Though companies have money/people and are interested in contributing to the environment, they do not know what/how to do. On the other hand, environmental non-profitable organizations (NPO) have environmental knowledge and know-how to conserve the environment though they do not have money/people. Then, in 2003, Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) began, as Tokyo Greenship Action (TGA), to create both opportunities in which both companies and environmental NPOs can meet and places where both can contribute to the environmental conservation.   

TMG has supplied some of 46 conservation areas in Tokyo for TGA in order to make the natural environment in good condition and enhance environmental awareness. 46 conservation areas have been designated by TMG to preserve the natural areas in Tokyo as precious assets based on the ordinance concerning protection and restoration of the nature in Tokyo.

In TGA, a company (with another company/other companies) makes an agreement with an environmental NPO concerning its roles and then carry out the conservation activity. In the conservation activity, a company/companies are required to pay costs for the activity directly to the environmental NPO. Further, they need to ask their employees and families of employees to participate in the activity and put together them. Basically, each activity is a one-day programme and a company/companies can participate just in one programme.

TMG has annually published a guidebook of TGA for applicants. Currently, 13 areas have been prepared for TGM in the fiscal year 2009. In the guidebook, TMG describes several key issues of the activity in each area such as an environmental NPO in the activity, recommended points, recommended ages and participants, facilities (bathroom), costs and summary of the activity.

The Nobidome Yosui area (Kodaira city) is, for instance, one of the 13 conservation areas. According to the guidebook, an environmental NPO in this activity is Midori Support Hachioji; the recommended point is that participants can directly experience the nature; recommended ages are 6, 7 and above and recommended participants are beginners and families; participants use bathrooms of facilities near the conservation area; the activity costs 250,000 yen; and the activity includes making and putting fences around the area, sanitary cutting and gathering leaves.   

Clearly, TGA has merits. For environmental NPOs, they can be supplied with people and money to conserve the nature. In addition, as far as TGM is concerned, the costs for the environmental conservation can be reduced and all the areas of TGA are the areas that TMG has strong interests in conserving. Finally, for a company/companies, they do not need to choose its environmental activities at random, in other words, using financial/human resources for the ‘right’ activities. Because the activities are officially recognized by TMG, it can be said that a company/companies can have an official guarantee that they are voluntarily engaged in environmentally good things.

However, TGA has demerits too. First, a company/companies often carry out conservation activities in areas which are not closely related to them. For instance, Mitsubishi Corporation, a general trading company, in 2008, participated in the conservation activity in Hachioji city (Oya machi), but its employees do not work in Hachioji city but in Chiyoda ward (Marunouchi), probably it taking more than one hour at least from Marunouchi to Oyamachi. If the areas are not closely related to a company/companies, it seems that they may have weak motivations to continue the activities for a long time. Second, because TGM has not sufficiently tried to let people know the conservation activities of a company/companies, it might be doubtful whether they can sustain motivations to continue the activities for a long time. Indeed, it seems that even most people living near the activity areas do not know these activities. For instance, when the author visited the Nobidome Yosui area in 2008, the author found a woody sign mentioning that Fuji Xerox, Tama, participated in the conservation activity in the area. However, it seemed that the woody sign could not be easily found and no walker that the author talked to (12 walkers) knew the conservation activity of Fuji Xerox, Tama.  

The basic concept of TGA seems excellent and can create a ‘win-win-win’ situation. However, TGA needs to be more refined in order for TGA substantially contributes to the environmental conservation for a long time. For example, TMG should more actively try to let people know the voluntary activities of a company/companies for the environmental conservation. Although the conservation activities in TGA are voluntary, it might be clear that participants can be proud of doing the activities and have motivations to continue the activities for a long time if their environmental efforts are widely known by TMG. Further, as all the conservation activities in TGA that TMG have prepared are those in suburb areas of Tokyo, it might be necessary for TMG to consider environmental activities in central parts of Tokyo in TGA. In addition, if a company/companies seek to carry out the conservation activities in the areas which are not closely related to them, it might be a good idea that they develop relationships in the areas such as performing environmental education in schools by using their own special knowledge and joining and helping festivals in the areas. The close relationships that a company/companies develop may let them to continuously carry out the conservation activities in the areas.

