes, Audi, Porsche, BMW) not benefiting to the extent of foreign producers like Fiat, Dacia, and Toyota.

From an climate change point of view, the positive impacts of the wrecking bonus have nevertheless be weighted against other ways to spend the money. Here the wrecking bonus quickly looks environmentally much less attractive. 5 billion € could have gone a long way in other fields. In energy efficiency, development of electric cars, increasing the pace of renewable energy deployment this kind of money could have given a crucial push to an industry which is becoming more significant and has a clear mandate for future growth - unlike the automotive industry. Furthermore, no-one can empirically validate how much of the extra-spending on cars is unblocking delayed demand, and how much of it is merely pulling forwards car purchases which will now not be conducted in the years to come.

With regards to electric cars, the fallacy of the wrecking bonus possibly becomes clearest. The German government supports some field trials of electric cars in selected cities, as well as subsidising technology needed to make these cars ready for the market. By increasing these subsidies as well as creating buying incentives similar to that of the wrecking bonus exclusively for electric cars - as China, among others is considering - German companies could have benefited and Germany could have had the crucial first-mover-advantage in a field that will clearly be crucial in the decades to come. But, the money is spent, both by consumers and the government. Some of the 1.4 million Germans that bought a car in the first four months of this year might have considered buying an electric, hybrid, or other environmentally-friendly car next year. More would have done so given a significant government support in doing so. But that money is spent, and an opportunity missed.

The transport sector once again takes centre stage, as the European Environment Agency criticizes the green credentials of motor vehicles, freight transport and rail networks. Highlighting the need to shift investments in the current economic climate to more sustainable and energy efficient modes, Professor Jacqueline McGlade, EEA executive director, added that

“…trends in transport are pointing in the wrong direction and will continue to contribute to air pollution, rising emissions of greenhouse gas and many negative environmental impacts.”

Jaguar Land Rover has just received a £330m bailout from the European Investment Bank to safeguard its 15,000 jobs an make investments in low emission technologies. The loan, the repayment of which will be guaranteed by the British government, is for a research and development project on reducing emissions. Jaguar Land Rover has been seeking Government assistance for some time and has recently put its workforce on a four-day week to avoid job losses.

The UK government received renewed pleas for an industry bailout from the motoring industry this week. Lobby groups are hoping April’s budget will include a ‘scrappage scheme’ - where car owners are given a financial incentive of about £2,000 to swap their old vehicle for a new greener model.

Whilst no decision has been announced, it is believed the scheme, which increased sales by 40% in March, attracting half a million buyers when it was introduced in Germany; is being taken seriously by MPs.  Statistics showed yesterday that sales of cars in the UK have dropped almost a third year on year. However, environmental campaigners highlight that the transport sector has been slow to introduce more environmental vehicles, and said that the money could be better used to fund sustainable transport solutions. There was also a fear that funds could be diverted from existing budgets set aside by the government for investment in green technologies, such as the £400m earmarked in the pre-budget report for an “environmental transformation fund”, which supports the development of new low-carbon energy and energy efficiency technologies in the UK.

A new report, The State of Green Investing 2009, by Progressive Investor, a green investment newsletter, has increased confidence in green investments, backed by positive signs from the stock market. The US report adds that the green industry is “at the nexus of stimulus support by governments around the world”.

The G20 leaders standing for their

The G20 Summit in London has now concluded, with US President Obama filling the main press briefing room for an hour-long press session.  The main points of the summit for international and national climate policy are summarised below:

1. Overall: In the substantive elements of the summit outcomes there is little mention of climate change.  In the summary communiqué climate change is mentioned in the second-to-last and penultimate paragraphs only.  As Climatico’s Simon Billett asked UK Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband, there is little evidence that this summit has been more than an agreement to agree in later meetings.
2. Forestry: UK Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband, said that forestry was a fundamental element of the global climate programme.  Italy has agreed to hold specific discussions on it at the G8 in July 2009.  There was agreement from France, Australia, Italy, Germany, US on the need for a global forestry deal.  Forestry was a major point of discussion in the corridors between delegations.
3. USA Climate Policy: It remains unclear whether the Obama administration will require cuts from China and India for a ‘comprehensive’ COP15 deal.  Obama said that “further discussions” needed with China, and that the US recognises its role as leader of clean energy and tech for China and India.  Obama: “We need an interesting conversation on how to overcome this challenge… we need low carbon growth… a rapid deployment of technology across the world… the US needs to lead these countries into the low carbon energy future”.
4. Green Growth: The summit has done little to define green growth or encourage the use of best practice measures between G20 countries.  While para. 27 and 28 of the final communiqué do reaffirm the commitment to low carbon growth, the summit has done almost nothing to further definitions of what this might mean or how it should be achieved.