On April 2 2009, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) reported the results of examination of the storm surge flooding and the current defence capacity in the Tokyo Bay coastal area against flood tide at an expert panel on large-scale flood control measures of the central disaster management council. In its report, MLIT set up six scenarios based on objects because storm surge flooding may differ according to strength of typhoon, tide condition and so on. In addition, three of the six scenarios have been prepared to examine the influences of the sea level rise caused by global warming:

1. Case in which a strong typhoon like Typhoon Vera in 1959 (Isewan Typhoon) would attack the Tokyo Bay coastal area and the current shore protection facilities would deal with it in the higher average sea level because of global warming (based on the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007).
2. Case in which a super typhoon like Muroto Typhoon in 1934 would attack the Tokyo Bay coastal area and the current shore protection facilities would deal with it in the higher average sea level because of global warming (based on the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007).
3. Case in which a super typhoon like Muroto Typhoon in 1934 would attack the Tokyo Bay coastal area, and water gates and embankments at the zero-metre area would be damaged by floating things (based on the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in 2007).

In terms of maximum flooded areas, 16,105 hectares would be flooded for the first case; 24,619 hectares for the second case and 27,630 hectares for the third case. Then, concerning the maximum volume of flooded water, it would be 102,645,000 cubic metres for the first case; 265,492,000 cubic metres for the second case and 324,365,000 cubic metres for the third case. The report does not examine how many casualties would be because of these flood disasters. However, it is expected in the worst case that some areas such as some parts of Koto Ward in Tokyo (e.g. the Koto Ward office), Chiba city (e.g. the town hall of Chiba city), Funabashi city (e.g. the town hall of Funabashi city) and Yokohama city (e.g. Yokohama station of Japan Railways) would be flooded by 2 to 5 metres in depth at the maximum. Because these areas are overpopulated (448,325 in Koto Ward, 949,730 in Chiba city, 594,298 in Funabashi city and 3,654,429 in Yokohama city), it might be easily expected that the number of casualties would not be small.

As Japan is surrounded by the sea, ‘how to cope with problems related to sea level rise caused by global warming’ is one of the significant issues in the Japan’s adaptation strategies for global warming. However, it seems that both the Japanese Government and Japanese people have been less concerned about how to adapt to sea level rise and even sea level rise itself partly because it is not perfectly certain that the sea level would rise because of global warming and partly because if it were so it would happen in the future, not now. The world might have been obsessed with the current economic recession and less interested in global warming. Surely, our life and happiness would be important. However, it might be necessary to always consider those of the future generations. The future generations would have to live in and cope with the changed world because of global warming caused by the past and present generations. Thus, it can be suggested that the Government of every nation, especially advanced nations, has to spend money for the economic recovery into adaptation measures, making both generations happier. It is our responsibility.

©WWF, Japan

As explained in a previous article, the Japanese Government has been examining its mid-term goal of greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions (2020) and is going to announce it in June. On 12 February, the committee on the mid-term goal, which has been established under the conference on global warming of the Government and has examined the mid-term goal of GHG reductions, proposed six plans concerning the GHG reductions. According to the six plans, proposed reduction rates range from a 6% increase to a 25% decrease.

Then, on 27 March, the committee disclosed results of economic impact assessment of those plans, which were carried out by several research institutes. The ranges of GHG reduction rates in this analysis became slightly modified to those of a 4% increase to a 25% decrease because the previous trial calculations of the reduction rates in GHG emissions looked at CO2 only, excluding other greenhouse gases that were included in the current trial calculations.

Economic impact assessment was carried out based on an assumption that Japanese GDP would increase annually by 1.3% and analysed economic impact of five plans compared to the other plan of increasing GHG emissions by 4%. According to the results of economic impact assessment, for example, in a case that Japan would reduce GHG emissions by 25%, the cumulative GDP losses by 2020 would be 3.2% to 6.0%; the maximum increase in the annual average unemployment rates would be raised by 1.9%; disposable income per household in 2020 would be pushed down by 220,000 yen to 770,000 yen.

Because the results of economic impact assessment of GHG reduction plans strongly emphasized negative economic effects, if people read them, they might feel threatened not to agree to the great reductions of GHG emissions. Although environmentalists and those who believe in ecological modernization (EM), may argue that strict environmental regulation would have positive economic effects, the committee might underestimate or even neglect positive effects of reducing GHG emissions greatly. Surely, environmentalists and EM believers would not agree to the results of economic impact assessment.

The battle between the industry side and the side of the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) over the mid-term goal of GHG reductions has been recently critically severe. In order to make people to stand by their own side, both of them have shown their results of economic impact assessment and cost estimation of GHG reductions. For instance, the Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), estimated that reducing GHG emissions by 7% by voluntarily introducing most up-to-date energy saving technologies would cost totally approximately 52 trillion yen by 2020. On the contrary, the National Institute for Environmental Studies, under the jurisdiction of MoE, analysed that reducing GHG emissions by 25% would cost annually approximately only 7 trillion yen. According to Sankei Shinbun, this difference was generated by different preconditions between them over costs of introducing energy-saving technologies and diffusion rates of them. Further, several economic associations, including the Economic Association of Japan (Nippon Keidanren), jointly carried out opinion advertising in major newspapers on 17 March. They emphasized that only the small amount of GHG reductions would cost 52 trillion yen for the society as a whole and approximately 1.05 million yen for each household. Regarding this argument, Tetsuo Saito, the Minister for the Environment, criticized that such an argument would be misleading people because it was the opinion of the industry side. World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Japan, also complained that if energy saving technologies were domestically used, it would expand domestic demand.

Although environmentalists and MoE have often criticized negative campaigns of the industry side including METI, it might be unfair if they were not entitled to do so. Because there are millions of uncertainties in economic assessment and cost estimation of GHG reductions, there might be no ‘right’ arguments and a wide range of conflicting opinions/data/analyses should be discussed in public whether they support for GHG reductions or not. Thus, the number of different opinions/data/analyses might be less important.

The more important thing is rather ‘who choose?’. It might be a waste of time and money if the Government did not ask what people want though a number of both public and private organizations/groups/individuals showed their own opinions/data/analyses to people. Choosing a plan for the mid-term goal of GHG reductions is a very important choice for the Japanese future. People should be involved in this important choice process. Because of millions of uncertainties over economic/social/environmental impact of GHG reductions, it might be highly difficult for the Government and Prime Minister to take a responsibility for consequences of the choice. Different opinions/data/analyses should be showed to people by different sides, especially the industry side and the MoE side. Then, examining them, people should choose a plan for the mid-term goal of GHG reductions even though they would choose the worst plan for the environment.

©Sankei Digital INC.

In February, Honda started selling its Insight Hybrid and received 18,000 of orders for one month though its monthly sales target was 5,000, making Insight Hybrid 10^th in the ranking of car sales by model and 18^th in the ranking of car sales; Toyota Prius hybrid was ranked 12^th in the former ranking and 20^th in the latter ranking.

There seem four kinds of main reasons for the success of Honda Insight hybrid.

First, this success of Honda may owe much to its pricing strategies. There are three kinds of prices available for Honda Insight hybrid: 1.89 million yen (Grade G), 2.09 million yen (Grade L) and 2.21 million yen (Grade LS). Though Japanese needed to pay more than 2 million yen to buy hybrid cars, they now need to pay 1.89 million yen for the cheapest one. As prices of Toyota Prius hybrid start at 2,331,000 yen, Honda Insight hybrid is much cheaper. Normally, when new car model is sold, that of middle prices is most sold, but the cheapest one is most sold among these three, indicating the successful pricing strategies of Honda. Takayoshi Ito, an executive director of Honda, said, ‘Honda is good at producing highly efficient and environmentally friendly cars at affordable prices like Honda Insight hybrid’.