Geithner, Obama, and Brown

As expected, the global economy took center stage at the G20 Summit held yesterday in London. Amidst the world economic crisis, G20 leaders met to discuss and put forth a global plan for recovery. Included amongst the six pledges made by the leaders of the Group of Twenty was a pledge for a green and sustainable recovery. However, despite this pledge and the hopes of many demonstrators, the public, and officials, climate change and plans for a green recovery featured little in the day’s discussions.

Over the weekend, the official G20 communiqué leaked to the press and included only vague language on the topic of climate change. According to paragraphs 27 and 28 in the official communiqué:

27. We agreed to make the best possible use of investment funded by fiscal stimulus programmes towards the goal of building a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery. We will make the transition towards clean, innovative, resource efficient, low carbon technologies and infrastructure. We encourage the MDBs to contribute fully to the achievement of this objective. We will identify and work together on further measures to build sustainable economies.

28. We reaffirm our commitment to address the threat of irreversible climate change, based on the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and to reach agreement at the UN Climate Change conference in Copenhagen in December 2009.

The vague language of the communiqué led to speculation that a “green stimulus” package might be less than concrete. This sentiment continued in the days leading up to the Summit.

Therefore, the day began with slightly lowered expectations for the one-day summit. Much of the morning for reporters was spent researching, writing, and watching leaders get their pictures taken. Anticipation and excitement began to grow as delegates sat down for their plenary session in the morning. However, not until close to 2:00 PM did green issues appear on the agenda with a press conference held by the UK Climate Change Secretary, Ed Miliband.

In the early afternoon, Miliband surprised reporters with a short press conference to brief them on the progress of climate change discussions and answer questions. Miliband stated that he was confident that the G20 Summit would provide forward movement towards Copenhagen in December. The discussions would serve to facilitate the process toward Copenhagen and would be used to make a statement to China and other developing countries that the United States, UK, and EU countries were committed to tackling climate change.

Climatico’s Simon Billett asked Miliband whether this talk of “first steps” was anything more than “agreeing to agree?” In response, Miliband stated that while the G20 summit was “essentially an economic summit,” among the G20 participants existed the understanding of the “mainstreaming [of] the green message.” Furthermore, Miliband said that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Russia are more likely to attach importance to renewables despite prior hesitation. “This is a significant step in mainstreaming low carbon development in economic recovery…The notion of low-carbon as a way out of recession has gone from being marginal to being mainstream.”

Miliband went on to say that forestry is a fundamental element in the climate program and will be discussed in Italy at the G8 meeting in July. Billett noted that forestry proved a major topic of conversation within the corridors of the Summit. Furthermore, private discussions between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd regarding the importance of including forestry in a global climate deal adds to the speculation that forestry will be a topic to watch in the months to come.

Despite Miliband’s press conference, the topic of climate change once again became quiet over much of the afternoon. During his speech, French President Nicholas Sarkozy failed to reference any discussion on the topic of the environment. And, despite Miliband’s enthusiasm, UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown only restated that the G20 was committed to meet again later this year to discuss a Post-Kyoto climate deal.

However, U.S. President Barack Obama brought climate change back onto the floor during his press conference late in the day. Obama’s trip to London included several bilateral meetings with the leaders in attendance outside of the context of the G20. In response to a reporter’s question from the Times of India, Obama addressed a bilateral meeting he had with Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Amongst other points of discussion, Obama and Singh touched on the issue of “energy and how important it is for the United States to lead by example in reducing our carbon footprint so that we can help to forge agreements with countries like China and India…for our efforts to control climate change.”

Obama alluded to future discussions on the topic of climate change with China. In addition, he recognized the challenges that lie ahead for the topic amidst the current economic crisis. “In some ways, our…European counterparts have moved more quickly than we have on this issue, but I think even the Europeans have recognized that it’s not easy. It’s even harder during times of economic downturn.” He went on to add, “We’re going to have to combine the low-hanging fruit of energy efficiency with rapid technological advances. And to the extent that in some cases we can get international cooperation and pool our scientific and technical knowledge around things like developing coal sequestration, for example, that can be extremely helpful.”

Obama’s speech wrapped up the events of the day. However, despite a long day of meetings and press conferences at the G20 Summit, action towards green growth remained largely undefined. As to be expected, the world economic crisis was the star of the show and, therefore, plans to repair the global economy held the spotlight. Yet, often this subject turned to the discussion of bank regulation and executive pay rather than outlining plans for green growth. Despite all of this, environmentalists can rest assured that the international dialogue on climate change has begun to move forward. Furthermore, as demonstrated in Obama’s press conference, the United States appears onboard for further discussions and acknowledges its role as a leader and partner in reaching a climate change deal come December. Between Obama’s acknowledgement that the US must lead by example and Miliband’s enthusiasm for momentum, hopefully the G20 will prove a success for environmentalists, after all, by bringing in greater participation, particularly by China and India, at Copenhagen later this year. We shall have to wait and see.