The second reason may be its high efficiency. Experiencing the rapid increase in global fuel prices in 2008 as well as the increasing awareness about the environment, Japanese became more concerned about hybrid cars. According to Kaoru Iguch, a chief of the sales development office in the sales control department of Honda, ‘although prices of gasoline have halved compared to their peak in the last year, the public have been still worried about the increase in its prices in the future and as a result highly interested in hybrid cars’.

Thirdly, many Japanese may want to buy Honda Insight hybrid because it is ‘stylish’. According to Nikkei bp, the top reason of buying Honda Insight hybrid is its appearances and body style. Its straight line from front to rear and its virile front mask mostly attracted many of those who have bought it. People may not be willing to purchase hybrid car if it is not fun. Hybrid car may need to be entertaining.

Finally, related to the first reason, tax reduction for ‘eco car’ may have pushed Japanese to purchase Honda Insight hybrid. Because tax reduction for eco car is to be introduced from this April, owner of eco car can receive 100%, 75% or 50% of reduction for automobile acquisition tax and Automobile weight tax for the next three years from this April. These two kinds of taxes for Honda Insight hybrid as well as Toyota Prius hybrid and Nissan X-Trail (20GT) will be fully exempted, which will be equivalent to 108,500 yen for Honda Insight Hybrid, 122,000 yen for Toyota Prius hybrid and 178,400 yen for Nissan X-Trail (20GT).

Although there can be other reasons, these may be the main reasons for the success of Honda Insight hybrid. Namely, people would not purchase hybrid cars only because they are environmentally friendly. Hybrid cars need to be inexpensive and stylish as well as highly fuel efficient and environmentally friendly if they want to be popular among people. Honda Insight hybrid has been amazingly sold because it is sold at affordable prices; many people are highly concerned about fuel efficiency and the environment; many people think it is stylish; and the Government encourages purchasing hybrid cars by introducing tax reduction measures for ‘eco-car’.

Selling ‘eco products’ may not be so simple and easy even though they are highly environmentally friendly because consumers are selfish or wagamama in Japanese. Eco products may need to be satisfying wagamama consumers and be sold at affordable prices as well as environmentally friendly. If they failed to do so, consumers could not maximize their utility by purchasing them and such products would not become popular among them. Eco-products may become popular among people only when they could satisfy demand of wagamama consumers, which may enrich our lives without sacrificing the environment. Surely, the Government must play a significant role in the success of eco-products through, for instance, tax reduction for them and environmental education. Honda Insight hybrid may indicate the hint of the eco products’ success.

©Mainichi Shinbun

Japan had the abnormally warm winter this year possibly because of global warming. According to Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), average temperatures in Japan were higher in this winter (December to February) than other years and the eastern part of Japan recorded the second highest average temperatures and the northern part recorded the third highest since 1946. Further, daylight hours on the Japan sea side of the eastern part was longest after the second world war, and the volume of snow falling was the second lowest on the Japan sea side of the northern part and the third lowest on the same side of the eastern part since 1961.

For environmentalists or possibly those who are concerned about global warming, this is a bad news. However, the thing is not so simple. Because of the warm winter, some people were happy while others were unhappy. By searching the word, Danto (warm winter), in Google (news), some Japanese were unhappy but others were happy because of Danto. Let me cite two examples.

First, as the volume of snow falling was surprisingly low and warmer weather continued in February, preventing road surface from icing, six local governments of the Suwa area in Nagano could reduce their expenses in snow clearing. Those governments welcomed the small amount of snow falling, saying ‘it is appreciated that we could reduce expenses for snow clearing’ because of their serious fiscal situation. In this February, the Suwa municipal government spent 700,000 yen for snow clearing though its spending was 5.30 million yen in February of last year. In contrast construction companies in Suwa city which contracted snow clearing works complained that they lost most of their works in this winter. According to one construction company, it annually received almost 3 to 4 million yen in the winter season from clearing snows but the amount of money it earned in this winter became a third.

Second, in Tokai area, while ski resorts lost many visitors as they ran short of snow, Higashiyama zoological park in Nagoya, AIchi and Lake Biwa in Shiga had more visitors. Higashiyama zoological park increased visitors by 45,000 compared to those of February of last year. In addition, though yacht schools in Lake Biwa had almost no customers in winter seasons, they had many customers in this winter and many visitors at Lake Biwa enjoyed yachting and wind surfing.

Though it may not be surprising, this abnormally warm winter seems favourable for some people. Clearly, most Japanese might not like the severely cold winter; in Tokyo, perhaps you could often hear people not ‘criticising’ but ‘appraising’ the warm winter. Further, some people seriously desire warmer winter and welcome global warming. Because winter in the northern part of Japan such as Hokkaido is normally very severe, it may be understandable that they hope so. Recognising abnormalities in weather seem thus insufficient to unite people to combat global warming. In order to do so, the Japanese Government must make more efforts to make people understand the necessity to combat global warming even though some of them may no longer enjoy warm winter. Currently, Japanese climate policy has less focused on making people having sufficient understandings of global warming, namely environmental education, and the Government has sought to carry out climate policy without sufficient public understandings of global warming. However, the cooperation and support of people in climate policy and sufficient understandings of global warming and climate policy may be essential in order to unite people to combat global warming and without them the Japanese Government may find difficulties in tackling global warming effectively in the near future.

©Japan Wind Consultant Corporation

On 29 September, in the Prime Minister’s general policy speech, Prime Minister Taro Asa said, ‘environmental and energy technology, in which Japan has its strength, has power to create new demand and jobs’. Then, on 6 January, the Minister of the Environment, Tetsuo Saito, proposed the creation of Green Economy and Social Change (Midori no keizai to shakai no henkaku), a framework for Japanese Green New Deal (JGND), which aims at simultaneous achievement of economic recovery/job creation and solution of environmental problems through environmental measures. Concretely, it seeks to create jobs through promotion of the development of the environment-related industry and simultaneously control CO2 emissions by encouraging investment into development and spread of energy-saving technologies and products. Further, it seeks to expand its market from 70 trillion to 100 trillion yen and create more than 80 thousand jobs. MoE said that it would form a concrete plan in cooperation with other ministries and by receiving ideas from experts and the public.

Then, on 1 March, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) has constructed a framework for JGND. The framework proposes to create jobs and boost the economy through social capital development, consumption promotion and investment encouragement. For instance, the framework suggests that solar energy panels will be installed on public facilities, schools and government buildings. Further, it proposes that fixed price purchase system will be introduced which obligates electric power companies to purchase electricity generated by solar power, leading to decrease in costs of solar energy and the rapid spread of solar energy in the private sector. MoE will work out details of JGND and then draw up its final draft within March.

As JGND seeks to shape the future Japanese economy and the society (FJES), the Government should display its clear vision of FJES and the success of JGND may depend on the wider social consensus on how FJES should be. However, the Government seemingly has failed to display it so far and there has been no wider social consensus on FJES. Major opposition parties also have failed to display their own vision of FJES. Thus, the insufficient degree of discussion among the society has been done.

Indeed, even within the Government, there has not been a clear vision or consensus of FJES. Indeed, when the Minister of the Environment Saito submitted the MoE’s policy proposal to the Prime Minister Aso on 6 January 2009, Aso told him ‘it became shabby because it was examined only within MoE’ and rejected it and ordered him to cooperate with other ministries. Though MoE examined the ideas about JGND provided by the public, experts and local government leaders, it seems that MoE has not (or has been unable to) sufficiently and effectively discussed it with other ministries. According to the senior official of the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), which is an affiliated agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), ‘regarding JGND, MoE has told nothing to ANRE and we do not need to tell MoE anything about it.’ Contrarily, on 13 January, ANRE established a new apartment for new energy society system which aims at job creation and realisation of new energy and energy-savings measures in cooperation with other ministries. Because METI and ANRE have strong connections with industry and deal with economic issues and policies, JGND of MoE must be hardly successful unless they are closely involved into its decision-making process. In addition, although JGND must be highly significant for the Japan’s future, the public may be less familiar with JGND. Thus, MoE needs to try harder to let JGND well known and create a wide range of opportunities for public participation.

JGND must be a grand idea. However, unlike ‘ordinary’ economic or environmental policy, if Japan took the wrong direction, Japan would no longer be a leading country in political, economic and environmental respects. As MoE could not take the responsibility for such consequence, JGND must be carefully and sufficiently discussed by all components of the society, because the Japanese society as a whole needs to take the responsibility.

According to the analysis of the Ministry of the Environment (MoE), it was estimated that Japan could reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 50 million tons (CO2 equivalent), which is equivalent to a 4% reduction compared to the 1990 base year.

Although GHG emissions increased by 8.7% (provisional) in the fiscal year 2007, MoE estimated that it would decrease by 1.4% in the third quarter of the fiscal year 2008 and approximately by 2.8% in the fourth quarter, leading to a 4 percent decrease in the fiscal year 2008. This unexpected great reduction of GHG emissions is due to the economic recession and resulting low economic activity in Japan.

Temporarily, this reduction seems beautiful. However, examined from the long-term viewpoint, it may not be so admirable because ‘economic recession’ and ‘temporary environmental improvements’ can become an unbeatable excuse of industry to avoid strict environmental policy. Though Japan’s economy contracted at an annualised 12.7 per cent in real terms in the third quarter of the fiscal year 2008, this was the SECOND worst after the Second World War. The worst occurred in the fourth quarter of the fiscal year 1974, influenced by the first oil crisis. At that time, its economy contracted at an annualised 13.1 per cent in real terms.

In the early 1970s, until the economic recession happened, Japanese environmental policy remarkably developed in response to four deadly pollution-related diseases including Minamata disease, Itai-itai disease, Yotsukaichi asthma, and Niigata Minamata disease, a wide range of serious pollution all over Japan and resulting strong public demand for pollution prevention. For instance, the ‘Pollution Diet’ was held in 1970, in which existing environmental regulations were modified or reinforced and new environmental regulations were also established. Further, in 1971, the Environmental Agency (EA) was created for integrated environmental administration so that environmental policy would be systematically planned and administered. Though Japanese industry often sought to interrupt establishment of strict environmental policies, it had to stand and deal with them in the early 1970s because of strong power of EA originated from great public support for pollution prevention.

However, after the economic recession, Japanese industry with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), started a counterattack on EA by using ‘economic recession’ and ‘temporary environmental improvements’ as an excuse. In the mid-1970s, the air quality did improve because of low economic activity though environmental policies enforced in the early 1970s contributed to it. For instance, emissions of Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) increased every year and almost by 5% on average in the 1971 to 1973 fiscal years, it decreased by 9% in the fiscal year 1974 compared to its level in the fiscal year 1973. Consequently, Japanese industry succeeded in making the national ambient air quality standard for NOx eased (from 0.02ppm for a daily mean to 0.04ppm to 0.06ppm) in 1978. The relaxation of the ambient air quality standard was a must issue for some Japanese industries, such as the auto industry and the steal industry, because emission standards for both cars and factories were to be reinforced until the national ambient air quality standard was achieved.

While the national ambient air quality standard for NOx was the main target in the previous serious economic recession, what would be the main target for Japanese industry in the current economic recession? The target might be the mid-term goal of GHG reductions by 2010 because Japanese industry would have to suffer severe burdens unless the mid-term goal would be less strict. Actually, as discussed before, Japanese industry has strongly and actively sought to make the mid-term target less strict and nearly succeeded in making so.

Will history repeat itself?

Ene Farm

On 28 January, six companies, including Astomos Energy Corp., Osaka Gas Co., Seibu Gas Co., Tokyo Gas Co., Nippon Oil Corp., and Toho Gas Co., made a joint-statement that they were going to sell their home-use fuel cell system, ‘Ene Farm’, from this April.

Ene Farm is a coined word that consists of energy and farm. Because generating both electricity and heat from hydrogen and oxygen is like producing agricultural products from water and earth, they created it as a brand name.

Ene Farm generates power through chemical reactions between hydrogen, from city gas, liquefied petroleum gas (LP gas) and paraffin oil, and oxygen in the atmosphere, and waste heat from the power generation heats waters, which can be used in hot water supply and floor heating.

Merits

1. CO2 reduction by 45%

For 1 kWh of energy generation and 1.4 kWh of heat collection, 1,016g of CO2 is created when energy is generated by thermal power generation and existing general water heaters. But, by using Ene Farm, only 555g of CO2 is created.

2. Reduction of primary energy consumption by 33%

For 1 kWh of energy generation and 1.4 kWh of heat collection, 16.2 MJ of primary energy consumption is necessary by thermal power generation and existing general water heaters, while 10.9 MJ is necessary by using Ene Farm.

3. Saving money

Because Ene Farm can cover sixty percent (at maximum) of electricity used by a standard family or a family of four, light and heat cost can be cut by 50,000 yen to 60,000 yen per year.

Shunichi Eguchi, a manager of the planning and promotion group of the Japan Gas Association, said ‘Fuel cell is a trump card for controlling both household CO2 emissions and energy consumption. The maximum merit is that you can save energy without giving up a convenient life.’

Obstacle

One obstacle for households to use Ene Farm is its prices. Prices of Ene Farm will range from 3,200,000 yen to 3,465,000 yen. Although households can have government subsidies of up to 1,400,000 yen per unit, Ene Farm may be still too costly for households.

Eco Cute

Another obstacle for Ene Farm must be its strong potential rival, Eco Cute. While four gas firms and two petroleum firms seek to diffuse Ene Farm, electric power companies such as Tokyo Electric Power Co., Kansai Electric Power Co., Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Tohoku Electric Power Co., Chubu Electric Power Co., Chugoku Electric Power Co., Kyushu Electric Power Co., and Okinawa Electric Power Co., seek to diffuse Eco Cute.?In Eco Cute, cute has double meanings, charming and hot water supply as hot water supply in Japanese is Kyuto.

Eco Cute is an electric heat pump water heater using natural refrigerant (CO2). Because it is a heat pump system that collects ambient heat in the air to supply hot water, it does not burn fuel, leading to no release of CO2 where it is used, according to Hiroshi kato (Chairman, the Heat Pump & Thermal Storage Technology Center of Japan).

Although Eco Cute cannot generate electricity and CO2 reduction by Eco Cute is approximately a half of CO2 reduction that can be achieved by Ene Farm. its market prices are 500,000 yen to 700,000 yen. Further, because of expansion of all-electric residences promoted by electric power firms, cumulative Eco Cute sales have already reached 1.5 million.

Thus, it should be very hard for Ene Farm to win in this battle concerning this situation. If Ene Farm wants to win, its prices should go down. As Tadashi Kimura of New Energy Foundation points out, ‘price reduction by technological development and mass production effect is inevitable for Ene Farm to be widely introduced into ‘normal’ family. Though firms on the side of Ene Farm aim to reduce its prices to 500, 000 yen by 2015, price reduction may be necessary as soon as possible before Eco Cute conquers Japan.

On 12 February, the committee on the mid-term goal (Chuki mokuhyo kento iinkai; Chairman: Toshihiko Fukui, former Governor of the Bank of Japan), which has been established under the conference on global warming of the Government (Chikyu ondanka mondai ni kansuru kondankai; Chairman: Hiroshi Okuda, Corporate advisor of Toyota) and has examined the mid-term goal of greenhouse gas (GHG) reductions, submitted its interim report to the conference.

The interim report suggested SIX plans concerning the GHG reductions by 2020.

Among six plans, three plans were proposed for the case in which industrialized nations are required to reduce GHG emissions by 25% compared to the year 1990 based on the requirements of the IPCC fourth Assessment Report though it requires them to reduce emissions by 25% to 40%.

• First Plan:

The costs in reducing GHG emissions should be as equal as those in other industrialized nations.

• Second Plan:
  

The costs per GDP should be as equal as those in other industrialized nations.

• Third Plan:

Japan should reduce GHG emissions by 25% as equally as other industrialized nations.

The rest of the six plans include:

• Fourth Plan:

Japan should reduce GHG emissions by the extension of current technologies.

• Fifth Plan:

Japan should spend almost the same amount of money in reducing GHG emissions as those in the EU and the US.

• Sixth Plan:

Japan should introduce most advanced technologies for the reduction of GHG emissions not by

compulsory measures but by voluntary efforts.

According to the trial calculations of the reduction rates in GHG emissions compared to its levels in 1990 for each plan, GHG emissions of Japan will

(Plan1) decrease by 1% to 12%

(Plan2) decrease by 16% to 17%

(Plan3) decrease by 25%

(Plan4) increase by 6%

(Plan5) increase by 0% to 7% if Japan spends the same amount of money as the EU; increase by –2% to 7% if Japan spends the same amount of money as the US

(Plan6) decrease by 4%

Then, which plan will Japan choose?

Undoubtedly, it will not be acceptable for the rest of the world that Japan will increase its GHG emissions. However, Japan surprisingly has such an option. This reflects a strong frustration of the Japanese industrial world in the current unequal burdens of costs in reducing GHG emissions among industrialized nations.

According to Economic Association of Japan (EAJ: Nihon keidanren), in order to reduce GHG emissions by 25% compared to its levels in 1990, in Japan, where energy-saving is highly advanced, reducing 1 ton of CO2 requires almost 400 dollars though it requires almost 143 dollars for the US and almost 128 dollars for the EU. EAJ argues that it would demand the equality in cost burdens among nations because if the equality is not secured, Japanese people will be forced to suffer excessive burdens in reducing GHG emissions and the international competitiveness will weaken and overseas production transfer will occur.

Along the same line, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has demanded the equality in the cost burdnes among nations and insisted that the mid-term goal should not pose excessive burdens on the Japanese industrial world. For instance, Vice-Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Harufumi Mochizuki emphasized ‘it is a basic principle to make the best selection in consideration of the comparability between the economy and the environment.

Contrarily, the Ministry of the Environment has sought for the mid-term goal that is as strict as possible. Indeed, Minister of the Environment Tetsuo Saito insisted on reducing GHG emissions by 25% to 40% saying ‘although the government has not reached its consensus, the reduction of GHG emissions by 25% to 40% is the only one option that Japan should choose.’

These two conflicting lines exist in the debates on the mid-term goal in the committee too and the committee consequently had to propose SIX plans including both ‘increase’ and ‘decrease’ options. Because the conflicts between these two lines cannot be easily solved, Japan will not announce its mid-term goal soon although the world has been waiting for its early decision. Further, considering the strong frustration in unequal cost burdens and the opposition of the industrial world in setting strict mid-term goal, the final choice of Japan will not be the strictest plan.

However, it cannot be expected that Japan will choose an ‘increase’ plan because the government and even the industrial world understand that such an option will not be acceptable for the rest of the world and Japan will loose power in the international debates on the global climate change.

Thus, the choice Japan will make may be a ‘moderate reduction’ plan, which is not impressive but acceptable for the rest of the world. Surely, if Prime Minister Taro Aso is determined to dramatically reduce GHG emissions of Japan by exercising his strong leadership, it may be still possible for Japan to choose the strictest plan. However, Aso has recently often emphasized ‘the mid-term goal should be internationally acceptable but should be feasible at the same time.’ Clearly, Aso seeks for a ‘moderate reduction’ plan. Although Japan will announce its mid-term goal by June, the reduction rates will be 25% at best and possibly less than 25%.